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ERISA: Reformulating the Federal
Common Law For Plan Interpretation
GEORGE LEE FLINT, JR.*
This Article develops a standard tojudge the correctness of the
ERISA federal common law rules. That standard requires the
protection ofparticipants' reasonable expectations. Using the plan
interpretation rule as an example, the Article shows the present
court rules fail the standard and then develops the proper plan
interpretation rule.
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA)' became law, participants2 denied benefits from private
employee benefit plans used state contract law and, to a lesser extent,
* Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas;
B.A., 1966, B.S., 1966, M.A., 1968, University of Texas at Austin; Nuc. E., 1969,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Ph.D. (Physics), 1973; J.D., 1975, University of
Texas at Austin.
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.). For a general introduction to ERISA, see RONALD
J. COOKE, ERISA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1993); HENRY H. PERRiTr, EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS: CLAIMS LAW AND PRACTICE (1990).
For a brief discussion of the structure and regulation of employee benefit plans, see
George L. Flint, Jr., ENSA: Jury Trial Mandated for Benefit Claims Actions, 25 LoY.
L.A. L. REv. 361, 362-71 (1992).
2. As used in this Article, the word "participant" includes beneficiaries, if
applicable.
state trust law to recover their benefits in the courts.' However, these
"pre-ERISA" participants faced several jurisdictional and procedural
hindrances. The jurisdictional obstacles concerned such matters as legal
rules requiring service on all trustees The procedural obstacles varied
depending on the recovery theory used.
Under state contract law, litigants developed four recovery theories.
Under contract law's gratuity theory, courts treated the employer's
promise to pay benefits as a future gift. The promise was unenforceable
until the gift was actually made,6 effectively providing a block to the
participant's recovery. Consequently, many plans had provisions stating
3. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112 (1989)
(describing pre-ERISA law as contractual); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell,
473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985) (ERISA to protect contractually-defined benefits); see also
David Ziskind, The Law of Employee Benefit Plans, 1955 WASH. U. L.Q. 112, 117-25
(explaining that participants used contract law to recover denied benefits and used trust
law supplementally to prevent mishandling of funds before participants had rights to
draw on those funds); Note, Pension Plans and the Rights of the Retired Worker, 70
COLUM. L. REv. 909, 916-24 (1970) (same); cf. W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Rights and
liabilities as between employer and employee with respect to general pension or
retirement plan, 42 A.L.R.2d 461, 467-72 (1955) (using both contract and trust law to
recover denied benefits).
4. See, e.g., Planten v. Lester B. Knight & Assoc., Inc., 198 N.Y.S.2d 902, 903-
04 (Sup. Ct. 1960); see also 3 SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR
& PUBLIC WELFARE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESs., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE
RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, P.L. 93-406 274 (Comm. Print 1976)
[hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (Sen. Javits's introduction of bill: "[I]n view of the
problems of service of process and jurisdiction involved in maintaining individual suits
against funds or their administrators, I have great reservations about [a proposed $10,000
amount in controversy for federal jurisdiction].").
5. For one interpretation of the history of pre-ERISA cases using the contractual
approach, see Jay Conison, Foundations of the Common Law of Plans, 41 DEPAUL L.
REV. 575, 589-617 (1992) (history reveals the failure of contract law to handle the
subject). Traditional histories record a development from a gratuity theory to a unilateral
contract theory. Robert D. Wieck, Comment, The Pension Reform Act of 1974: An
Alternative to Contractual Theories of Preserving Retirement Benefits, 14 J. FAM. L. 97,
102-14 (1975); Timothy J. Heinsz, Note, A Reappraisal of the Private Pension System,
57 CORNELL L. REV. 278, 282-85 (1972); Note, supra note 3, at 916-21; Comment,
Consideration for the Employer's Promise of a Voluntary Pension Plan, 23 U. CHI. L.
REV. 96, 97-103 (1955); Note, Legal Status of Private Industrial Pension Plans, 53
HARV. L. REV. 1375, 1377-79 (1940). A better interpretation is the gradual recognition
of a negotiations imbalance between employer and employees that required legislative
intervention. See infra-notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
6. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 406 illus. 4, § 414 cmt. a (1932).
A gift of personal property ordinarily is the realm of property law; however, future
promises to make gifts are encompassed in the subject of contracts. See, e.g., 2
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMmENTARIEs 441-42 (1st Amer. ed. reprint 1967) ("A true
and proper gift or grant is always accompanied with delivery of possession and takes
effect immediately .... But if the gift does not take effect by delivery of immediate
possession, it is then not properly a gift, but a contract: and this a man cannot be
compelled to perform .... ).
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that the participant acquired no enforceable contractual rights under the
plan.7
Second, under the bilateral contract theory, the participant's continued
employment constituted consideration for the employer's promise to pay
the benefit. The drawback to the bilateral contract theory was that, until
ERISA, the employer could place sufficient conditions in the plan to
defeat enforcement of the resulting contract! The participant had no
rights until he satisfied all conditions, including age and service.9
Third, under the unilateral contract theory, the participant's benefit
constituted deferred compensation, retention of which would result in
unjust enrichment of the employer. The drawback to the unilateral
contract theory was that, until ERISA, the employer could place
sufficient conditions in the plan 0 to divest the participant of his
deferred compensation."
Fourth, under the estoppel theory, the court held that the participant's
right to a plan benefit arose because of his reliance on the promise of
benefits in continuing his work with that employer. Unfortunately, this
too seldom led to recovery of the benefit because reliance must be
reasonable. 2 Employers frequently made statements which destroyed
reasonable reliance.'
3
In addition to the four contract theories, state trust law provided
litigants with another legal framework for recovery. Under state trust
law, when an employer established a benefit plan, a trust was created for
the participants. Unfortunately, some employers did not pay into trusts
until the Taft-Hartley Act (LMRA)'4 required employers to fund multi-
7. See, e.g., Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 1944) (Missouri
law); Fickling v. Pollard, 179 S.E. 582, 583 (Ga. Ct. App. 1935).
8. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 270 (1932).
9. See, e.g., Wallace v. Northern Ohio Traction & Light Co., 13 N.E.2d 139, 143
(Ohio Ct. App. 1937); David v. Veitscher Magnesitwerke Actien Gesellschaft, 35 A.2d
346, 349 (Pa. 1944).
10. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 53 cmt. a (1932).
11. See, e.g., Hurd v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 136 F. Supp. 125, 134 (N.D. Ill. 1955)
(Illinois law), aff'd, 234 F.2d 942 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 918 (1956).
12. See RESTATEMENT OF CoNTerCs § 90 (1932).
13. See, e.g., Hughes v. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 117 N.E.2d 880, 882-83 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1954) (cert. denied).
14. Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 141-187 (1988)).
employer plans.'" Since there was no trust res, 16 participants failed
to recover benefits under a trust theory.17  As a result, many courts
adopting the trust approach followed the passage of the LMERA.
By passing ERISA, Congress attempted to change this unfavorable
legal climate for participants. Congress intended to afford participants
denied benefits the full range of legal and equitable remedies to obtain
their promised benefit. The House Education and Labor Committee,
considering the purposes of ERISA, expressed that intent:
The enforcement provisions [of ERISA] have been designed specifically to
provide ... participants and beneficiaries with broad remedies for redressing
or preventing violations of [ERISA] .... The intent of the Committee is to
provide the full range of legal and equitable remedies available in both state
and federal courts and to remove jurisdictional and procedural obstacles which
in the past appear to have hampered effective enforcement of fiduciary
responsibilities under state law or recovery of benefits due to participants.' 8
This intent appeared in ERISA's statement of congressional findings:
"[O]wing to the lack of ... adequate safeguards concerning their
operation, it is desirable in the interests of employees and their
beneficiaries ... that safeguards be provided with respect to the
establishment, operation, and administration of such plans .... ."" This
intent can also be found in ERISA's declaration of policy: "It is hereby
declared to be the policy of [ERISA] to protect ... the interests of
participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by ...
15. See Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C.
§ 186(c)(5) (1988).
16. See REsTATEmENT oF TRUSTS § 75 (1935).
17. See, e.g., Lewis v. Jackson & Squire, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 354, 359-60 (W.D. Ark.
1949) (Ark. law), appeal dismissed, 181 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1950); Geams v.
Commercial Cable Co., 42 N.Y.S.2d 81, 82-83 (N.Y. App. Div. 1943), affyd, 56 N.E.2d
67 (N.Y. 1944).
18. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1973), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4655 (emphasis added); S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35
(1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4871 (same, but considering different
language); see 120 CONG. REc. 29,196 (1976), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 4, at 4665 (Statement of Rep. John Dent that initially there was only one
ERISA aim and "that was to give to a pension participant his entitlements under the
contract of the pension plan he belonged to."); see also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114 (1989) (refusing to interpret ERISA to provide less protection
for participants than before ERISA); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473
U.S. 134, 148 (1985) (ERISA is to protect contractually defined benefits); George L.
Flint, Jr., ERISA: Extracontractual Damages Mandated for Benefit Claims Actions, 36
AIz. L. REv. 611,621, 643-47 (1994) (correcting an erroneous interpretation of S. REP.
No. 127, supra, appearing in Russell, 473 U.S. at 146).
19. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a)
(1988).
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providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the
Federal courts. 20
To achieve these fundamental policies, Congress engaged in a three-
step process. First, Congress eliminated the participant's state law
hindrances with an ERISA preemption provision, uprooting all state law
relating to employee benefit plans.21 Second, Congress replaced state
law with standards for vested benefit preservation, funding adequacy,
investment security, and fiduciary conduct required of all employee
benefit plans.' Third, Congress made federal causes of action and
remedies available to participants in either federal or state court.
23
A. Creation of the Problem
Unfortunately, lawyers representing plan administrators have seriously
undermined congressional intent by misapplying the doctrine of federal
common law.24 There are at least two ways to explain the improper
development of federal common law pertaining to ERISA. First, the
fundamental nature of the American adversary system led to the
undermining of congressional intent. Lawyers representing plan
administrators-which include in-house counsel of insurance compa-
nies-had more time and money to devote to a particular lawsuit
formulating the initial federal common law rule than lawyers represent-
ing deprived participants." Second, an incompetent federal judiciary
failed to follow legislative intent. Federal judges did not know the
principles of developing federal common law, were politically opposed
20. Id. § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
21. Id. § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
22. H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 18, at 5-8, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
4643-46. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 §§ 201-211, 301-306,
401414, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061, 1081-1086, 1101-1114 (1988).
23. See Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 502(a), (e), 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a), (e) (1988) (participants may bring civil actions against employers and
fiduciaries in various situations in federal court; the benefits-due lawsuit may also be
brought in state court).
24. See infra notes 50-115 and accompanying text for the federal common law
doctrine; infra notes 27-33 and accompanying text for the cases adopting rules which
have undermined congressional intent.
25. See William K. Carr & Robert L. Liebross, Wrongs Without Rights: The Need
for a Strong Federal Common Law ofERISA, 4 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 221,225 (1993)
(suggesting ignorance of ERISA and the role of federal common law by employees'
attorneys).
to making decisions favoring employees over employers, or were more
concerned with decreasing their caseloads with quick, unreasoned
summary judgment opinions than rendering justice.2 6
By 1986, the misapplication of federal common law by federal courts
led to the adoption of a number of substantive legal rules regulating
ERISA. These rules thwart recovery by many-perhaps deserv-
ing-participants. The following is a list of rules, among others,27 that
are extremely detrimental to litigating participants denied benefits:
(1) courts review the plan administrator's benefit-denial decision with the
arbitrary and capricious standard-a standard which only requires the use of one
of many logical reasons and some minimal documentation to confirm the
administrator's decision;28
(2) courts accept the plan administrator's interpretation of ambiguous ERISA
plan terms;2
(3) participants may not have a jury trial under ERISA;30
(4) only the written terms of the plan, and not estoppel doctrines, define the
employee's reasonable expectations;
31
26. See id. at 222-23; see also Burnham v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 873 F.2d 486,
487 (1st Cir. 1989) (sympathetic but refusing to provide benefit under strict construction
for one who had substantially fulfilled the condition); Carr & Liebross, supra note 25,
at 222 (suggesting federal courts are hostile to statutes favoring workers); Catherine L.
Fisk, Lochner Redux: The Renaissance of Laissez-Faire Contract in the Federal
Common Law of Employee Benefits, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 153, 159-60 (1995) (claiming the
problem is the adoption of an outdated contract model rather than modem contract law).
27. Other rules, which may also be detrimental to participants, include: (1)
exhaustion of remedies, e.g., Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 566-68 (9th Cir. 1980),
(2) waiver of conditions, e.g., Pitts v. American See. Life Ins. Co., 931 F.2d 351, 357
(5th Cir. 1991), (3) substantial compliance, e.g., Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Adams,
30 F.3d 554, 562-65 (4th Cir. 1994), and (4) period of limitations, e.g., Jenkins v. Local
705 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 713 F.2d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1983); see also Jim Greiner,
Comment, Federal Common Law and Gaps in Federal Statutes: The Case of ERISA
Plan Limitation Periods for Section 502(a) (1) (B) Actions, 93 MICH. L. Rav. 382 (1994).
28. E.g., Bueneman v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 572 F.2d
1208 (8th Cir. 1978); contra George L. Flint, Jr., ERISA: The Arbitrary and Capricious
Rule Under Siege, 39 CATH. U. L. REv. 133, 167-79 (1990) (providing the correct
ERISA position, which in a few rare instances becomes the arbitrary and capricious
standard). See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text for the proper review standard.
29. Smith v. California Metal Trades Assoc.-Int'l Ass'n of Machinists Pension
Trust, 654 F.2d 650, 655 (9th Cir. 1981). See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text
for the proper interpretation rule.
30. E.g., Wardle v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820
(7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981); contra Flint, supra note 1, at 383-
87, 399-417 (explaining the error of the Wardle decision and setting forth the proper
ERISA position). See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text for the proper jury rule.
31. E.g., Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 959-60 (11th Cir. 1986). Contra
Kimberly Kralowec, Estoppel Claims Against ERISA Employee Benefit Plans, 25 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 487 (1992) (arguing for estoppel enforcement through federal common
law). See infra notes 48-49 and the accompanying text for the proper estoppel rule.
960
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(5) participants may not recover extracontractual damages under ERISA;
31
and
(6) successful participants may not recover legal fees except in rare
instances.
These substantive legal rules create a situation in which plan
administrators need not pay out benefits as provided in ERISA and as
intended by Congress. Instead, administrators can find some logical
reason to deny paying benefits, make the decision not to pay, and await
a lawsuit. Of course, the lawsuit might not be filed because the
participant may die. If the lawsuit is filed, the action might settle for
considerably less than the benefit specified in the plan documents
because of the threat posed by the above six detrimental rules. If the
lawsuit goes to trial, the odds favor a court affirming the plan
administrator's decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard of
review. If the arbitrary and capricious standard is not sufficient to
support the plan administrator's decision, the favorable interpretation
rule, the absence of a jury, and the anti-estoppel rule favor a court
finding in favor of the plan administrator. Finally, if a court does rule
in favor of the participant, the absence of recovery for extracontractual
damages and attorney fees will limit recovery to the original amount
specified in the plan documents.
Under these new court-adopted ERISA rules, there is no incentive to
pay benefits, leading to a result contrary to congressional intent.
Testimony before both houses of Congress has revealed the callousness
of ERISA insurance companies with respect to payment of rightfully-due
benefits. Participants before the Senate bemoaned:
[Trhe insurance company]'s actions were motivated by money alone and "The
insurance company] would be better off if Devon died." . . . Why pay claims
32. E.g., Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985)
(dicta for the benefits-due lawsuit). Contra Flint, Jr., supra note 18, at 634-65
(explaining the error of the Russell decision and setting forth the proper ERISA
position). See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text for the proper extracontractual
damages rule.
33. E.g., Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 465 (10th Cir. 1978); contra Ann Bertino,
The Need for a Mandatory Award of Attorney's Fees for Prevailing Plaintiffs in ERISA
Benefit Claims, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 871, 899-905 (1992). See infra notes 48-49 and
accompanying text for the proper attorney fee rule.
in a timely fashion or at all, when at worst that failure or delay will result in
merely having to pay what the policy offered to begin with?'
Insurance regulators before the House bewailed: "Since 1987, insurers
have had a virtual incentive not to act in good faith, as their exposure
for delaying, compromising, or refusing outright legitimate claims has
been limited to the contractual amounts they owed in the first place."3
The House Committee on Education and Labor found:
[L]ittle financial downside exists for an insurance company that routinely delays
payments or refuses to pay large claims.... [E]ven if a suit is brought and the
court finds that the insurance company has behaved in the most egregious and
outrageous way, the worst that could happen to the insurance company is that
it would be forced to pay the claim it should have paid in the first place. 6
Finally, these new court-adopted ERISA rules are antithetical to or
incompatible with legal theories traditionally used to curb egregious
behavior by plan administrators, such as evading the payment of benefits
altogether3 7 or punishing employees. 38 In particular, these rules may
34. The ERISA Preemption Amendments of 1991: Hearings on S. 794 Before the
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
93 (1991) (statement of Cindy and Devon Ferguson).
35. Bills Relating to ERISA 's Preemption of Certain State Laws: Hearings on H.R.
1602 and H.R. 2782 Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House
Comm. on Education on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1991) (statement of Masako Dolan,
Deputy Comm'r, Cal. Dep't of Ins.).
36. H.R. REP. No. 1023, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24 (1992) (recommending
passage of the Health Insurance Fairness Act of 1992, H.R. 1602 as amended).
37. In the welfare plan situation, for example, a participant had a kidney stone,
checked with the plan administrator under his medical reimbursement plan, and was
informed that the treatment for this disease was covered. See Rodrigue v. Western and
S. Life Ins. Co., 948 F.2d 969, 970 (5th Cir. 1991). The participant, led to believe he
had a benefit, had the treatment and afterwards the plan administrator refused to pay the
hospital bill, confessing a mistake since the treatment was not covered due to an
exclusion for ailments of the genitourinary system. Id. The participant, unable to pay
the bill, suffered loss of his credit rating and other savings not exempt from levy. Id,
38. In the pension plan situation, for example, a bank vice-president changed bank
employers, taking some of his borrowing clients with him to the new employer. See
Denton v. First Nat'l Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1297 (5th Cir. 1985). The original
employer, furious over the loss of business, denied a lump sum payment of a retirement
benefit from a defined benefit plan upon termination, which payment it had made for all
other separating employees. Id. at 1298. This act delayed payment until the vice-
president reached retirement age. Id. The logical reason to support the denial was an
actuary's report indicating that the employer had so under-funded the plan that the
payment could not presently be made without jeopardizing the plan's fund, meaning
typically selling assets at below cost. Id. Anyone who has dealt with actuaries knows
that such calculations depend on various assumptions, the choice of which will pre-
determine the desired result. See, e.g., Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 415(b)(2)(E),
26 U.S.C. § 415(b)(2)(E) (1988) (specifying interest rate of five percent for actuarial
equivalency; an attempt to limit the discretion in selecting assumptions); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.416-1 Q&A T-26(c), 26 C.F.R. § 1.416-1 Q&A T-26(c) (1994) (specifying an
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limit the application of bad faith breach of contract doctrine. State
courts invoke this doctrine to prevent insurance companies from
unreasonably refusing to pay when required by contract to do so.
3 9
However, federal courts should seriously consider applying a common
law doctrine of bad faith breach of contract in ERISA cases in order to
deter unscrupulous behavior.
B. Efforts to Rectify the Situation
Some lawyers representing deserving participants denied benefits for
various wrongful reasons recognize that they have little chance of
success under ERISA as presently interpreted. As a result, lawyers have
attempted to reformulate their lawsuits to avoid ERISA's preemption by
relying on state law instead of ERISA. The initial attempts of the
participant's lawyers to use bad faith claims processing law under the
insurance exception to preemption failed.4  Subsequent efforts have
developed two ways to get around ERISA's preemption in some narrow
interest rate of between five and six percent as reasonable for top-heavy plans; same).
39. E.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc. v. Campbell, 466 So. 2d 833, 842 (Miss.
1984). See generally 16A JOHN A. APPELMAN & JEAN APPELMAN, INSURANCE LAW &
PRACTICE § 8878.15, at 422 (1981).
40. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,44 (1987) (preempting Mississippi
tort of bad faith for improper processing of claims in lieu of ERISA claim as not within
the insurance law exception to ERISA preemption and refusing to adopt it as ERISA
common law as not uniform); see Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
§ 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1988).
For a discussion of the hopelessness of no remedy when the court finds that ERISA
preempts the state action, see Paul O'Neill, Protecting ERISA Health Care Claimants:
Practical Assessment of a Neglected Issue in Health Care Reform, 55 OHIo ST. L.J. 723
(1994); Carr & Liebross, supra note 25, at 221.
For a discussion of the glee of insurance defenders for the application of ERISA
preemption to their lawsuit, see James L. Nolan & Eunice L. Bumgardner, Defending
the Insurance Company Against Claims for Wrongful Denial in Administration of
Employee Benefits Plans, ALI-ABA Course of Study, Jan. 16, 1992, available in
WESTLAW, C719 ALI-ABA 129, at 169 (ERISA provides strategic advantages in
defending insurers against claims of improper administration of employee benefit plans);
E. Thomas Bishop & Paula Denney, Hello ERISA, Good-bye Bad Faith: Federal Pre-
Emption of DTPA, Insurance Code, and Common Law Bad Faith Claims, 41 BAYLOR
L. REv. 267, 288-89 (1989) (explaining advantages of ERISA over state law for group
insurance-related areas); Richard G. Mandel, Must Claims Denials Be Upheld Under
Arbitrary and Capricious-What Standard of Review Applies to Group Policies Issued
to ERISA Plans?, 19 FORUM 457 (1984) (suggesting that insurance companies convert
state insurance contract cases into federal ERISA claims to take advantage of the
favorable ERISA rules).
situations. First, lawyers avoid triggering ERISA when their complaints
allege that enrollment in a plan was induced by coverage misrepresenta-
tions because the lawsuit does not sufficiently relate to the administration
of an ERISA plan.41 Second, participant's lawyers have successfully
argued that the simple purchase of an insurance policy by the employer
does not create an employee benefit plan, especially if the employer does
not directly or indirectly own, control, administer, or assume responsibil-
ity for the policy or its benefits.42 Other critics have recommended
amending ERISA to permit an exception to ERISA preemption for the
benefits-due lawsuit.43
Congress has attempted to rectify the situation. Initially, Congress
called on the courts to create new remedies by developing federal
common law." Then, Congress considered three approaches to
41. E.g., Ingram v. American Chambers Life Ins. Co., 643 So. 2d 575, 578 (Ala.
1994) (misrepresentation of kidney stone coverage); HealthAmerica v. Menton, 551 So.
2d 235, 237 (Ala. 1989) (induced participant to drop health policy covering an ailment
for enrollment in ERISA plan but not providing the same coverage), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1093 (1990); Pace v. Signal Technology Corp., 628 N.E.2d 20, 24 (Mass. 1994)
(misrepresentation about extended coverage on termination); Kelly v. Fort Dearborn Life
Ins. Co., 641 N.E.2d 717, 718 (Mass. 1994) (misrepresentation on scope of coverage for
preexisting exclusion).
42. E.g., Taggart Corp. v. Life & Health Benefits Admin., 617 F.2d 1208, 1210
(5th Cir. 1980) (health insurance policy), cert. denied sub nom. Taggart Corp. v. Efros,
450 U.S. 1030 (1981); Sindelar v. Canada Transp., Inc., 520 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Neb.
1994) (life insurance policy); Universe Life Ins. Co. v. Giles, 881 S.W.2d 44, 50-51
(Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (health insurance policy); see also McQueen v. Salida Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 652 F. Supp. 1471, 1472 (D. Colo. 1987) (stating single deferred
compensation agreement not requiring any insurance).
43. E.g., Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating
estoppel rule not permitted); see O'Neill, supra note 40, at 780; Karen Peterson,
Comment, ERISA Preemption of California Tort and Bad Faith Law: Whats Left?, 22
U.S.F. L. REV. 519, 522 (1988); Robert Aldisert, Note, BlindFaith Conquers BadFaith:
Only Congress Can Save Us After Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 21 LOY. L.A.
L. REv. 1342, 1399 (1988); Laura Bond, Note, ERISA-Preemption--Pilot Life Insurance
Co. v. Dedeaux: Congress's Cue to Reassess ERISA's Preemptive Effect, 36 KAN. L.
REV. 611, 625 (1988).
44. See H.R. REP. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 55-56 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 1948 (Budget Committee recommendation on the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1989).
The House Budget Committee had received numerous complaints from constituents
that Pilot Life Ins. Co v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987), left them with no legal remedy
for improper denials of medical claims, improper denial of continuation coverage, or
unreasonable delays in processing claims. H.R. REP. No. 247, at 55. The Committee
disagreed with that portion of Pilot Life refusing to develop a common law remedy, but
felt it was not necessary to amend ERISA. Id. at 56. The Committee felt that the
legislative history of ERISA clearly indicated that Congress intended courts, through
federal common law, to develop "appropriate remedies, even if they are not specifically
enumerated in section 502 of ERISA," for improper claims processing. Id. The
Committee reaffirmed the "authority of the Federal courts to shape legal and equitable
remedies to fit the facts and circumstances of the cases before them, even though those
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amending ERISA. Under the first approach, ERISA would be amended
to preserve state law remedies only against insurance companies.45 The
second approach would establish federal procedures and judicial
remedies for improper claims handling only with respect to welfare
plans.46 The third approach would remove health care plans from
ERISA and establish for them a new system of procedures, administra-
tive hearings, and judicial review intended to protect health care
claimants.47 None of the three amendments has passed. None of the
proposals would solve the problem for retirement plans because of the
proposals' limited application to insured, welfare, or health plans.
This Article takes a different approach by reformulating the federal
common law of ERISA.48 Part II of this Article articulates the
remedies may not be specifically mentioned in ERISA," by "drawing upon principles
enunciated in state law, including such remedies as the awarding of punitive and/or
compensatory damages against the person responsible for the failure to pay claims in a
timely manner." Id.
45. Senator Howard Metzenbaum and Representative Howard Berman introduced
the Health Insurance Claims Fairness Act of 1991. S. 794, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991);
H.R. 1602, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). This bill would exempt from ERISA
preemption state laws allowing workers to sue insurance companies, but not plan
sponsors, for compensatory and punitive damages arising from unfair insurance claims
practices in connection with the administration of benefit plans or the processing of
benefit claims. Id.
46. In 1993 Representative Berman introduced the Health Insurance Claims
Fairness Act of 1993 that would: (1) add a specified time frame for processing claims,
(2) permit mediation to resolve disputed claims, (3) allow a federal action for actual
damages, including compensatory and consequential damages, caused by violation of
ERISA or the terms of an ERISA plan, (4) permit recovery of punitive damages against
certain parties in cases of fraud, and (5) require an award of attorney fees for prevailing
plaintiffs. H.R. 1881, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); see H.R. REP. No. 1023, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (recommending passage of the Health Insurance Fairness Act of
1992, H.R. 1602 as amended, a predecessor version of H.R. 1881).
47. In 1993 the Clinton Administration proposed the Health Security Act that
would: (1) establish time limits for claims processing and plan review procedures of
denials, (2) permit aggrieved claimants to elect alternative dispute resolution, plan
administrative hearings, or court remedies, (3) establish the National Health Board to
review plan administrative decisions with appeals to the circuit courts for amounts in
excess of $10,000, and (4) establish substantial civil penalties for wrongful denial or
delay of claims. H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993).
48. Carr & Liebross, supra note 25, at 229 (recommending development of a
strong federal common law of ERISA without specifying any operative principle plus
Department of Labor regulations changing the definition of "plan" to include employer
representations); J.E. Zanglein, Closing the Gap: Safeguarding Participants Rights by
Expanding the Federal Common Law of ERISA, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 671, 723 (1994)
principle federal courts should use to fashion federal common law for a
statute such as ERISA. Part III examines one of the above-stated court-
adopted rules: the plan interpretive rule. The examination begins with
an investigation of interpretive rules from various bodies of state and
federal common law to derive possibilities for the component parts of an
ERISA plan interpretive rule. This Article then proceeds to investigate
pre- and post-ERISA cases to determine the foundations of current
ERISA plan interpretive rules. Careful analysis of these rules shows that
federal courts have ignored fundamental principles of federal common
law development. As a result, current ERISA plan interpretive rules are
invalid. Next, this Article suggests that a similar examination of other
court-adopted ERISA rules would reveal their invalidity. Finally, with
respect to the plan interpretive rule, Part IV outlines the analysis the
federal courts should conduct with respect to reformulating the correct
rule.
This Article asserts that the federal common law of ERISA must be
consistent with and further the purpose of ERISA. The statute's
principal purpose is to facilitate recovery of promised benefits by
beneficiaries. The current court-fashioned rules fail to achieve Congress'
purpose. Instead, federal courts should adopt the following rules in
order to better achieve Congress' goals for ERISA: (1) review the
ERISA plan administrator's decisions under the de novo rule in most
situations, allowing the court to replace the administrator's decision with
its own based on additional facts not before the administrator, (2)
construe ERISA plan wording in lay terms and read ambiguities in favor
of participants, (3) make jury trial available under ERISA, (4) enforce
employer representations concerning benefits, (5) make extracontractual
damages available under ERISA in certain situations, and (6) allow
prevailing participants to recover attorney fees.
Some federal circuit courts have already adopted the reformulated rule
for plan interpretation in certain situations. Hopefully, this process
of turning to the correct ERISA rules will continue with respect to the
other five rules. In sum, adopting this Article's proposals would deter
improper conduct by plan administrators and reduce the federal courts'
caseload by removing all the cases in which administrators routinely
deny rightfully due benefits.
966
(urging development of federal common law); see also Jay Conison, Suits for Benefits
Under ERISA, 54 U. PIrrT. L. REv. 1, 4 (1992) (recommending against the use of state
and LMRA rules in ERISA common law).
49. See infra note 385 and accompanying text.
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II. FEDERAL COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES
The federal common law is generally defined as "any rule of federal
law created by a court when the substance of that rule is not clearly
suggested by federal enactment."50  The ability of federal courts to
fashion federal common law is a much-discussed subject. 1  The
discussion generally revolves around two concerns: (1) confining federal
courts under the doctrine of federalism in order to permit adequate state
lawmaking capabilities 2 and (2) confining the federal courts under the
doctrine of the separation of powers in order to permit adequate
congressional consideration of political matters. 3 The commentators'
formulations of the proper extent to which federal courts may fashion
common law are spread between the two positions.
A. Interstitial Common Lawmaking
One position protects federalism. This federalist position sees state
law as the pre-existing backdrop against which federal law is made.
Under the Supremacy Clause,54 federal law made by Congress or the
courts ousts state law. However, a vibrant federalism requires that
federal law not oust state law easily. Representation of state interests in
Congress provides the desired restraint on excessive or objectionable
50. George D. Brown, Federal Common Law and the Role of the Federal Courts
in Private Law Adjudication-a (New) Erie Problem?, 12 PACE L. REv. 229,230 (1992).
51. E.g., George D. Brown, Of Activism and Erie-The Implication Doctrine's
Implications for the Nature and Role of the Federal Courts, 69 IowA L. REv. 617
(1984); Donald L. Doemberg, Judicial Chameleons in the "New Erie" Canal, 1990
UTAH L. REv. 759; Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common
Law, 99 HARV. L. REv. 883 (1986); Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the
New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964); Larry Kramer, The
Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REv. 263 (1992); Thomas Merrill,
The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Cm. L. REV. 1 (1985); Martin H.
Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An
"Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 761 (1989); Louise Weinberg, Federal
Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 805 (1989).
52. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (use state law unless
governed by an act of Congress); see Brown, supra note 50, at 244.
53. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 743 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (striking compromises between competing interests is better left to the
politically accountable legislators); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 35 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); see Brown, supra note 50, at 244.
54. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cI. 2.
federalization by statute. But there is no corresponding structural
restraint on the federal and state courts. The federalist position imposes
a restraint through the following principle: Courts are incapable of
generating common law rules about a subject matter unless authorized,
directly or indirectly, by federal statute."5
Since ERISA has a preemption provision eliminating all state law
insofar as it relates to employee benefit plans,56 federalism is of little
concern under ERISA. Under the federalist approach, preemption itself
constitutes the authorization to make federal common law 7 when
ERISA fails to provide a rule for the situation. No statute can compre-
hend all the rules necessary for regulating a particular area. Courts must
address the gaps, oversights, ambiguities, and neglected procedural
questions to successfully implement the statute through the court's
interstitial common lawmaking power.5
The second position discussed by commentators preserves the
separation of powers. Separation of powers requires clear delineation of
authority among the branches of government to maintain the checks and
balances system. Although the legislature and judiciary can make legal
rules, the Constitution gives the lawmaking power to Congress.
5 9
Unlike the federalist approach, the separation of powers position takes
the opposite tack: Courts can generate federal common law about a
subject matter unless barred by the presence of a congressional
statute."
Since Congress has acted for employee benefit plans by passing
ERISA, under the separation of powers approach federal courts may only
make federal common law for the subject matter of employee benefit
plans that is not inconsistent with ERISA and that fills the gaps,
oversights, ambiguities, and neglected procedural questions in the statute.
Therefore, the two positions-federalist and separation of pow-
55. Redish, supra note 51, at 766; Brown, supra note 51, at 618; Doemberg, supra
note 51, at 761; Merrill, supra note 51, at 8. The position is based on the Rules of
Decision Act, part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652 (1988)) ("The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties
of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded
as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where
they apply.").
56. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 514(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a) (1988).
57. Doemberg, supra note 51, at 777; Merrill, supra note 51, at 36-39; Redish,
supra note 51, at 790-92.
58. Sol Wachtler, Judicial Lawmaking, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1990).
59. U.S. CONsT. art. I.
60. Weinberg, supra note 51, at 805 (to the extent the federal government is itself
authorized by the Constitution); accord Field, supra note 51, at 884 (less extreme);
Friendly, supra note 51, at 421 (same); Kramer, supra note 51, at 301 (same).
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ers--provide the same subject matter over which federal courts may
formulate ERISA rules.
There is also a practical reason why, under both positions, courts may
only create federal common law for statutory interstices. Federal courts,
which create most federal common law,61 acquire jurisdiction predomi-
nantly by federal question jurisdiction arising from federal statute. 62 As
a result, federal common lawmaking is often contingent on a statute that
creates federal court jurisdiction. State common lawmaking, however,
is not similarly limited because many state courts have general
jurisdiction.63
B. The Limit of the Furtherance of Policy
Even within the authorized subject matter-ERISA's statutory
interstices--the ability of a federal court to make a rule is circumscribed.
Some commentators place a limit on the rule-making ability within the
authorized area: the created rule must further the policy of the
statute.' For these commentators, this limit is not compelled by any
statutory or constitutional authority, but instead is imposed by pru-
61. ERISA provides concurrent jurisdiction for federal and state courts for the
benefits-due lawsuit, Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 514(a), 29
U.S.C. § 1132(e) (1988), so state courts obviously also have authority to create
interstitial federal common law for ERISA with respect to the benefits-due lawsuit.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.").
Federal courts also develop some common law under their other sources ofjurisdiction,
namely, the federal common law of interstate relations, federal admiralty law, and the
common law of rights and obligations of the United States. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2
(controversies between two or more states, cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,
and controversies to which the United States is a party). Rarely do federal courts make
federal common law under their diversity jurisdiction. See Boyle v. United Technologies
Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504-06 (1988) (developing federal common law occurs in the
context of a tort defense to liability to third parties under a government contract).
63. E.g., TEX. CONsT. art. V, § 8 (jurisdiction of district court over all actions
unless deprived by constitution or statute); TEX. GOV'T CODE § 24.007 (1988)
(jurisdiction of district court as in constitution).
64. Doemberg, supra note 51, at 804 (from the federalism viewpoint); Kramer,
supra note 51, at 288 (from the separation of powers viewpoint); Weinberg, supra note
51, at 851 (same); accord Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (1584) (to interpret a
statute the court examines the problem that the legislature set out to solve and the
remedy it developed and then construes the statute in light of achieving those ends).
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dence. 65 The limitations are derived by analogy to the congressional
authority to pass statutes contained in McCulloch v. Maryland.66 The
Constitution contains an enumeration of the subjects on which Congress
can legislate, with an authorization to make such laws as shall be
necessary and proper to achieve those ends.67 Justice John Marshall
interpreted this to mean that Congress can pass any act in furtherance of
a listed power.68 Thus, some commentators argue that a federal court's
ability to make law is similarly circumscribed: it must be in furtherance
of a statutorily-authorized policy.
1. Legislative History for Federal Common Law of ERISA
With regard to ERISA, policy-driven limits on federal common law
are not merely a matter of prudence. Instead, Congress, in enacting
ERISA, has imposed upon federal courts the responsibility of furthering
a statutorily-authorized policy. ERISA's legislative history mentions that
federal courts will fashion a federal common law for ERISA for
benefits-due lawsuits. This reference appears indirectly in a committee
report and directly in an explanation made by a principal committee
member.
The Conference Committee report indicates that courts should treat the
benefits-due lawsuit as arising under the federal law in the same fashion
as pre-ERISA benefits-due lawsuits under LMRA:
[S]uits to enforce benefit rights under the plan or to recover benefits under the
plan which do not involve application of [ERISA's] provisions ... may be
brought ... also in State courts . . . . All such actions in Federal or State
courts are to be regarded as arising under the laws of the United States in
similar fashion to those brought under section 301 of the Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947.69
Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., then chairman of the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,70 co-sponsor of the original
draft of the ERISA legislation7' and floor manager of the bill,72
65. Brown, supra note 50, at 252; see also 2A NoRMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.09, at 42-44 (5th ed. 1992).
66. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
67. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
68. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
69. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 76-77 (1974), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5107.
70. 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. XCII.
71. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 156 (1985);
Theodore P. Manno, ERISA Preemption and the McCarran-Ferguson Act: The Needfor
Congressional Action, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 51, 61 (1979).
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explained the legislation similarly in the final passage debates: "It is
intended that such [ERISA benefits-due] actions will be regarded as
arising under the laws of the United States, in similar fashion to those
brought under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act."'73 Since
the benefits-due lawsuit was not specifically provided for in LMRA, it
arose and developed under a federal common law.74 LMRA benefits-
due lawsuits were brought both under LMRA's contractual section for
collective bargaining agreements75 and under LMRA's trust section.76
72. Leon E. Irish & Harrison J. Cohen, ERISA Preemption: Judicial Flexibility
and Statutory Rigidity, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 109, 113 (1985).
73. 120 CONG. REc. 29,933 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 4, at 4745.
74. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,451,457 (1957) (Section 301
"authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law" in the context of collective
bargaining agreements). See Flint, supra note 1, at 365-68 (development of the pre-
ERISA benefits-due lawsuit under LMRA).
75. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1988). See, e.g., Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1976) (widow
sued trustees for survivor's benefits); Smith v. Union Carbide Corp., 350 F.2d 258 (6th
Cir. 1965) (former employee sued for denied pension benefit); Rhine v. Union Carbide
Corp., 343 F.2d 12, 15 (6th Cir. 1965) (former employee sued for denied disability
benefit); United Auto. Workers v. Textron, Inc., 312 F.2d 688, 691 (6th Cir. 1963)
(union action on behalf of employees to determine their rights in terminated pension
plan); Hayes v. Morse, 347 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 (E.D. Mo. 1972) (former employee sued
trustees for denial of pension benefit), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1265 (8th Cir. 1973); Brune v.
Morse, 339 F. Supp. 159, 159 (E.D. Mo. 1972) (same), aff'd, 475 F.2d 858 (8th Cir.
1973); Knoll v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 325 F. Supp. 666, 668 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (action by
former employees to discontinue pension fund and distribute assets to beneficiaries upon
closing of plant), aff'd, 465 F.2d 1128 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1126
(1973); accord Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S.
157, 176-77 n.17 (1971) (dictum in unfair labor practice case); Beam v. International
Org. of Masters, 511 F.2d 975, 978 (2d Cir. 1975) (spouse of deceased union member
sought denied accidental death benefits).
76. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)
(1988). See, e.g., Johnson v. Botica, 537 F.2d 930, 933 (7th Cir. 1976) (former
employee sued to challenge denial of disability pension); Lugo v. Employees Retirement
Fund of the Illumination Prods. Indus., 529 F.2d 251, 254-56 (2d Cir.) (former employee
sued for declaration and injunctive relief for denial of disability pension), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 826 (1976); Pete v. United Mine Workers Welfare & Retirement Fund, 517
F.2d 1267, 1269-70 (D.C. Cir.) (former employee sued to review pension benefit denial),
reh'g granted, 517 F.2d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Kiser v. Huge, 517 F.2d 1237, 1244
(D.C. Cir.) (class action brought to review denial of pension benefits), reh "ggrantedsub.
nom. Kiser v. Boyle, 517 F.2d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Kosty v. Lewis, 319 F.2d 744,
745 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (union member sued trustees to determine eligibility for pension),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 964 (1964).
Senator Jacob Javits, the other co-sponsor of the original draft
legislation and the senior ranking Republican on the Senate Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare," made it clear that this LMRA reference
meant the federal common law power when he explained that a "body
of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with
issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension
plans.' ' 8
The Supreme Court recognizes this congressional reference to the
LMRA practice as at least a mandate to develop a federal common law
for the benefits-due lawsuit within the interstices of the statute."
Although courts generally use committee reports to confirm statutory
constructions° or to determine the meaning of ambiguous language"
and often treat the explanations of committee reports made by a
committee member or the committee chairman merely as supplemental
committee reports, 2 the Supreme Court has used such items to imply
the congressional authority to create federal common law for LMRA. 3
77. 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. XCII; Manno, supra note 71, at 61.
78. 120 CONG. REC. S29,942 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 4771.
79. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (acknowledg-
ing that the statement binds the Supreme Court); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481
U.S. 41, 55-57 (1987) (courts are to develop a "federal common law of rights and
obligations under ERISA-regulated plans"); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 & n.26 (1983) (concurring opinion) (adopting Sen.
Javits's statement); see also H.R. REP. No. 247, supra note 44, at 55-56, reprinted in
1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 1948 (suggesting the federal courts have authority to fashion
ERISA remedies even if not specifically enumerated).
80. Commissioner v. Bilder, 369 U.S. 499, 502 (1962); McLean v. United States,
226 U.S. 374, 380 (1912); Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 610 (1869),
overruled on other grounds by Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 553 (1870);
see 2A SINGER, supra note 65, § 48.06, at 332-33.
81. Wright v. Vinton Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 459 (1937); United
States v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929); Railroad Comm'n v. Chicago,
B. & Q.R.R., 257 U.S. 563, 589 (1922); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S.
443, 474 (1921); see 2A SINGER, supra note 65, § 48.06, at 332-33.
82. See Deering, 254 U.S. at 475-77; see also Wright, 300 U.S. at 459 (explana-
tions given in Congress make meaning plain); Helvering v. Twin Bell Oil Syndicate, 293
U.S. 312, 322 (1934) (chairman of committee so stated); Missouri Pac. R.R., 278 U.S.
at 278 (statements by those in charge); Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 257 U.S. at 589
(explanatory statements of members in charge); United States v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry.
Co., 247 U.S. 310, 318 (1918) (remarks in nature of supplementary report); United States
v. Coca Cola Co., 241 U.S. 265, 281 (1916) (chairman explaining the provision); see 2A
SINGER, supra note 65, § 48.14, at 361-62 (committee member in charge), § 48.15, at
364 (sponsor of the bill).
83. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 449, 452-56 (1957)
(House, Senate, and Conference Reports and sponsor pronouncements; LMRA lacks a
preemption provision).
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The Supreme Court similarly has done so for ERISA. In Franchise
Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust8 Justice Brennan,
in dicta, quoted Senator Javits's statement. The Justice's opinion
concluded that where federal jurisdiction over ERISA lawsuits is
exclusive (all except the benefits-due lawsuit) the suits are governed
solely by ERISA and federal common law.85 Brennan, in his concur-
ring opinion in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company v.
Russell,86 again accepted Senator Javits' statement as the directive
supported by Williams' "indirect" directive involving the LMIRA.87 In
Pilot Life Insurance Company v. Dedeaux,s8 Justice O'Connor, accept-
ing the ERISA committee report backed by the statements of its
sponsors, noted in dicta that state law was preempted by ERISA to avoid
the possibility of subjecting plans to varying state law.89 Hence,
ERISA actions must rely upon federal common law since state law is
gone.
90
2. The Meaning of the LMRA Reference
The basic federal common law principles discussed above provide the
necessary mandate to develop federal common law for ERISA in the
absence of any reference in the legislative history. The reference to the
84. 463 U.S. 1 (1983) (unanimous).
85. Id. at 20 n.20. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
§ 502(e), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (1988) for jurisdiction.
The plan was a welfare plan and hence not required to have the anti-alienation
provision required by ERISA of pension plans. Id. § 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1)
(1988); see also 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) (1988) (the Internal Revenue Code's portion of
ERISA). The plan argued that whether a tax levy was enforceable against a plan's anti-
alienation provision that was not required by ERISA was within the class of questions
for which Congress (quoting Javits) intended federal courts to create federal common
law. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 5-6 & n.3,
26 & n.30. Brennan never reached the issue posed by the plan's argument since the
state's action to enforce its tax levy against the account of two participants in the plan
did not arise under ERISA and hence was not removable from state court to federal
court. Id. at 27. The action did not arise under ERISA since the state was not one of
the authorized parties to sue under ERISA. Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1988).
86. 473 U.S. 134 (1985) (joined by White, Marshall, and Blackmun).
87. Id. at 156.
88. 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (unanimous). The case held that a state bad-faith insurance
processing claim against an ERISA plan was preempted by ERISA.
89. Id. at 55-56.
90. Id.
LMRA is more than a mere mandate. The LMRA reference is
susceptible to three possible explanations.
First, the LMRA reference could be that, when formulating ERISA's
federal common law, courts should commence with pre-ERISA LMRA
cases, which provide a body of pre-ERISA federal common law relating
to employee benefit plans. The federal courts have already done this
with respect to the fiduciary review standard, plan interpretive rule, and
jury decision by using the LMRA arbitrary and capricious standard,
9'
the LMRA rule of acceptance of the trustee's plan interpretation, 92 and
the LMRA anti-jury rule93 in ERISA cases. The Supreme Court also
has used this directive as authority to incorporate into ERISA some
LMRA procedural rules.94 As a result, some courts95 and commenta-
tors96 have stated that the reference means the courts should import the
rules developed under LMRA into ERISA.
However, LMRA law was the same body of law that created the
problems forcing ERISA's passage.97 The benefits-due lawsuit under
LMRA, an ERISA predecessor for union plans, also met jurisdictional
problems and procedural hindrances. The jurisdictional hurdles included
legal rules against suing nonresident trusts, service on all trustees, and
insufficient violations under the act.98 Moreover, the two statutes
91. E.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989); see
Flint, supra note 28, at 165-67 & n.155.
92. Miniard v. Lewis, 387 F.2d 864, 865 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 873
(1968); see infra notes 252-64 and accompanying text.
93. E.g., Wardle v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820,
823-24 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981); see Flint, supra note 1, at
386, 387 & n.150.
94. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1987) (removal rule).
But see Conison, supra note 48, at 17-20 (1992) (explaining the danger of incorporating
LMRA rules into ERISA).
95. E.g., Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d 923, 939 (3d Cir.
1985); Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 1980).
96. Richard P. Donaldson, The Use of Arbitration to Avoid Litigation Under
ERISA, 17 WM. & MARY L. Rv. 215, 216-17 (1975); Whitman F. Manley, Civil
Actions Under ERISA Section 502(a): When Should Courts Require that Claimants
Exhaust Arbitral or Intrafund Remedies?, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 952, 965-69 (1986)
(student work); Randy J. Schneider, Surviving ERISA Preemption: Pension Arbitration
in the 1980's, 16 COLuM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 269, 279 (1980); G. Richard Shell, ERISA
& Other Employment Statutes: When Is Commercial Arbitration an "Adequate
Substitute "for the Courts?, 68 Tax. L. REv. 509, 547 (1990).
97. H.R. RP. No. 533, supra note 18, at 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4642 ("The [LMRA] is not intended to establish nor does it provide standards for the
preservation of vested benefits, funding adequacy, security of investment, or fiduciary
conduct.").
98. See, e.g., Bass v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, Local No. 582, 630 F.2d
1058, 1066-67 (5th Cir. 1980) (insufficient violations); Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308,
310-11 (6th Cir. 1974) (D.C. law under Kentucky choice of law rule; nonresident trust);
Conway v. Cross, 16 Misc. 2d 451, 452 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958) (service); Kane v. Lewis,
974
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indicate different objectives with respect to remedies, suggesting that
courts formulating federal common law for ERISA are not to incorporate
the LMRA rules wholesale. 9 Finally, with respect to the ability to
recover benefits, commentators usually list two causes for the passage
of ERISA, both involving plans subject to LMRA. The first cause
identified is the Studebaker incident, during which the termination of
Studebaker's United States' operations resulted in a union-negotiated
plan termination under which employees under age sixty received fifteen
cents on the dollar."° The second cause is trustee malfeasance with
respect to plans of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. 10'
Another possible explanation for the LMRA reference could be that
courts should use state law as a source of rules. In Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama,102 the first LMRA case recogniz-
ing the courts' ability to develop a federal common law under the
LMRA, the Supreme Court suggested state law as a source for federal
common law rules. The Court stated that an incorporated rule, once
adopted, would be the uniform federal rule throughout the United
States. 3 The Supreme Court has similarly incorporated state law into
ERISA. Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion in Russell, suggested
incorporation of state law through an improper method of determining
ERISA's federal common law. He examined the Sherman Act and its
legislative history, both of which indicated the Sherman Act's origin in
125 N.Y.S.2d 544, 546 (1953) (same); Hobbs v. Lewis, 270 S.W.2d 352, 353-54 (Tenn.
1954) (nonresident trust).
99. LMRA declares a preference for non-judicial dispute resolution of collective
bargaining agreements (including employee benefit plans) by grievance and arbitration.
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 173 (d) (1988) ("Final adjust-
ment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method of
settlement or interpretation of disputes arising over the application or intent of an
existing collective-bargaining agreement .... ).
In contrast, ERISA states as its purpose to provide "ready access to the Federal
courts." Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)
(1988).
100. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic Comm.,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 128 (1966).
101. COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, REPORT ON DIVERSION OF UNIONS WELFARE-
PENSION FUNDS OF ALLIED TRADES COUNCIL AND TEAMsTERS LOCAL 815, S. REP. No.
1348, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); see, e.g., JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK,
PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 53-69 (1990).
102. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
103. Id. at 457.
state anti-trust law. '  Then, he similarly examined ERISA's legisla-
tive history and found a congressional intent to incorporate state trust
law into ERISA. Although his technique for determining federal
common law was incorrect, Justice Brennan concluded that courts should
use this body of law to supplement ERISA.05
In Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch,0 6 Justice O'Connor
made Justice Brennan's view law. Further, since Justice Marshall had
previously used trust law treatises by Scott and Bogert, as well as the
Restatement Second of Trusts, to determine ERISA trustees' powers,
Justice O'Connor extended Justice Brennan's view to the benefits-due
lawsuit.0 7 In Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon,"°8 O'Connor sug-
gested in dicta that the authority to incorporate state common law into
the federal common law for ERISA extended to permitting a wrongful
104. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 156 n.15 (1985)
(citing National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688
(1978)); see ALBERT H. WALKER, HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 1-46 (1910).
105. Russell, 473 U.S. at 156-57; see H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 18, at 11,
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4649 ("The fiduciary responsibility section, in
essence, codifies and makes applicable to ... fiduciaries certain principles developed in
the evolution of the law of trusts."); S. REP. No. 127, supra note 18, at 28-29, reprinted
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4865 (same); H.R. REP. No. 533, at 13, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4651 ("The principles of fiduciary conduct are adopted from existing
trust law, but with modifications appropriate for employee benefit plans."); S. REP. No.
127, at 18, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4866 (same).
Brennan's technique for determining federal common law was incorrect because it
does not seek to further the legislative purpose. See infra notes 114-15 and accompany-
ing text. Moreover, he ignores the ERISA legislative history explaining the shortcom-
ings of trust law's application to ERISA plans. See infra notes 127-30 and accompany-
ing text. But his shortcomings in Russell are understandable.
Brennan wrote the concurring opinion to dispel the majority's notion that plan
administrators might not fully be subject to the strict fiduciary duties in claims
processing under traditional trust law. 473 U.S. at 151-52. The majority under Justice
Stevens had denied extracontractual damages to a participant suing under the breach of
fiduciary section, based solely on the express language of the statute. Id. at 139-44; see
Employee Retirement Security Income Act of 1974 § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1988).
Brennan's opinion might be overbroad.
106. 489 U.S. 101 (1989) (unanimous). The case involved whether courts reviewed
an administrator's plan interpretations without a grant under the LMRA arbitrary and
capricious standard.
107. Id. at 111. Marshall's use of AUSTIN ScoTr, LAW OF TRUSTS (3d ed. 1967),
GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (2d rev.
ed. 1980), and RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS (SECOND) (1959) appeared in Central States,
S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985)
(whether plan could conduct field audit of employer; since Congress incorporated trust
law into ERISA, trust law determines the extent of trust powers).
108. 498 U.S. 133 (1990) (unanimous).
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
termination action based upon an employer's attempt to avoid payment
of ERISA benefits.'0 9
Justice White, in his dissenting opinion in Mertens v. Hewitt Associ-
ates,"° made state law incorporation clear through another improper
method of determining ERISA's federal common law. Justice White
stated that treatises and restatements of the law represented the settled
experience of the law, and could be used to create federal common
law."' This body of state law, however, led to so many problems
before ERISA's passage that it was preempted." 2  Moreover, other
109. Id. at 145. The federal courts have ignored this suggestion. See Harsch v.
Eisenberg, 956 F.2d 651, 659 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Bihler v. Eisenberg, 113
S. Ct. 61 (1992) (disparaging the idea); McRae v. Seafarers' Welfare Plan, 920 F.2d 819,
823 (1 th Cir.), reh'g denied, 931 F.2d 901 ( Ith Cir. 1991) (same); Medina v. Anthem
Life Ins. Co., 983 F.2d 29, 31-32 (5th Cir. 1993) (same).
110. 113 S. Ct. 2063 (1993) (joined by Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor). Justice
Scalia for the majority had rejected the federal common law argument to determine what
the terms "other equitable relief' in ERISA meant and held that "other equitable relief'
excluded extracontractual damages for the benefits-due lawsuit. Id. at 2070.
Ill. Id. at 2073 (trust law).
Treatises and the restatements do not necessarily represent well-settled law. See infra
notes 301-02 and accompanying text (unsettled trust law in well-respected treatises);
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 59-76 (1974) (explaining the different
approaches of the first Restatement of Contracts and Samuel Williston's treatise from
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Arthur Corbin's treatise). State common law
rules for plan interpretation are anything but well-settled, even though expressed in
treatises and restatements. See infra notes 198 (classical contract theory), 202
(neoclassical contract theory), & 219 (trust law) and accompanying text.
However, the uncertainty of the law in this area is irrelevant to developing the federal
common law of ERISA. The issue is whether a rule, well-settled or not, furthers the
purposes of ERISA. See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
112. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1976 § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144
(1988); see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 69, at 383, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5162 ("Under the substitute, the provisions of title I are to supersede
all State laws that relate to any employee benefit plan that is established by an employer
engaged in or affecting interstate commerce or by an employee organization that
represents employees engaged in or affecting interstate commerce."); 120 CONG. REC.
S15737 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 5188 (statement
of Sen. Harrison A. Williams, Jr.) ("It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions
specified in the bill, the substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference
substitute are intended to preempt the field for Federal regulation, thus eliminating the
threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit
plans."); H.R. REP. No. 1785, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 47-48 (1977) ("Based on our
examination of the effects of section 514, it is our judgment that the legislative scheme
of ERISA is sufficiently broad to leave no room for effective state regulation within the
field preempted. Similarly it is our belief that the Federal interest and the need for
national uniformity are so great that the enforcement of a state regulation should be
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legislative history indicates that while courts may rely on well-settled
rules of trust law, such reliance must take into proper consideration
differences between trust law and ERISA."3
Under the third possible explanation for the reference to LIVRA
practice, courts should apply the common law pertaining to ERISA the
same as they do under the LMiRA. In Lincoln Mills, the Supreme Court
addressed the question of how to exercise the federal common law
power for LMtRA. For matters lying outside the penumbra of express
statutory provisions, the court was to "look ... at the policy of the
legislation and fashionf a remedy that will effectuate that policy.""1 4
The Lincoln Mills Court also indicated that a source of such rules could
be state law, provided the rules would best effectuate federal policy."'
C. The ERISA Policies to be Advanced
When courts create a body of federal common law under ERISA,
judges must not only deal with matters not expressly provided for, but
must also further the purposes of ERISA. Courts are aware of ERISA's
purposes or policy rationales because of the statute's declaration of
policy. ERISA lists only three policies. Other than the obvious matter
of governmental concern-namely Congress' interest in the protection
of interstate commerce' '-the only remaining expressed ERISA
policies are (1) "to protect ... the interests of participants in employee
benefit plans" and (2) "to protect ... the Federal taxing power.""
7
precluded. Accordingly, any activity by a state or political subdivision thereof, which
relates to employee benefit plans . . is preempted by section 514(a).").
113. For caution in using trust law, see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 69,
at 302, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5083 ("The conferees expect that the
courts will interpret this prudent man rule (and the other fiduciary standards) bearing in
mind the special nature and purpose of employee benefit plans.").
For the inadequacies of pre-ERISA trust law, see infra notes 127-30 and accompanying
text.
114. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957). That
federal common lawmaking is limited by the requirement to further the purposes of the
statute is the general position of the Supreme Court See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v.
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 642-43 (1981) (Sherman Act); Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 & n.5 (1972) (Water Pollution Control Act); Wallis v. Pan
Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 69 (1966) (Mineral Leasing Act).
115. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457.
116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
117. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001
(1988).
The Supreme Court has gleaned another ERISA policy from legislative history, namely
a policy to achieve national uniformity of ERISA rules. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S.
Ct. 2242, 2250 (1992); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990);
Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987); see H.R. REP. No. 533, supra
note 18, at 12, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4650 ("The uniformity of decision
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This second policy is related to fostering plan growth. 118 The Supreme
Court generally uses congressional declarations of policy along with
other items of legislative history to interpret statutory interstices." 9
The various committee reports confirm these latter two policies.
Essentially four bills resulted in ERISA. One bill dealt with labor
aspects and another bill dealt with the tax aspects in both the Senate and
House. Committees considering the labor bills acted first, with the
Senate reporting first in each case.
20
which the Act is designed to foster will help administrators, fiduciaries and participants
to predict the legality of proposed actions without the necessity of reference to varying
state laws."); id. at 17, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4655 ("[T]he Committee
believes it essential to provide for a uniform source of law in the areas of vesting,
funding, insurance and portability standards, for evaluation of fiduciary conduct, and for
creating a single reporting and disclosure system in lieu of burdensome multiple
reports."). Senate Report No. 127 uses language virtually identical to the House Report.
See S. REP. No. 127, supra note 18, at 29, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4865;
id., at 35, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4871. Legal uniformity is actually part
of the policy to protect participant interests. Once a right is recognized under ERISA
in one part of the nation, it will also be recognized throughout the nation.
One commentator suggests several ERISA provisions point to another unstated policy:
preserving the employer's ability to use employee benefit plans for business purposes.
E.g., Conison, supra note 5, at 623-24, 630. This policy was a distortion of the policy
to foster plan formation, see infra notes 160-81 and accompanying text, and it was
probably a response to limit an attempt to gut the exclusive benefit rule. See Daniel
Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive
Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1118 (1988) (arguing that plans are established
to the benefit of both employer and employee).
118. See infra notes 160-81 and accompanying text.
119. E.g., Citicorp Indus. Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 483 U.S. 27, 36 & n.8 (1987)
(declaration of policy, case law, and legislative history to support the plain meaning rule
for the Fair Labor Standards Act); Burlington N.R.R. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481
U.S. 454, 456 (1987) (declaration and legislative history to grant federal jurisdiction for
Railroad Vitalization and Regulatory Reform Act).
The Supreme Court has done similarly for ERISA. E.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113 (1989) (with cases to avoid the arbitrary and capricious
rule); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 15 (1987) (with legislative history
to permit state law).
120. See 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639 (Senate labor report on April 18, 1973; Senate
tax report on August 21, 1973; House labor report on October 2, 1973; House tax report
on February 21, 1974).
1. Protection of Participant Expectations
The policy of participant protection was the concern of the labor
committees."' The Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee
announced that the function of ERISA was to protect participant
interests:
[T]he bill (S.4) [is] to strengthen and improve the protections and interests
of participants and beneficiaries of employee pension and welfare benefit plans.
... Mhe Committee recognizes the absolute need that safeguards for plan
participants be sufficiently adequate and effective to prevent the numerous
inequities to workers under plans which have resulted in tragic hardship to so
many.
It is intended that coverage under the Act be construed liberally to provide the
maximum degree of protection to working men and women covered by private
retirement programs.a 2
On the other hand, the House Education and Labor Committee
declared participant protection was ERISA's principal purpose, limited
only by the second express ERISA policy of plan formation: "The
primary purpose of the bill [H.R. 2] is the protection of individual
pension rights, but the committee has been constrained to recognize the
voluntary nature of private retirement plans."''
ERISA's declaration of policy lists six methods Congress would use
to protect participant interests. Several impose specific plan provisions.
First, ERISA requires adequate disclosure of participant interests to the
participants themselves. In some instances, language in the plan
121. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that one ERISA policy is to protect the
interests of participants. E.g., Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 15 (1987)
(to safeguard the operation and administration of employee benefit plans for partici-
pants); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 43 (1987) (policy to protect interest
of participants in employee benefit plan); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 90
(1983) (to promote interest of beneficiaries); Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension
Fund v. Central Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985) (to insure the equitable character
of plans for participants); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 511 (1981)
(to ensure employee expectations are not defeated); Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361-62 (1980) (to promote interest of beneficiaries); id. at
366 (protect employees from risk of insufficient funds); accord Mertens v. Hewitt
Assocs., 113 S. Ct. 2063, 2072 (1993) (White's dissent: policy to protect interest of
participants in employee benefit plans).
122. S. REP. No. 127, supra note 18, at 1, 13, 18, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4838, 4838, 4850, 4854 (emphasis added).
123. H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 18, at 1, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4639 (emphasis added).
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documents must inform participants of their rights. 24 Both the Senate
and House Labor Committees determined that a major pre-ERISA cause
of lost benefits was the inability of participants to obtain plan informa-
tion or comprehend it:
It is grossly unfair to hold an employee accountable for acts which disqualify
him from benefits, if he had no knowledge of these acts, or if these conditions
were stated in a misleading or incomprehensible manner in plan booklets.
Subcommittee findings were abundant in establishing that an average plan
participant, even where he has been furnished an explanation of his plan
provisions, often cannot comprehend them because of the technicalities and
complexities of the language used.' 25
The second method Congress used to protect participant interests was
to establish standards for judging plan fiduciary behavior of employers,
plan administrators, and trustees.126 Both the Senate and House Labor
Committees indicated trust law entered ERISA only for this purpose:
"The fiduciary responsibility section, in essence, codifies and makes
applicable to these fiduciaries certain principles developed in the
evolution of the law of trusts."'1 27 The reason was obvious. Trust law
had failed in the pre-ERISA benefits-due lawsuit.1 28  Therefore, trust
law required modification before courts could apply it to employee
benefit plans:
[E]ven where the funding mechanism of the plan is in the form of a trust,
reliance on conventional trust law often is insufficient to adequately protect the
interests of plan participants and beneficiaries. This is because trust law had
developed in the context of testamentary and inter vivos trusts (usually designed
to pass designated property to an individual or small group of persons) with an
attendant emphasis on carrying out the instructions of the settlor.... [Cqourts
applying trust law to employee benefit plans have allowed the same kinds of
deviations [allowing exceptions to fiduciary duties if specified by the settlor],
124. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)
(1988) (labor matters); see id., §§ 101(a), 104(a), 105(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021(a), 1024(a),
1025(a).
125. S. REP. No. 127, supra note 18, at 11, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838,
4847 (emphasis added); H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 18, at 8, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4646 (same).
126. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)
(1988) (labor matters); see id. §§ 404-06, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104-06.
127. S. REP. No. 127, supra note 18, at 29, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838,
4865 (emphasis added); H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 18, at 11, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4649 (same).
128. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text and infra notes 247-62 and
accompanying text.
even though the typical employee benefit plan, covering hundreds or even
thousands of participants, is quite different from the testamentary trust both in
purpose and in nature.
... [E]ven assuming that the law of trusts is applicable ... without
standards by which a participant can measure the fiduciary's conduct [ he is
not equipped to safeguard either his own rights or the plan assets.
[The bill] incorporate[s] the core principles of fiduciary conduct as adopted
from existing trust law, but with modifications appropriate for employee benefit
plans.1
29
Courts, too, would have to modify trust law because Congress adopted
ERISA in order to make up for the inability of traditional trust law to
provide for participant protection: "In the absence of adequate federal
regulation, the participant is left to rely on the traditional equitable
remedies of the common law of trusts.' 30  It was as if Congress
realized that contemporary employee benefit law relied too much on trust
law principles. Thus, members of Congress limited trust law's
application to employee benefit plans by imposing other principles.
The third method Congress used to protect participant interests was to
provide federal remedies.13 1  The Senate Labor Committee found a
need to provide a new source of remedies because pre-ERISA law failed
to protect a participant's benefit claims: "The purpose of S.4 is to
prescribe legislative remedies for the various deficiencies existing in the
private pension plan systems. [A] substantial number of plans fail to
provide adequate and fair procedures to participants and beneficiaries
when their benefit claims or applications are denied.' 32  Consequently,
both the Senate and House Labor Committees provided for very broad
remedies.
33
The fourth method Congress employed to protect participant interests
was to require vesting standards for inclusion in the plan document for
pension plans, but not welfare plans." Both the Senate and House
Labor Committees concluded that the absence of vesting in pension
129. S. REP. No. 127, supra note 18, at 29, 30, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4838, 4865, 4866 (emphasis added); H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 18, at 12, 13,
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4650, 4651.
130. S. REP. No. 127, supra note 18, at 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838,
4841; H.R. REP. NO. 533, supra note 18, at 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4643.
131. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)
(1988) (labor matters); see id. § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132.
132. S. REP. No. 127, supra note 18, at 1, 34, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4838, 4838, 4870 (emphasis added).
133. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
134. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 2(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c)
(1988) (revenue matters); see id. § 203,29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1988); Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 § 411, 26 U.S.C. § 411 (1988).
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plans was another major cause of the loss of pre-ERISA benefits: "[IMf
pension promises are to be meaningful to workers, there is need for
federal statutory requirements which will compel an employer to grant
such vesting benefits." '135 Both the Senate Finance Committee and the
House Ways and Means Committee concluded similarly: "Unless an
employee's rights to his accrued pension benefits are non-forfeitable, he
has no assurance that he will ultimately receive a pension."'36
The fifth method by which participant interests were protected was to
require minimum funding provisions in the plan document for pension
plans, but not welfare plans.1 37  Both the Senate and House Labor
Committees decided that the absence of funding was another major cause
of the loss of pre-ERISA benefits: "The Promise and commitment of a
pension can be fulfilled only when funds are available to pay the
employee participant what is owed to him. Without adequate funding,
a promise of a pension which [sic] may be illusory and empty."'
13
Both the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means
Committee stated similarly: "[A] significant portion of existing tax
qualified pension plans have not been adequately funded and are not
accumulating sufficient assets to pay benefits in the future to covered
employees .... As a result [the] bill provides that unfunded past service
liabilities must be amortized . ,, 139
The sixth method Congress identified to protect participant interests
was to require plan termination insurance for defined benefit plans, but
not defined contribution plans or welfare plans." Both the Senate and
135. S. REp. No. 127, supra note 18, at 8, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838,
4845; H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 18, at 6, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4644.
136. S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890, 4930; H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1974), reprinted
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4719.
137. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 2(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c)
(1988) (revenue matters);,see id. § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 1082; Internal Revenue Code of
1954 § 412, 26 U.S.C. § 412 (1988).
138. S. REP. No. 127, supra note 18, at 10, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838,
4846; H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 18, at 7, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4645.
139. S. REP. No. 383, supra note 136, at 56, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890,
4941; H.R. REP. No. 807, supra note 136, at 74, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670,
4739 (same, slight variation).
140. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 2(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c)
(1988) (revenue matters); see id. §§ 4001-4068, 29 U.S.C. § 1301-1368.
House Labor Committees concluded that plan termination prior to
funding was another major cause of the loss of pre-ERISA benefits:
When a pension plan is terminated, an employee participating in it can lose all
or a part of the benefits which he has long been relying on, even if his plan is
fully vested .... [E]ven one worker whose retirement security is destroyed by
the termination of a plan is one too many.
14
ERISA also contains thirteen congressional findings that define the
participant interest ERISA was to protect. These findings indicate that
congressional concern for the protection of participant interests includes
the benefits promised to the participant by the employer. 42  Five
findings relate to interstate commerce and government revenues. Two
findings relate to acknowledging the growth of plans and their impor-
tance for employment stability. The remaining six findings support
several of the above mentioned policy methods to protect the interests
of participants. Three of those findings refer to anticipated or promised
benefits.143
The six findings are: (1) participants' continued well-being is
dependent on plans; (2) participants' lack of information requires
disclosure; (3) participants are losing anticipated benefits due to lack of
vesting; (4) participants' promised benefits are endangered by inadequate
funding; (5) participants are deprived of anticipated benefits due to
premature plan terminations; and (6) participants need minimum
standards to assure the equitable character and financial soundness of
plans. Only the first finding does not relate directly to one of the policy
methods. Of all the policy methods, only federal remedies are not
directly supported.
Labor Committee reports confirm congressional concern with insuring
that participants received the benefits they believed their employers had
promised them. The Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee
141. S. REP. No. 127, supra note 18, at 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838,
4842 (quoting a message sent to Congress by President Nixon); H.R. RFP. No. 533,
supra note 18, at 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4643.
142. The Supreme Court has also acknowledged that the congressional concern is
that participants receive their promised benefits. E.g., Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct.
2242, 2250 (1992) (goal of protecting pension benefits; policy to safeguard stream of
income for pensioners); Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S.
365, 376 (1990) (policy to safeguard stream of income for pensioners); Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113 (1989) (to promote interest of beneficiaries;
to protect contractually defined benefits for participants); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985) (to protect contractually defined benefits for
participants).
143. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a)
(1988).
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declared that ERISA seeks to protect the benefits employers promised to
participants or led them to believe they had:
The provisions of S.4 are addressed to the issue of whether American
working men and women shall receive private pension plan benefits which they
have been led to believe would be theirs upon retirement from working lives.
It responds by mandating protective measures, and prescribing minimum
standards for promised benefits.
. .. The Promise and commitment of a pension can be fulfilled only
when funds are available to pay the employee participant what is owed to him.
Without adequate funding, a promise of a pension which [sic] may be illusory
and empty.
... One of the more dramatic evidences of the deficiencies of pension
plans, illustrated by the Studebaker case in 1964[,] is the failure of employees
to receive all of the pension benefits to which they are entitled, when a
company shuts down, relocates or merges with another corporate entity."
Both the Senate and House Labor Committees concluded that the
protection was for anticipated benefits, promises of benefits, and just
expectations of benefits: "Our primary consideration in [ERISA] has
been to help assure that workers now covered by pension plans get their
expected benefits."'45 The Senate report also stated:
The Internal Revenue Code provides only limited safeguards for the security
of anticipated benefit rights in private plans ....
[I]f pension promises are to be meaningful to workers, there is need for
federal statutory requirements which will compel an employer to grant such
vesting benefits.
The Bill reported by the Committee represents an effort to strike an
appropriate balance between the interests of employers and labor organizations
in maintaining flexibility in the design and operation of their pension programs,
and the need of the workers for a level of protection which will adequately
protect their rights and just expectations.'
The Senate Finance Committee indicated that protection was for
promises of benefits: "[M]any employees now covered by pension plans
144. S. REP. No. 127, supra note 18, at 1, 10, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4838, 4838, 4846 (emphasis added).
145. H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 18, at 40, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4639, 4666 (emphasis added).
146. S. REP. No. 127, supra note 18, at 5, 8, 13, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4838, 4841, 4845, 4850 (emphasis added); H.R. REP. NO. 533, supra note 18, at 4, 6,
9, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4642, 4644, 4647.
may not actually receive the pensions they have been promised, because
the needed funds will not be available.' 47  The House Ways and
Means Committee came to similar conclusions: "[M]any employees now
covered by tax qualified pension plans may not actually receive the
pensions they have been promised, because the present minimum funding
requirements for plans qualified under the Internal Revenue Code is not
adequate to prevent this underfunding .. . .,148
Careful analysis of legislative sources shows that Congress passed
ERISA to insure that plans protected participant expectations. In other
words, under ERISA, participants should receive the benefits they
reasonably believed their employers had promised them.
Committee reports discussing ERISA explain the reason for Congress'
concern for participants' expectations. • Benefits accumulated under a
plan are the property of the participants, representing remuneration for
labor already completed for the employer. Both the Senate Labor and
Public Welfare Committee and the House Education and Labor
Committee stated that benefits were deferred wages and that the
employer owed benefits to plan participants. The House report stated:
"The Act presumes that promised pension benefits are in the form of a
conditional deferred wage. While popular attention focuses on the
deferred wage aspect of pensions, the Act recognizes that the pension
promise is conditional upon completion of minimum periods of
service."'49  Likewise, the Senate report came to the following
conclusions:
[T]he issue basically resolves itself into whether workers, after many years
of labor, whose jobs terminate voluntarily or otherwise, should be denied
benefits they have earned as deferred compensation and which have been placed
for them in a fund for retirement purposes.
As a matter of equity and fair treatment an employee covered by a pension
plan is entitled, after a reasonable period of service, to protection of his future
retirement benefit against any termination of his employment.
... [A] pension can be fulfilled only when funds are available to pay the
employee participant what is owed to him.'
147. S. REP. No. 383, supra note 136, at 44, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890,
4941 (emphasis added).
148. H.R. REP. No. 807, supra note 136, at 74, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4670, 4739 (emphasis added).
149. H.L REP. No. 533, supra note 18, at 13, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4639, 4651 (emphasis added).
150. S. REP. No. 127, supra note 18, at 5, 9, 10 (without parallel in House report),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838,4843,4845,4846 (emphasis added); see H.R. REP.
No. 533, supra note 18, at 5, 6, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4643, 4644-45.
The language "they have earned as deferred compensation and" quoted above in the
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Both the Senate and House Labor Committees concluded recognition of
benefits as deferred wages resulted from the World War 11 experience.
The Senate report states:
Increases in fringe and retirement benefits during [World War II and the Korean
conflict] became a means of compensating workers in lieu of increased wages,
thus making pension benefits a form of deferred wages. In 1947, stemming
from a suit filed with the National Labor Relations Board, the U.S. District
Court decided that pensions were a form of remuneration for labor .... 151
Likewise, the House report states:
The wage freezes imposed during World War II and the Korean conflict
focused increased attention in the deferred component of compensation as a
means of avoiding the freeze restrictions .... In 1947 a series of administra-
tive proceedings and court decisions under the National Labor Relations Act of
1935 held that pensions were a form of remuneration for the purposes of the
Act .... 152
Both the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means
Committee also recognized benefits as deferred compensation: "[L]osses
of pension rights [from the absence of a vesting provision] are inequita-
ble, since the pension contributions previously made on behalf of the
Senate report does not appear in the House report. Id.
One commentator denigrates conditional deferred compensation, implying Congress
had little concern for the contractual relationship. See Conison, supra note 5, at 610-17
(arguing for a rejection of the contractual approach). Conison's argument, however, fails
to consider the practical concerns involved in calculating a deferral based in part on prior
years' salaries under a non-qualified deferred compensation agreement. For management
executives, the amount deferred each year not only reflects a portion calculated from the
current year's salary, but portions calculated from increased vesting on prior years'
salary as well as portions calculated from earnings on prior years' deferrals. There is
nothing "conditional" about the amount deferred in each year. Rather, the deferred
amount reflects a detailed formula reflecting vesting and earnings. See, e.g., Albertson's,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 F.3d 537, 544 (9th Cir. 1994) (taxpayer claimed calculated
amounts under deferred compensation plans representing interest were currently
deductible).
151. S. REP. No. 127, supra note 18, at 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838,
4839 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1 (1948), enf'd, Inland
Steel v. National Labor Relations Bd., 170 F.2d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1949), af'd, sub nom.
American Communications Assoc. v. Doud, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); accord W.W. Cross
& Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1162 (1948), enf'd, 174 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949).
152. H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 18, at 2, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4640 (emphasis added).
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employee may have been made in lieu of additional compensation or
some other benefits which he would have received."'
53
The reports also clarify that the congressional method for protecting
participant interests requires contractual provisions delineating the
relationship created by the plan. Both the Senate and House Labor
Committee reports indicate that Congress viewed the relationship
between the participant and the plan as contractual: "In almost every
instance, participants lose their benefits not because of some violation of
federal law, but rather because of the manner in which the plan is
executed with respect to its contractual requirements of vesting or
funding."'
154
It is clear that Congress accepted the unilateral contractual theory for
establishing the right to benefits.155 A large portion of ERISA merely
specifies what must be included in the contract.'56 This is the tradi-
tional legislative approach to regulating adhesion contracts.157  But
153. S. REP. No. 383, supra note 136, at 45, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890,
4930 (emphasis added); H.R. REP. No. 807, supra note 136, at 53, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4719.
154. S. REP. No. 127, supra note 18, at 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838,
4841-42 (emphasis added); H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 18, at 5, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4643 (same); accord S. REP. No. 127, supra, at 8, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838,4844. The President's Commission found "defective private pension
plans were failing to provide the elderly with adequate income to meet economic needs
when their productivity had ended." Id.
155. See supra notes 5-17 and accompanying text for the five pre-ERISA liability
theories.
156. See S. REP. No. 634, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 111 (1972) (Statement of Javits)
("[W]hile, admittedly, pension rights and obligations are basically matters of contractual
liability, Congress must not ignore the need for ascertaining solutions to the problems
which were brought to the surface .... Those in need can turn only to Congress to
provide corrections for the deficiencies in the system."); id. at 113 (recommending
imposition of minimum vesting, funding, and fiduciary standards to overcome plan
inadequacies); see also I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(8), 401(a)(9), 401(a)(12), 401(a)(13), 401(a)(14),
401(a)(16), 401(a)(25), 410, & 411, 26 U.S.C. §§ 401(a)(8) (defined benefit plan must
prohibit forfeitures from increasing benefit), 401(a)(9) (plan must provide for distribution
of entire interest), 401(a)(12) (plan must provide for benefit equality upon plan merger),
401(a)(13) (plan must provide anti-alienation provision), 401(a)(14) (plan must provide
for benefit distribution time limits), 401(a)(16) (plan must provide for maximum benefit
limitations), 401(a)(25) (defined benefit plan must specify actuarial assumptions), 410
(plan must provide minimum participation), & 411 (plan must provide minimum vesting)
(1988).
157. E.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-702 (McKinney 1989) (consumer contracts
up to $50,000 must be written "in a clear and coherent manner using words with
common and every day meanings"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 422.303(2) (West 1988)
(consumer credit sale contract must use type of stated size); U.C.C. § 2-316(2), IA
U.L.A. 465 (1989) (disclaimer of implied warranty of merchantability must mention
merchantability and, if written, be conspicuous); UNIU. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
§ 2.201, 7 U.L.A. 643-44 (1985) (prohibiting provision setting finance charges above a
specified rate). See generally 1 E. ALLAN FARNsWORTH, CONTRACTs § 4.29, at 517-22
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under general contract theory, one party's duty to the other operates on
the low standard of the morals of the marketplace. 58 With respect to
the duties of the ERISA plan's non-employee parties--the employer, the
plan administrator, and the trustee-Congress implemented a higher
standard. Non-employee parties are subject to the more stringent legal
standard of fiduciaries, as seen in trust law.59 In sum, Congress
recognized the employee benefit plan as a sort of unilateral adhesion
contract that gives rise to fiduciary duties on the part of the dominant
party.
2. The Policy to Encourage Plan Formation
Protection of federal revenues was the concern of the tax committees.
Protecting tax revenues reflects the second ERISA policy, fostering the
growth of plans through tax subsidies.16
(1990).
158. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REv. 795, 829 (1983).
159. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928) ("Not honesty alone
but the punctillio of an honor the most sensitive is ... the standard of behavior.")
(Cardozo, J.).
160. The Supreme Court has recognized that another ERISA policy is to foster plan
formation. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 658 (1990)
(encourage use and maintenance of pension plans) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Massachu-
setts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 n.17 (1985) (concern to reduce
employer costs so as not to discourage the growth of private pension plans); Nachman
Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 379-80 n.30, 385 n.35 (1980).
See also 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 4706-07 (Rep. Rostenkowski on
conference bill):
The goal of the legislation was to strengthen the rights of employees under
existing pension systems, while at the same time encouraging the expansion
of these plans and the creation of new ones .... As a result, the conference
report on H.R. 2 represents a true balance of the interests of all concerned.
For example, its early vesting provisions will insure that each employee will
have rights and not just empty promises as retirement approaches. Similarly
the tax provisions ... will ... continue to encourage the establishment of
retirement plans by corporate employers.
Id. at 4791 (Sen. Bentsen):
[Tihis legislation recognizes the importance of expanding private retirement
coverage to the tens of millions of American workers who do not now have
the opportunity to participate in private retirement plans.... The purpose of
this legislation is not to establish an ideal pension plan but rather to set up
minimum standards to prevent real abuses . ... Hopefully, companies and
unions would establish plans that, in fact, are more generous than the
minimum standards .... [I]f minimum standards are set too high, we would
discourage the creation of new plans.
989
Both the Senate and House Labor Committees, which dealt with the
policy to protect participant expectations, refer to the policy of fostering
growth of plans as if it were not their policy but the policy of the
opponents of ERISA:
[G]ovemmental supervision of mandated and essential improvements has been
resisted due to the belief that such legislation might impede plan growth."'
Opponents of mandatory vesting believe that compulsory vesting provisions
will discourage development of new plans and impede flexibility and latitude
in formulating employee benefits because of excessive costs that are certain to
result."62
The same opposition is voiced for new plans, which invariably assume a
large unfunded liability at the outset of the plan .... "
But each Labor Committee separately recognized fostering plan growth
as of some concern. The Senate report states: "The Committee also
concluded that an exemption for plans of small size was necessary in
order to prevent discouraging small employers from establishing pension
plans. ''lM Similarly, the House report states: "[W]e have been careful
not to inhibit benefit improvements for these covered workers and not
to retard the expansion of the pension system in such a way as to deny
retirement benefits to workers not now covered."' 65
The reason for the Labor Committees' indifference to this ERISA
policy was that it was already taken care of by the tax committees.
Consequently, these Committees acted as if ERISA itself would be
sufficient to encourage new plan formation:
[Enactment of the labor bill] should serve to encourage rather than diminish
efforts by management and industry to expand pension plan coverage and to
improve benefits for workers .... [The labor bill's] approach of establishing
minimum standards and safeguards for private pensions is not only consistent
161. S. REP. No. 127, supra note 18, at 8, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838,
4844; H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 18, at 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4643.
162. S. REP. No. 127, supra note 18, at 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838,
4845; H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 18, at 6, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4644.
163. S. REP. No. 127, supra note 18, at 8, 9, 10, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4838, 4844, 4845, 4846; H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 18, at 5, 6, 7, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4643, 4644, 4645.
164. S. REP. No. 127, supra note 18, at 18, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838,
4854.
165. H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 18, at 41, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4639, 4666.
990
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with retention of the freedom of decision-making vital to pension plans, but in
furtherance of the growth and development of the private pension system."
The Senate Finance Committee and House Ways and Means Commit-
tee, on the other hand, did deal with achieving desired social goals
through the tax subsidy. Both stated that the ERISA policy was to
encourage new plan formation:
The bill continues to rely primarily on the tax laws to secure needed improve-
ments in pension and related plans. In general, it retains the tax incentives
granted under present law for the purpose of encouraging the establishment of
plans which contain socially desirable provisions.16
Present law encourages employers to establish retirement plans for their
employees by granting favorable tax treatment where plans qualify by meeting
nondiscrimination and other rules set forth in the Internal Revenue Code ....
The favorable tax treatment granted qualified plans is substantial .... "I
[T]he objective [of the tax portions of ERISA] is to increase the number of
individuals participating in employer-financed plans; to make sure to the
greatest extent possible that those who do participate in such plans actually
receive benefits and do not lose their benefits as a result of unduly restrictive
forfeiture provisions or failure of the pension plan to accumulate and retain
sufficient funds to meet its obligations ....
A fundamental aspect of present law, which [the bill] continues, is reliance on
voluntary action by employers... for the establishment of qualified retirement
plans ... [and] encouraging the establishment of retirement plans which
contain socially desirable provisions through the granting of tax inducements.
... Since the favorable tax treatment is quite substantial... it is anticipated
that plans vill have a strong inducement to comply with the new qualification
rules .. 170
Both the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means
Committee recognized that new plan formation would occur through the
subsidy as long as the costs of the ERISA requirements were not greater
166. S. RE'. No. 127, supra note 18, at 13, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838,
4849-50; H.R. REP'. No. 533, supra note 18, at 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4647.
167. S. REP. No. 383, supra note 136, at 2, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890,
4890 (emphasis added).
168. S. REP. No. 383, supra note 136, at 2, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890,
4891 (emphasis added); H.R. RlEP. No. 807, supra note 136, at 2-3, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4671-72.
169. S. REP. No. 383, supra note 136, at 10, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890,
4898 (emphasis added); H.R. REP. No. 807, supra note 136, at 8, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4676-77.
170. S. REP. No. 383, supra note 136, at 2 (without parallel in House report), 2, 10,
10-11, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890, 4890, 4891, 4898, 4898-99 (emphasis
added); H.R. REP. No. 807, supra note 136, at 2-3, 8, 8-9, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4671-72, 4676-77, 4677.
than the subsidy. As a result, the Committees engaged in a balancing
process:
mhe committee recognizes that private retirement plans are voluntary on the
part of the employer, and, therefore, it has weighed carefully the additional
costs to the employer and minimized them to the extent consistent with
minimum standards for retirement benefits."'
[T]he committee is aware that ... unduly large increases in costs could impede
the growth and improvement of the private retirement system. For this reason,
... the committee has sought to adopt provisions which strike a balance
between providing meaningful reform and keeping costs within reasonable
limits . ... [I]t would appear that the wider or more comprehensive the
coverage, vesting, and funding, the more desirable it is from the standpoint of
national policy.'
Both the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means
Committee balanced in the three areas of interest for the tax subsidy:
coverage, vesting, and funding:
[for coverage:] provide a balance between the need to grant employees the right
to participate in pension plans at a relatively early age so that they can begin
to acquire pension rights and the need to avoid the administrative drawbacks
that would be involved in granting coverage to transient short-term employees
whose pension benefits would in any event be small.'73
[E]arly participation tends to spread the cost of providing employees with
adequate pensions more evenly .... "
[for vesting:] In considering the minimum vesting provision, it is especially
important to balance the protection offered by the provision against the
additional cost involved in financing the plans.'
7
The first [consideration] relates to the need to balance the protection offered by
the minimum vesting provisions against the additional cost involved in
financing the plan.
176
[I]t would be counterproductive to increase employer costs by more rapid
vesting to such an extent as to significantly curtail the creation of new
171. S. REP. No. 383, supra note 136, at 1, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890,
4890; H.R. REP. No. 807, supra note 136, at 2, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670,
4671.
172. S. REP. No. 383, supra note 136, at 1, 18, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4890, 4890, 4904; H.R. REP. No. 807, supra note 136, at 2, 14-15, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4671, 4682.
173. S. REP. No. 383, supra note 136, at 19, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890,
4904; H.R. REP. No. 807, supra note 136, at 15, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670,
4682.
174. S. REP. No. 383, supra note 136, at 39, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890,
4924; H.R. REP. No. 807, supra note 136, at 44, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670,
4709-10.
175. S. REP. No. 383, supra note 136, at 18, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890,
4905.
176. H.R. REP. No. 807, supra note 136, at 19, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4670, 4686.
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retirement plans (or significantly curtail the increase of benefits in existing
plans).,m
[for funding:] [I]t is essential for plans to be adequately funded in accordance
with a contributions schedule which will produce sufficient funds to meet the
obligations of the plan when they fall due....
of .IT]he level payment method, while providing for adequate amortization
of the past service costs, initially adds only relatively moderate amounts to an
employer's existing funding costs."
The House Ways and Means Committee also understood that the
mechanism by which the tax subsidy operated was to provide a tax
shelter for management employees:
[The] committee recognizes the importance of tax incentives in creating a strong
private pension system. At the same time, however, [the] committee believes
it is appropriate to provide some limitations to prevent the accumulation of
corporate pensions out of tax-sheltered dollars which are swollen completely out
of proportion to the reasonable needs of individuals for a dignified level of
retirement income.179
It's clear that one of the greatest reasons for excessive executive salaries is the
tax avoidance which can be managed by earmarking large portions of these
salaries for pension or profit-sharing plans....
* * [I]f we are to continue to use our tax system to subsidize private pension
benefits, we'll need a lot more progress in distributing the tax benefits involved
more equitably among all workers."'
So ERISA was composed of two parts, a labor part and a tax part,
each with a different policy to foster. Moreover, the two policies need
not conflict.' Plan formation by providing management employees
177. S. REP. No. 383, supra note 136, at 45, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890,
4930; H.R. REP. No. 807, supra note 136, at 54, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670,
4720 (same).
178. S. REP. No. 383, supra note 136, at 18 (without parallel in House report), 19,
22, 39,45, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890,4904,4905,4907-08,4924,4930; H.R.
REP. No. 807, supra note 136, at 15, 19 (without parallel in Senate report), 21-23, 44,
54, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4682, 4686, 4690-92, 4709-10, 4720.
179. H.R. REP. No. 807, supra note 136, at 108, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4670, 4777.
180. H.R. REP. No. 807, supra note 136, at 108, 166, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4777, 4835 (statements of Reps. James A. Corman and Sam
Gibbons).
181. See SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, U.S. SENATE, 98TH CONG., 2D SEss., THE
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: THE FIRST DECADE 20-24
(1984) (explaining the opposition to ERISA's passage involving industry and the craft
unions concerned about the costs only of minimum vesting requirements that might
with a tax shelter is the role of the tax portion of ERISA. Payment of
benefits rightfully due participants is the role of the labor portion of
ERISA. Moreover, the tax portion, the portion that encourages plan
formation, only relates to coverage, vesting, and funding for all ERISA
plans, not payment of anticipated benefits from one plan. The purpose
of fostering plans relates to all plans in the aggregate, not one discrete
plan. Payment of benefits from one plan, due to litigation rules
favorable to participants, might discourage the one employer sued from
establishing further plans. But payment has no plan discouraging effect
on other employers, except those planning to engage in skulduggery.
Employers concerned about paying more than they desire to participants
should be more careful in drafting benefit promises.
D. Federal Courts' Recognition
Many federal circuit courts considering ERISA have recognized the
above principles. These courts have stated that the power to make
federal common law exists only within the interstices in the statute.
18 2
The scope of the authority is limited by the requirement that the federal
common law rule cannot conflict with ERISA principles.'8 3  In
discourage new plan formation, which opposition vanished when studies revealed only
moderate costs). Contra Conison, supra note 5, at 581 (describing ERISA policies as
participant interests versus employer interests); Fisk, supra note 26, at 168-69.
182. E.g., Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d 1249, 1257 (3d Cir. 1993) (plan
interpretation); Landro v. Glendenning Motorways, Inc., 625 F.2d 1344, 1351 (8th Cir.
1980) (same); see also Buckley Dement, Inc. v. Travelers Plan Adm'rs of Ill., Inc., 39
F.3d 784, 788 (7th Cir. 1994) (non-fiduciary liability); Miller v. Taylor Insulation Co.,
39 F.3d 755, 758 (7th Cir. 1994) (promissory estoppel); Glass v. United of Omaha Life
Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 1341, 1347 (11th Cir. 1994) (waiver); Slice v. Sons of Nor., 34 F.3d
630, 633 (8th Cir. 1994) (equitable estoppel); Reid v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co.,
17 F.3d 1092, 1098 (8th Cir. 1994) (late claim filing); Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons
Contractors, Inc., 974 F.2d 270, 280 (2d Cir. 1992) (non-fiduciary liability); Jamail, Inc.
v. Carpenters Dist. Council of Houston Pension & Welfare Trusts, 954 F.2d 299, 303-04
(5th Cir. 1992) (employer reimbursement); PM Group Life Ins. Co. v. Western Growers
Assurance Trust, 953 F.2d 543, 546 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1992) (conflicting insurance
provisions); Chemung Canal Trust Co. v. Sovran Bank/Maryland, 939 F.2d 12, 18 (2d
Cir. 1991) (contribution and indemnity), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1212 (1992); Provident
Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller, 906 F.2d 985, 991 (4th Cir.) (plan reimbursement),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 982 (1990); Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension Fund
v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 284 (7th Cir.) (en banc) (waiver), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 820
(1990); Board of Trustees of Watsonville Frozen Food Welfare Trust Fund v. California
Coop. Creamery, 877 F.2d 1415, 1424 (9th Cir. 1989) (multiemployer collections);
Northern Group Services, Inc. v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 85, 94 (6th Cir. 1987)
(coordination of benefits); Anderson v. John Morrell & Co., 830 F.2d 872, 877 (8th Cir.
1987) (promissory estoppel).
183. See, e.g., Butler v. Encyclopedia Brittanica, Inc., 41 F.3d 285, 294 (7th Cir.
1994) (substantial compliance); Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 30 F.3d 554, 562
(4th Cir. 1994) (substantial compliance); Elmore v. Cone Mills Corp., 23 F.3d 855, 869
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addition, the federal common law rule must further the policies of
ERISA. 184 The circuit courts have even recognized that ERISA fosters
employee benefit protection 185 and plan growth.'86
But recitation of the shibboleths does not necessarily produce correct
results. An examination of cases dealing with the plan interpretation
rule for the benefits-due lawsuit indicates that federal circuit courts either
paid no attention to the principles for developing federal common law
or intentionally acted to oppose these principles.
(4th Cir. 1994) (en bane) (equitable estoppel); Coleman v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 969
F.2d 54, 58 (4th Cir. 1992) (equitable estoppel), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1051 (1993);
Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1335 (5th Cir.) (extracontractual
damages), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 812 (1992); Singer v. Black & Decker Corp., 964
F.2d 1449, 1452 (4th Cir. 1992) (equitable estoppel); Rodrigue v. Western & S. Life Ins.
Co., 948 F.2d 969, 971 (5th Cir. 1991) (equitable estoppel); Chemung, 939 F.2d at 18
(Altimari, J., dissenting) (arbitration); Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 871 F.2d 1290, 1297
(5th Cir. 1989) (promissory estoppel); Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889, 894 (5th
Cir. 1989) (preemption); Woodfork v. Marine Cooks & Stewards Union, 642 F.2d 966,
971 (5th Cir. 1981) (preemption).
184. See, e.g., Adams, 30 F.3d at 565 (substantial compliance); Reich v. Rowe, 20
F.3d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 1994) (non-fiduciary liability); Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v.
Central States S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 982 F.2d 1006, 1015 (6th Cir.)
(employer reimbursement), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 67 (1993); Diduck, 974 F.2d at 281
(nonfiduciary liability); Davidowitz v. Delta Dental Plan, Inc., 946 F.2d 1476, 1480 (9th
Cir. 1991) (assignment); Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, and Pension Trust Funds,
944 F.2d 1176, 1186 (3d Cir. 1991) (employer reimbursement); Chemung, 939 F.2d at
18 (contribution and indemnity); Waller, 906 F.2d at 992 (plan reimbursement);
Plucinski v. International Assoc. of Machinists Nat'l Pension Fund, 875 F.2d 1052, 1058
(3d Cir. 1989) (employer reimbursement); Moran v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 872 F.2d 296,
302 (9th Cir. 1989) (promissory estoppel).
185. E.g., Saltarelli v. Bob Baker Group Medical Trust, 35 F.3d 382, 386 (9th Cir.
1994) (plan interpretation); see, e.g., Elmore, 23 F.3d at 874 (Niemeyer, J., concurring)
(equitable estoppel); Reich, 20 F.3d at 32 (non-fiduciary liability); Coar v. Kazimir, 990
F.2d 1413, 1424 (3d Cir.) (set-off for fiduciary breach), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 179
(1993); Lumpkin v. Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 933 F.2d 449, 466 (7th Cir.) (statute of
limitations), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 939 (1991); De Nobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 1180,
1185 (4th Cir. 1989) (plan review standard); Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Service
Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 962 (1st Cir. 1989) (exclusive benefit rule);
Board of Trustees of the Mill Cabinet Pension Trust for N. Cal. v. Valley Cabinet &
Mfg. Co., 877 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1989) (disregard of corporate form).
186. E.g., Albertson's, Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 F.3d 537,544(9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3800 (1995) (taxpayer claimed calculated amounts under deferred
compensation plans representing interest were currently deductible).
Il. COURT DECISIONS ON THE PLAN INTERPRETIVE RULE
A major rule that a benefits-due litigant might face deals with plan
interpretation, for which ERISA contains no express provision.
187
Thus, ERISA's plan interpretive rule is a fertile ground for developing
federal common law. A court faced with developing an appropriate rule
could devise its own original rule or adopt one from some other body of
law. Since few federal courts feel authorized to use the first method,
they generally have confined their efforts to the second method. Courts
adopting rules from other bodies of law also make modifications of the
rule they select.
A. Common Law Principles
The most likely bodies of common law that can be used to fashion an
ERISA rule are federal labor law and state contract, trust, and property
law. Each of these areas of law, like ERISA, deals with privately
drafted documents or oral agreements, which on occasion require
interpretation. Courts have developed several rules under each body of
law to resolve disputes over interpretation.
All of the interpretive rules essentially involve three successive steps.
The first step, the understanding principle, searches in the words to be
interpreted and intrinsic evidence for a single understanding. The
various interpretive rules take one of two approaches to this determina-
tion. One group of rules uses an elite standard; another group uses a lay
standard. The lay standard favors participants since they are more likely
to possess the lay understanding than are the experienced plan adminis-
trators. The lay standard is also more likely to result in ambiguities and
a multiplicity of possible interpretations, since participants, being more
numerous than plan administrators, will have more different understand-
ings. Of course, some principles for resolving ambiguities favor
participants.
Often, the first step fails to find a single interpretation because an
ambiguity exists. In this situation, the second step, the ambiguity
principle, resolves the ambiguity by selecting one interpretation as the
single understanding. The selection is made after an investigation of
187. Elmore v. Cone Mills Corp., 6 F.3d 1028, 1038 (4th Cir. 1993) ("ERISA does
not contain a body of contract law to govern interpretation ... of employee benefit
plans."); Holland v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1140, 1147 n.5 (4th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986); Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1501 (9th Cir.
1985); see Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) (not specifying
one after determining whether interpretive discretion is present).
996
[VOL. 32: 955, 1995] ERPSA
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
evidence outside the document-known as extrinsic evidence--suggests
the most reasonable meaning. The various interpretive rules have yet to
set up a rigorous hierarchy governing the order of types of extrinsic
evidence to use. The various rules generally accept any number of items
presented by the parties in toto and weigh them to select the correct
understanding. But the various rules differ in the use of extrinsic
evidence with respect to ambiguity. One group of interpretive rules uses
the extrinsic evidence principle to bar extrinsic evidence unless the
understanding principle results in the finding of an ambiguity, in which
case the court uses the extrinsic evidence only to resolve the ambiguity.
A second group of interpretive rules uses the partial-extrinsic evidence
principle to admit some extrinsic evidence without a finding of an
ambiguity. Of course, extrinsic evidence frequently facilitates the
finding of an ambiguity and bars all remaining extrinsic evidence, unless
the first portion of the second step results in a finding of an ambiguity,
in which case the court uses the remaining extrinsic evidence only to
resolve the ambiguity. A third group of interpretive rules use the anti-
extrinsic evidence principle to omit the second step, proceeding
immediately to the third step upon the finding of an ambiguity. In this
latter case, the court considers extrinsic evidence, if at all, to determine
the presence of an ambiguity. The extrinsic evidence principle,
admitting all extrinsic evidence together, generally favors the plan
administrator since much of it is technical, relates to facts not readily
known by participants, and is of easier access to plan administrators'
88
Unfortunately, sometimes the second step also fails to find a single
understanding. A third step specifies a default principle to resolve the
ambiguity. Interpretive rules take two approaches to this default
principle. One group of interpretive rules uses a default principle
favoring the draftsman; another group uses a default principle favoring
the non-draftsman, the contra proferentem principle. The latter standard
favors participants since they are very unlikely to have had a hand in
drafting the plan.1
8 9
188. See Masella v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 936 F.2d 98, 105 (2d Cir.
1991).
189. Some courts assert that for collectively-bargained plans the negotiating union
represents the participant and so the participant participated in the drafting and is not
entitled to a construction against the employer. See Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362,
1369 (9th Cir. 1976) (federal labor law presumes equal bargaining power of collectively-
bargained plans). This position contradicts the federal labor statutes, which recognize
Generally, the application of the three steps is a question of law for
the court, except the weighing of extrinsic evidence is for the jury or
other fact finder as a question of fact. 90 For ERISA this presently is
of little significance, since most circuit courts do not permit jury
trial. 9 ' In addition, sometimes courts describe steps two and three in
an inverted fashion. These courts specify a rebuttable presumption in
the second step and then use extrinsic evidence to rebut the presumption
in the third step.
Because of the frequency of interpretive success at step one, the other
steps may seem superfluous. But no good faith interpretive dispute
exists without ambiguities that lead to steps two and perhaps three.
Therefore, interpretive resolution at step one means the absence of a
good faith interpretive dispute or judicial reluctance to rule for partici-
pants.
If a court devised its own rule from these three steps, it could devise
twelve different combinations. It could choose two variations for step
one, the understanding principle. The court could choose among three
rules for step two, the ambiguity principle. And it could choose two for
step three, the default principle. Despite the large number of permuta-
tions, there are only six common law interpretive rules under the above-
mentioned bodies of law.
1. Contract Law
Contract law uses four of the six interpretive rules. The basic contract
interpretive principle law is to determine the intent of the negotiating
parties at the time of contracting. 92 Determining intent requires the
selection of objective or subjective standards.
Classical contract theory, prevalent during the early development of
employee benefit plans in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
union malfeasance in operating employee benefit plans to the detriment of participants.
See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text and infra note 243 and accompanying
text.
190. 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 554, at 224-27 (1960)
(neoclassical contract theory). Contra 4 SAMUEL WILLISTON, TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 600, at 284-85 (Walter H. E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1961) (classical
contract theory explains that interpretation is for the judiciary and not the jury).
191. See Flint, supra note 1, at 383-93.
192. E.g., 4 WILLISTON, supra note 190, § 600, at 284-85; 3 CORBIN, supra note
190, § 538, at 55; see MORTON J. HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERiCAN LAW
1870-1960, 35 (1992) (describing the subjective will theory of contract of the early
nineteenth century).
Some jurisdictions have codes mandating the interpretive rules. Eg., CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 1635-1662 (Deering 1994 & Supp. 1995) (including the contra proferentem
principle); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, §§ 3471-3474 (1990).
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centuries, provides an objective standard. In the case of employee
benefit plans under ERISA, there is generally a written contract.
193
Under the plain meaning principle, the court examines the specific
language of the contract, interpreting words as a reasonably intelligent
person would. 94 The court gives words their ordinary dictionary or
technical meaning as appropriate.' 95 If the words are ambiguous, then
the court examines extrinsic evidence and weighs it to select the most
reasonable meaning. 96  Some state courts, when presented with an
ambiguity, apply the default principle automatically without first
examining extrinsic evidence. 97
193. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 402(a), 29 U.S.C.
1102(a) (1988). If a court recognized application of estoppel doctrines to ERISA plans,
the plan could include those additional representations whether oral or written. See
Averhart v. US West Management Pension Plan, 46 F.3d 1480, 1486 (10th Cir. 1994)
(not reaching issue of whether court can use estoppel evidence to interpret ambiguities,
since plan had no ambiguity); Peckham v. Gem State Mut., 964 F.2d 1043, 1050 n.13
(10th Cir. 1992); see also supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
194. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAWv OF CONTRACTS § 230 (1932) ("The standard of
interpretation ... except where it produces an ambiguous result.., is the meaning that
would be attached... by a reasonably intelligent person acquainted with all operative
usages and knowing all the circumstances.... ."); 4 WILLISTON, supra note 190, § 607,
at 378-79.
195. RESTATMENT OF T=E LAW OF CONTRACTs §§ 235 (a) ("[T]he ordinary
meaning of language.., is given to words.") & 235(b) ('[T]echnical... words... are
given their technical meaning .... ).
196. Id. § 235(c) (aids to apply the standard: "A writing is interpreted as a whole
and all writings forming part of the same transaction are interpreted together."); id.
§ 235(d) ("All circumstances accompanying the transaction may be taken into
consideration . .. ."); id. 235(e) ("If the conduct of the parties subsequent to a
manifestation of intention indicates that all the parties placed a particular interpretation
upon it, that meaning is adopted. .. ").
197. E.g., Bruder v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 620 N.E.2d 355, 358 (Ill. 1993); Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 482 N.E.2d 467, 470 (Ind. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1060 (1987); Krombach v. Mayflower Ins. Co., 827 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Mo. 1992) (en
banc); United States Bronze Powders, Inc. v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 611 A.2d
667, 670 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992); Gunn v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 629
S.W.2d 59, 61 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981); Tempelis v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 485
N.W.2d 217, 221 (Wis. 1992).
Criticism of the contra proferentem principle generally focuses on this practice of
some courts to apply the principle immediately upon finding an ambiguity, the anti-
extrinsic evidence principle. See Stephen M. Hoke, Contract Interpretation in
Commercial Insurance Disputes: The Status of the Sophisticated Insured Exception and
Alternatives to the Ambiguity Rule, 40 FED'N INS. & CORP. CouNs. Q. 259 (1990);
David S. Miller, Note, Insurance as Contract: The Argument for Abandoning the
Ambiguity Doctrine, 88 CoLuM. L. REv. 1849 (1988).
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Because of this significant rule variation, classical contract theory
does not provide a well-settled interpretive rule. As a result, classical
contract theory does not satisfy Justice White's requirements for the
federal common law's use of state common law as a source of rules.'
98
If the extrinsic evidence principle did not resolve the ambiguity or was
omitted, then the court selects the reasonable meaning least favorable to
the draftsman of the words-the contra proferentem principle.' 99 One
explanation for the contra proferentem principle is morality-based: the
draftsman created the ambiguity and so should bear the loss."' Of
course, if a court did not desire to use the contra proferentem principle,
which favors participants, the judge needs only to find the language
unambiguous.2"'
Neoclassical contract theory provides a subjective standard, seeking
the common meaning of the parties at the time of entering the contract,
rather than a court-imposed interpretation.02 In the absence of
common meaning, the court selects the meaning of the ignorant party
198. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
199. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw OF CONTRACTS § 236(d) ("Where words... bear
more than one reasonable meaning an interpretation is preferred which operates more
strongly against the party from whom they proceed .... ."); see, e.g., Schering Corp. v.
Home Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 4, 10 n.2 (2d Cir. 1983) (New York law); Eagle-Picher Indus.,
Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1982) (Mass. law), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1028 (1983); Rich Maid Kitchens, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Lumbermens Mut. Ins.
Co., 641 F. Supp. 297, 307, 309 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (Pennsylvania law), aff'd, 833 F.2d 307
(3d Cir. 1987); Rainier Credit Co. v. Western Alliance Corp., 171 Cal. App. 3d 255,
263, 217 Cal. Rptr. 291, 295 (1985); Playtex FP, Inc. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 609
A.2d 1087, 1092 (Del. Super. Ct. 1991); M-Z Enter., Inc. v. Hawkeye Sec.-Ins. Co., 318
N.W.2d 408, 412 (Iowa 1982); Collier v. MD-Individual Practice Ass'n, Inc., 607 A.2d
537, 539 (Md. 1992). See generally 13 APPELMAN & APPELMAN, supra note 39, at
§ 7401.
For an advocation of the application of the contra proferentem principle to ERISA
plans, see Fisk, supra note 26, at 212.
200. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 236 cmt. d (1932) (since that
individual could have more easily prevented the mistake). In the insurance contract
context, where the terms are not negotiated and the parties have unequal bargaining
power, this rationale is intended to prevent the more sophisticated insurer from taking
advantage of the insured. Hoke, supra note 197, at 262; Barry R. Ostrager & David W.
Ichel, Should The Business Insurance Policy Be Construed Against the Insurer? Another
Look At The Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 33 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 273,
278-79 (1983).
201. See Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction And The Coordinating Function
of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 252 ("Plain meaning, quite simply, is a
blunt, frequently crude, and certainly narrowing device, cutting off access to many
features of some particular conversational or communicative or interpretive context that
would otherwise be available to the interpreter or conversational participant.").
202. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(a) (1981) ("Where the parties
have attached the same meaning. . . it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning
.... "); id. § 201 cmt. c; 3 CORBIN, supra note 190, § 538, at 57-75.
1000
[VOL. 32: 955, 1995] ERISA
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
over the knowledgeable party.20 3 The intentional meaning portions of
the neoclassical contract theory should have no application to ERISA
plans because the employee does not generally become aware of the
plan's details until long after entering employment.204  Hence, the
203. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 201(2) (1981):
Where the parties have attached different meanings ... it is interpreted in
accordance with the meaning attached by one if at the time the agreement was
made (a) that party did not know of any different meaning attached by the
other, and the other knew the meaning attached by the first party; or (b) that
party had no reason to know of any different meaning attached by the other,
and the other had reason to know the meaning attached by the first party.
See also id. § 201(c) ("Except as stated in this section, neither party is bound by the
meaning attached by the other, even though the result may be a failure of mutual
assent.").
204. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 §§ 102, 104(b), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1102, 1104(b) (1988) (provide summary plan description within 90 days after the
employee first becomes a participant, which occurs after the participant satisfies the age
and years of service under the participation requirements).
The employer's and participants' interests might not be the two intents to match. The
plan is an agreement between the employer, trustee, and plan administrator. E.g., 5A
JACOB RABKIN & MARK H. JOHNSON, CURRENT LEGAL FORMS WITH TAx ANALYSIS
13-1083 (sample form for defined benefit plan between company and trustees); id. at 13-
1549 (sample form for money purchase pension plan between company and trustees); id.
at 15-2077 (sample form for profit-sharing plan between company and trustees). The
participant enters the situation as a third party beneficiary of the plan "contract"; see
Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 467-71 (1960) (treating plan as third party
beneficiary of collective bargaining agreement between union and employer); accord
Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Gerber Truck Serv. Inc., 870 F.2d
1148, 1151-52 (7th Cir. 1989); Goldies, Inc. v. Alaska Hotel & Restaurant Employees
Health & Welfare Fund, 622 P.2d 979, 980-81 (Alaska 1981). The participant's congres-
sionally recognized consideration of deferred compensation or present salary reduction
runs to the employer, not the plan; see RIPSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 311
cmt. c (1981) (beneficiary of life insurance is a third party beneficiary of contract
between insurance company and mutual benefit association). Third party beneficiaries
are subject to the same rules as are parties to the contract, Conrad v. Thompson, 137
Cal. App. 2d 73, 77, 290 P.2d 36, 39 (1955) (party recision for failure of consideration),
including the same interpretive rule. Automobile Underwriters v. Camp, 28 N.E.2d 68,
70 (Ind. 1940) (extrinsic evidence principle); Lomont v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
151 N.E.2d 701, 704 (Ind. App. 1958) (plain meaning principle). See generally 8
APPELMAN & APPELMAN, supra note 39, § 4811, at 342 & n.7.
Generally employee benefit plans, other than those subject to collective bargaining, do
not result from negotiation. Instead, an entity seeking business prepares and sells a form
document to several unrelated employers. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 76-15, 1976-1 C.B. 553
(pattern plan of a law firm); Rev. Proc. 77-23, 1977-2 C.B. 530 (field prototype plan of
a firm other than a professional association, bank, insurance company, or regulated
investment company); Rev. Proc. 75-38, 1975-2 C.B. 567 (prototype plan of a
professional association or regulated investment company); Rev. Proc. 62-23, 1963-2
C.B. 757 (master plan of a bank or insurance company). Interpretive rules for non-
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employee has no intent to match or contradict the employer's intent. In
the absence of intentional meaning, neoclassical contract theory reverts
to classical contract theory: first the court looks for a single understand-
ing, then it employs the ambiguity evidence principle and lastly it resorts
to the default principle.20 5
Neoclassical contract theory also differs from classical contract theory
by using a different understanding principle. For adhesion contracts,
where one party significantly dominates the other so that there is no
negotiation of terms-a situation recognized by Congress for ERISA
plans-neoclassical contract theory adopts an interpretive rule developed
for insurance contracts. Under the reasonable expectation principle, the
court interprets words, not as a reasonably intelligent person, but as a
person similarly situated with the less dominant party.06 The reason-
negotiated contracts would therefore be the most appropriate interpretive rules.
205. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 (1981) ((1)"Words ... are
interpreted in light of all the circumstances .. ."; (2) "A writing is interpreted as a
whole, and all writings that are part of the same transactions are interpreted together";
(3) "Unless a different intention is manifested, (a) where language has a generally
prevailing meaning, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning; (b) technical...
words ... are given their technical meaning . . ."; and (5) "[l]ntentions of the parties
•.. are interpreted as consistent with... any relevant course of performance, course of
dealing, or usage of trade."); id. § 202 cmt. e (language understood throughout the
country, and not particular to a locality or group); id. § 206 ("In choosing among the
reasonable meanings ... that meaning is generally preferred which operates against the
party who supplies the words .... ).
206. Id. § 211 (reasonable standard lowered to that of reasonable consumer); see,
e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Gibralco, Inc., 847 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1988)
(California law); Oritani Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 741 F. Supp.
515, 520 (D.N.J. 1990) (New Jersey law), rev'd on other grounds, 989 F.2d 635 (3d Cir.
1993); Gordinier v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 742 P.2d 277, 283 (Ariz. 1987);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Kulla, 579 A.2d 525, 531 (Conn. 1990); Property Owners Ins. Co.
v. Hack, 559 N.E.2d 396, 402 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); West Trucking Line, Inc. v.
Northland Ins. Co., 459 N.W.2d 262, 264-65 (Iowa 1990); Atwater Creamery Co. v.
Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 277 (Minn. 1985); Central Waste Sys.,
Inc. v. Granite State Ins. Co., 437 N.W.2d 496, 498 (Neb. 1989); National Union Fire
Ins. Co. v. Caesars Palace Hotel & Casino, 792 P.2d 1129, 1130 (Nev. 1990); Sparks
v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 406, 413-14 (N.J. 1985); DiFabio v. Centaur Ins. Co., 531
A.2d 1141, 1143 (Pa. Super. 1987); Hazen Paper Co. v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 555
N.E.2d 576, 583 (Mass. 1990) (reasonable insured). See generally ROBERT E. KEETON
& ALAN I. WiDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 6.3(a), at 350-57 (1988); Robert E. Keeton,
Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 966-
67 (1970) (explaining the doctrine's origin in the 1960s); 2 GEORGE COUCH,
CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 15:16, at 171-74 (2d ed. Anderson 1984); 13
APPELMAN & APPELMAN, supra note 39, § 7386, at 144-46.
A rule of this sort governs international transactions, where industrialized traders draft
the documents for their trading with third world traders. The United Nations Convention
on the International Sale of Goods provides that the intent of the speaker or actor
governs only where the other party knew or could not have been unaware of that intent.
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 97/18, Annex I (1980), article 8. In all other cases the
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able expectation principle is more favorable to participants than the
contra proferentem principle because a court need not find an ambiguity
before construing in favor of some participants.2 7  The reasonable
expectation principle's rationale is that insurance contracts involve
disproportionate bargaining power and the typical insured is not able to
understand the language used in insurance contracts.2 8  Numerous
state courts have adopted this principle.09 Other courts apply the
reasonable expectation principle only in the presence of an ambigu-
ity21 In practice, these two versions may provide the same result.
21'
statements are interpreted according to the understanding that "a reasonable person of
the same kind as the other party would have in the same circumstances." Id. (emphasis
added). See also Amy H. Kastely, Out of the Whiteness: On Raced Codes and White
Race Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal, and Contract Law, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 269,
293-314 (1994) (explaining the origin of the classical contract theory's objective
interpretive rule of a reasonably intelligent person as a method to enforce the dominant
American norms and encourage immigrants to abandon minority beliefs and practices).
One of ERISA's fiduciary standards also is of this sort. Plan administrators are to act
"with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that
a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the
conduct of an enterprise of like character with like aims." Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 § 404(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(1)(B) (1988) (emphasis added).
One would think the insurance contract situation would fit this description and so
mandate the insurance contract rules. See Flint, supra note 18, at 651-53 (suggesting
insurance law application by analogy).
207. ALLAN WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS & DISPUTES § 6.03, at 233-38 (1988).
208. National Indem. Co. of Minn. v. Ness, 457 N.W.2d 755, 757 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990); see also Gordinier, 742 P.2d at 283 (following RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 211 for adhesion contracts which applies a reasonableness standard
lowered to that of average consumer).
ERISA plans suffer the same incomprehensible language problem. See supra note 125
and accompanying text.
209. BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE
COVERAGE DISPUTEs § 1.03[b](2)(B) (6th ed. 1993) (30 states in 1993); Roger
Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two
Decades, 51 Omo ST. L.J. 823 n.5 (1990) (stating that as many as 16 states may be
viewed as having adopted the reasonable expectation doctrine).
But some state courts have rejected the reasonable expectation principle to retain the
plain meaning principle. E.g., Sterling Merchandise Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 506 N.E.2d
1192, 1196-97 (Ohio App. 1986) (rejecting reasonable expectation principle); Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Mangum, 383 S.E.2d 464, 467 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989).
210. E.g., Enterprise Tools, Inc. v. Export-Import Bank of U.S., 799 F.2d 437, 442
(8th Cir. 1986) (applying federal law), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 931 (1987); Waranch v.
Gulf Ins. Co., 218 Cal. App. 3d 356, 359, 266 Cal. Rptr. 827, 828 (1990); Mutual of
Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Wood By-Products, Inc., 695 P.2d 409, 413 (Idaho 1984);
National Mut. Ins. Co. v. McMahon & Sons, Inc., 356 S.E.2d 488, 495-96 (W. Va.
1987); St. Paul Fire & Marine v. School Dist. No. 1, 763 P.2d 1255, 1263 (Wyo. 1988);
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In sum, because of rule variations, neoclassical contract theory also does
not provide a well-settled interpretive rule.
2. Trust Law
Trust law provides three interpretive rules, but only one differs from
contract rules. Trust law takes a different approach from contract law
because it does not deal with a negotiated transaction. Instead, it deals
with a donation by one party. The basic interpretive principle under
trust law is to determine the intent of the settlor in making the dona-
tion.212
Traditional trust theory uses the same method as classical contract
theory to determine the settlor's intent. The settlor's intent is determined
by the specific language of the trust document. In addition, traditional
trust theory provides an objective plain meaning principle.213  Once
again, the plain meaning principle might result in ambiguities. In that
case, traditional trust theory allows extrinsic evidence to aid interpreta-
tion.1 If the words remain ambiguous or if the court omits extrinsic
see Yancey v. Floyd West & Co., 755 S.W.2d 914, 925 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (dicta);
Keenan v. Industrial Indem. Ins. Co., 738 P.2d 270, 275 (Wash. 1987) (dicta).
211. See DiFabio v. Centaur Ins. Co., 531 A.2d 1141, 1143 (Pa. Super. 1987) (using
the reasonable expectation principle to determine ambiguity).
212. E.g., Corretti v. First Nat'l Bank, 276 So. 2d 141, 146 (Ala. 1973); State ex
rel. Goddard v. Coerver, 412 P.2d 259, 262 (Ariz. 1966); West Coast Hosp. Ass'n v.
Florida Nat'l Bank, 100 So. 2d 807, 810 (Fla. 1958); American Rubbermaid & Plastics
Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 277 N.E.2d 840, 842 (Ill. 1971); Department of Revenue v.
Kentucky Trust Co., 313 S.W.2d 401,404 (Ky. 1958); State Tax Comm'n v. Loring, 215
N.E.2d 751, 754 (Mass. 1966); First Nat'l Bank v. Anthony, 557 A.2d 957, 960 (Me.
1989); see also RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 4 (1935) ("terms of the trust' means the
manifestation of the intention of the settlor... in a manner which admits of its proof
in judicial proceedings"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 4 (1955); 1 AUSTIN W.
ScoTr & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 4, at 53 (4th ed. 1987);
GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 182, at
255 (2d ed. rev. 1979).
213. E.g., In re Fiske's Trust, 65 N.W.2d 906, 910-11 (Minn. 1954); Commerce
Trust Co. v. Starling, 393 S.W.2d 489, 494 (Mo. 1965); Ohio Citizens Bank v. Mills,
543 N.E.2d 1206, 1208 (Ohio 1989) (ordinary sense); Industrial Nat'l Bank v. Rhode
Island Hosp., 207 A.2d 286, 291 (R.I. 1965). See also RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 164
cmt. e (1935) ("determined by the provisions of the instrument"); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 164 cmt. e (1959) (same); 2A ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra note
212, § 164.1, at 253 (same); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 212, § 182, at 31 n.22.5.
214. E.g., Goddard, 412 P.2d at 263; Mercury Bay Boating Club, Inc. v. San Diego
Yacht Club, 557 N.E.2d 87, 93 (N.Y. 1990); Freed v. Judith Realty & Farm Prods.
Corp., 113 S.E.2d 850, 854 (Va. 1960); Rigg v. Lawyer, 408 P.2d 252, 256 (Wash.
1965); In re Fortwin Trust, 203 N.W.2d 711, 715 (Wis. 1973); see Halter v. First Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 336 P.2d 701, 702 (Mont. 1959) (even if unambiguous); see also
RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS (FIRST) § 164 cmt e (1935) ("if... ambiguous, evidence of
the circumstances [extrinsic evidence] is admissible"); RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS
(SECOND) § 164 cmt. e (1959) (same); 2A ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra note 212, at
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evidence, then many courts select the reasonable meaning least favorable
to the draftsman of the words-a contra proferentem principle in favor
of the beneficiary.215 Other courts use a default principle in favor of
the settlor or his designate, the trustee.21 6 Because of these variations
in the use of extrinsic evidence and the default principle, traditional trust
theory does not provide a well-settled rule. This fact is recognized by
the restatements and treatises since they do not specify a default
principle.
Trust law, like contract, has developed another interpretive rule for
trusts granting the trustee interpretive discretion. The discretionary trust
theory's interpretive rule operates the same as the traditional trust
theory's rule, except for the default principle. Under the discretionary
trust theory's default principle, the court accepts the trustee's interpreta-
tion, unless it is arbitrary or capricious. 17 The rationale for this abuse
§ 164.1, 254 (same); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 212, § 182, at 31 n.22 (Supp.
1994).
215. E.g., Brenneman v.. Bennett, 420 F.2d 19, 24 (8th Cir. 1970) (applying Iowa
law after considering extrinsic evidence); Funsten v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 805, 808
(8th Cir. 1945) (applying Missouri law without mentioning extrinsic evidence);
Seasongood v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 486, 491 (S.D. Ohio 1971) (applying Ohio
law after considering extrinsic evidence); Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Duffill, 191 Cal. 629,
642, 218 P. 14, 18 (1923) (uses only intrinsic evidence); In re Greenleaf's Estate, 101
Cal. App. 2d 658, 667, 225 P.2d 945, 948 (1951) (same); Perling v. Citizens and S. Nat'l
Bank, 300 S.E.2d 649, 651 (Ga. 1983) (does not mention extrinsic evidence); In re
Miller's Trust, 397 P.2d 443, 447 (Haw. 1964) (same); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v.
Clarke, 178 S.W.2d 359, 365 (Mo. 1944) (same); Dibert v. D'Arcy, 154 S.W. 1116,
1125 (Mo. 1913) (same); Damiani v. Lobasco, 79 A.2d 268, 271 (Pa. 1951) (same);
Wood v. Paul, 95 A. 720, 722 (Pa. 1915) (same); Price v. Johnston, 638 S.W.2d 1, 4
(Tex. Civ. App. 1982) (uses only intrinsic evidence).
216. Malone v. Malone, 379 So. 2d 926, 929 (Miss. 1980) (applying ambiguities
in favor of settlor and mentioning only intrinsic evidence); Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v.
First Nat'l Bank, 352 So. 2d 1324, 1327 (Miss. 1977) (same); Davison v. Duke Univ.,
194 S.E.2d 761, 784 (N.C. 1973) (after considering extrinsic evidence, trustees'
interpretation due some weight); United States Nat'l Bank v. Duling, 592 P.2d 257, 261
(Or. App. 1979) (after considering extrinsic evidence, adopt a construction most
consistent with settlor's other intentions).
217. See, e.g., American Bd. of Comm'rs of Foreign Missions v. Ferry, 15 F. 696,
699 (Cir. Ct., W.D. Mich., 1883) (Michigan will; if in good faith, court cannot reverse);
Greene v. Huntington, 46 A. 883, 885 (Conn. 1900) (uphold unless abuse of power);
Howe v. Sands, 194 So. 798, 800 (Fla. 1940) (if reasonable, court cannot interfere);
Talladega College v. Callahan, 197 N.W. 635, 637 (Iowa 1924) (cannot be arbitrary or
in bad faith); In re Barbey's Will, 32 N.Y.S.2d 191, 193 (N.Y. Supr. Ct. 1942) (in
absence of abuse of discretion, court cannot interfere); In re Cowen's Estate, 265 N.Y.S.
40, 42 (Surr. Ct. 1933) (final in absence of fraud or bad faith); Nations v. Ulmer, 139
S.W.2d 352, 356 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) (if reasonable, is conclusive); Grant v. Stephens,
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of discretion interpretive rule is to avoid consuming the trust estate with
costly litigation.2"'
Not all state courts have adopted this abuse of discretion interpretive
rule when the trust grants the trustee interpretive discretion. Instead,
other courts use a default principle, construing interpretations in favor of
the beneficiary. 19 Because of this variation in the default rule,
discretionary trust theory does not yield a well-settled rule. This fact,
too, is recognized by the restatements and treatises since they do not
specify an abuse of discretion interpretive rule.
3. Property Law
Property law provides two interpretive rules, but they do not differ
from the rules articulated by classical contract theory. In addition,
judges applying property law construe real estate instruments the same
way they would under trust law. The basic interpretive principle under
property law is to determine the intent of the grantor.22' The grantor's
intent is determined by reading the language used in the instrument.
200 S.W. 893, 896 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) (same); Couts v. Holland, 107 S.W. 913, 916
(Tex. Civ. App. 1908) (same); Old Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Hughes, 134 P.2d 63, 66
(Wash. 1943) (in absence of fraud or arbitrary conduct, court cannot interfere); Moore
v. Harper, 27 W. Va. 362, 373-74 (1886) (if without fraud or corruption, final); see also
3 ScoTr & FRATCHmR, supra note 212, §§ 187.2-187.5, at 32-48 (the four parts of the
abuse of discretion standard: (1) reasonableness, (2) failure to use judgment, (3)
dishonesty, and (4) improper motive); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 212, § 559, at
169-71 (subject to reasonableness).
218. Barbey, 32 N.Y.S.2d at 194.
219. See, e.g., Lydick v. Lydick, 76 P.2d 876, 879 (Kan. 1938) (not conclusive if
erroneous); Taylor v. McClave, 15 A.2d 213, 216 (N.J. 1940) (court must construe
rightly); In re Jones' Estate, 99 N.W.2d 365, 367 (Mich. 1959) (not contrary to the plain
intention of the testator); In re Reilley's Estate, 49 A. 939, 940 (Pa. 1901) (cannot
deprive the court); see also 3 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 212, § 187, at 25-26
(cannot oust court of jurisdiction); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 212, § 559, at 171
n.43 (cannot deprive court of its powers); Note, Trusts-Implication from General
Plan--Power of Trustees to Construe Instrument, 41 COLuM. L. REv. 761, 762-63
(1941) (depicting de novo review as the minority rule); Alfred Rothman, Note,
Wills-Provisions for Construction of the Will by Umpire Named by Testator, 39 MICH.
L. REV. 1255, 1257 (1940) (same).
220. E.g., Gibson v. Pickett, 512 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Ark. 1974); In re Estate of
Fleck, 154 N.W.2d 865, 867 (Iowa 1967); Winsor v. Powell, 497 P.2d 292, 299 (Kan.
1972); Root v. Mackey, 486 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Mo. 1972); Bauer v. Bauer, 141 N.W.2d
837, 840 (Neb. 1966); Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 210 N.W.2d
158, 160 (S.D. 1973); Chesapeake Corp. v. McCreery, 216 S.E.2d 22, 25 (Va. 1975).
See generally 1 RUFFORD G. PATRON & CARROLL G. PATON, LAND TITLES § 214, at
500 (1957). But see Creason v. Peterson, 470 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1970) (intention of
the parties); GEORGE W. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY § 3094, at 804 (1962) (same).
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First, the objective plain meaning principle is applied." If the plain
meaning principle results in ambiguities, property law allows extrinsic
evidence to aid interpretation.t If the words remain ambiguous or if
the court omits extrinsic evidence, then the court selects the reasonable
meaning least favorable to the presumed draftsman-in other words, the
court applies the contra proferentem principle in favor of the grant-
ee. M
221. E.g., Barnes v. Barnes, 627 S.W.2d 552, 552 (Ark. 1982); Bokock v. Noon,
215 A.2d 899, 901 (Pa. 1966) (reasonable); Gillespie v. Worcester, 322 A.2d 93, 95 (Me.
1974) (ordinary meaning); Payne v. Campbell, 164 So. 2d 780, 784 (Miss. 1964) (not
unreasonable); Phelps v. Sledd, 479 S.W.2d 894, 896 (Ky. 1972) (ordinary meaning);
Conner v. Hendrix, 72 S.E.2d 259, 264 (Va. 1952); Wasser & Winters Co. v. Jefferson,
528 P.2d 471, 473 (Wash. 1974) (ordinary meaning); Wellman v. Tomblin, 84 S.E.2d
617, 620 (W. Va. 1954); Weekley v. Weekley, 27 S.E.2d 591, 595 (W. Va. 1943). See
generally I PATRON & PATRON, supra note 220, § 214, at 501; THOMPSON, supra note
220, § 3094, at 804.
222. E.g., Brown v. Huckabaa, 89 So. 2d 180, 182 (Ala. 1956); State v. Hawaiian
Dredging Co., 397 P.2d 593, 607 (Haw. 1964); Gardner v. Fliegel, 450 P.2d 990, 994
(Idaho 1969); Siegel v. Hackler, 310 P.2d 914, 917 (Kan. 1957); In re Moreck, 100
N.W.2d 758, 762 (Minn. 1960); Payne, 164 So. 2d at 784; see Darman v. Dunderdale,
289 N.E.2d 847, 850 (Mass. 1972) (without reference to ambiguity). See generally 1
PATRON & PATON, supra note 220, at 504-06; THOMPSON, supra note 220, § 3094, at
804.
223. E.g., Griffith v. Utah Power & Light Co., 226 F.2d 661, 667 (9th Cir. 1955)
(applying Idaho law after evaluating extrinsic evidence); Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Ward,
100 F.2d 778,779 (5th Cir.) (applying Texas law with no mention of extrinsic evidence),
cert. denied, 307 U.S. 632 (1939); Gibson v. Pickett, 512 S.W.2d 532, 536 (Ark. 1974)
(after extrinsic evidence); Clevenger v. Continental Oil Co., 369 P.2d 550, 552 (Colo.
1962) (no mention of extrinsic evidence); Faiola v. Faiola, 238 A.2d 405, 408 (Conn.
1968) (after extrinsic evidence); Hawaiian Dredging Co., 397 P.2d at 608 (same); Patton
v. Vining, 150 N.E.2d 606, 608, (Ill. 1958) (same); Corbin v. Moser, 403 P.2d 800, 804-
05 (Kan. 1965) (same). See generally 1 PATTON & PATTON, supra note 220, § 214, at
505; THOMPSON, supra note 220, § 3094, at 803.
When the grantee prepares the deed, the default principle is to construe in favor of the
grantor. E.g., Baker v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 218 So. 2d 39,41 (Miss. 1969)
(examining intrinsic evidence); Hampton v. Kessler, 145 P.2d 955, 957 (Okla. 1944)
(examining extrinsic evidence); McBride v. Hutson, 306 S.W.2d 888, 891 (Tex. 1957)
(same).
The court applies the default principle only after examining extrinsic evidence.
Hodges v. Owings, 13 A.2d 338, 340 (Md. 1940); Strauss v. J.C. Nichols Land Co., 37
S.W.2d 505, 508 (Mo. 1931); Gladys City Oil, Gas & Mfg. Co. v. Right of Way Oil
Co., 137 S.W. 171, 179 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911), aft'd, 157 S.W. 737 (Tex. 1913).
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4. Labor Law
Federal labor law provides the sixth interpretive rule. When courts
interpret collective bargaining agreements under federal labor law, the
judge takes an approach similar to contract law: the judge seeks to
determine the intent of the parties. 4 However, federal common law
governing the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements is not
exactly the same as the common law of contract." When applying
the understanding principle, federal labor law and contract law differ
because the former limits the use of extrinsic evidence of related
collective bargaining agreements to show practice, usage, and cus-
tom. 6  Other than this difference, federal courts generally follow the
usual principles of classical contract theory, admitting other extrinsic
evidence to resolve ambiguities. 227 In addition, some courts may apply
the contra proferentem principle as a last resort. s
224. FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA A. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WoRKs 348 (4th
ed. 1985).
225. Transportation-Communication Employees Union v. Union P.R.R., 385 U.S.
157, 160-61 (1966); accord Mastro Plastics Corp. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 350
U.S. 270, 281 (1956) (construing liberally, not technically, to achieve statutory purposes:
holding anti-strike clause against "any strike" not to include strike to protest unfair labor
practice).
226. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299,
311 (1989); Transportation-Communication Employees Union, 385 U.S. at 161; John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964) (the common law of a
particular industry); United Steel Workers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 578-80 (1960) (gaps to be filled in by references to the practices of a
particular industry). See generally ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 224, at 360-61
(limiting it to ambiguities).
227. E.g., Stewart v. KHD Deutz of Am. Corp., 980 F.2d 698, 702 (1Ith Cir. 1993)
(health plan); John Morrell & Co. v. Local Union 304A of the United Food &
Commercial Workers, 913 F.2d 544, 551 (8th Cir. 1990); Smith v. ABS Indus., Inc., 890
F.2d 841, 845-46 & n.1 (6th Cir. 1989) (pension plan); Griesmann v. Chemical Leaman
Tank Lines, Inc., 776 F.2d 66, 72 (3d Cir. 1985); Operating Eng'rs Pension Trust v.
Beck Eng'g & Surveying Co., 746 F.2d 557, 566 (9th Cir. 1984) (retirement plan);
National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. National Constructors Ass'n, 678 F.2d 492, 498
(4th Cir. 1982). See generally ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 224, at 348-60.
228. See Northwest Adm'rs, Inc. v. B.V. & B.R., Inc., 813 F.2d 223, 226 (9th Cir.
1987) (did not use contra proferentem since in a negotiated deal it is difficult to
determine who offered the language). See generally ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note
224, at 362-63.
Arbitrators, however, routinely use the contra proferentem principle. E.g., Passavant
Retirement & Health Ctr. v. Teamsters Local 538, 103 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 808 (1994)
(Hewitt, Arb.); Food 4 Less Supermarkets, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers
Union Local 770, 102 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 817 (1994) (Grabuskie, Arb.); Southwest
Airlines Co. v. Transport Workers Union of Am. Local 556, 102 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 207
(1993) (Helburn, Arb.); United Can Co. v. Cannery, Warehousemen, Food Processors,
Drivers & Helpers, Teamsters Local 748, 102 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 806 (1993) (Hoh, Arb.);
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It is important to make one other note with regard to the substantive
differences between collective bargaining agreements and typical
insurance contracts. First, collective bargaining agreements generally
involve negotiated deals between various employers and union represen-
tatives, unless a union is so strong as to dictate the terms or so weak as
to capitulate to the employer's demands. Second, collective bargaining
agreements generally provide for resolution of disputes by arbitra-
tors .229
B. Pre-ERISA Choices for Employee Benefit Plans
In general, depending on which legal theory a court used to analogize
a plan interpretive rule, it would select one of six rules:
(1) The understanding of a reasonably intelligent person, followed, if
needed, by the extrinsic evidence principle and, if needed, the trustee's
reasonable interpretation. As classified by this Article, this method
represents one of the two rules of discretionary trust theory and one of
the three rules of traditional trust theory.
(2) The understanding of a reasonably intelligent person, followed, if
needed, by the extrinsic evidence principle and, if needed, by the contra
proferentem principle. This method reflects one of the two rules of
classical contract theory, one of the three rules of traditional trust theory,
one of the two rules of discretionary trust theory, and one of the two
rules of property law.
(3) The understanding of a reasonably intelligent person, followed, if
needed, by the anti-extrinsic evidence principle and the contra
proferentem principle. This method represents one of the two rules of
Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist. v. Atascadero Dist. Teachers Aides Ass'n, 101 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 673 (1993) (Bickner, Arb.); Carrier Air Conditioning Corp. v. Sheet Metal
Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local 483, 101 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 618 (1993) (Mathews, Arb.).
229. The Railway Labor Act requires carriers and employees to establish boards to
resolve grievances, 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1988), and judicial review is available only if such
board oversteps its jurisdiction or commits fraud. Id. § 153(q). Some ERISA plans are
within the scope of the Railway Labor Act, Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., 627 F.2d 272, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1980), and so a court cannot review a
board's decision under ERISA. Long v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 994 F.2d 692, 695 (9th
Cir. 1993) (holding that if the court were to find jurisdiction "we would eviscerate the
Railway Labor Act's system of arbitration"); accord Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 § 514(d), 29 U.S.C. § 144(d) (1988) (leaving federal law intact).
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classical contract theory, one of the three rules of traditional trust theory,
and one of the two rules of property law.
(4) The understanding of a reasonably intelligent person along with
some extrinsic evidence, followed, if needed, by additional extrinsic
evidence, and, if needed, by the contra proferentem principle. This is
the rule of federal labor law.
(5) The understanding of a reasonably intelligent person, except to
determine ambiguities, in which case the understanding of a reasonable
lay person, followed, if needed, by extrinsic evidence and, if needed, by
the contra proferentem principle. This method represents one of the two
rules of neoclassical contract theory.
(6) The understanding of a reasonable lay person, followed, if needed,
by the partial-extrinsic evidence principle and, if needed, by the contra
proferentem principle. This method reflects one of the two rules of
neoclassical contract theory.
Pre-ERISA employee benefit law used four of these plan interpretive
rules. Courts considering state law, including union-negotiated single-
employer plans separate from their collective bargaining agreements,
used the first three of the above rules. Courts also used the first rule
under federal law for the trusts of the LMRA plans.23 Courts used the
fourth rule under federal labor law for union-negotiated, single-employer
plans contained within their collective bargaining agreements. These
four rules differed in choices for the understanding principle, the
ambiguity principle, and the default principle.
1. State Law Decisions
By far, the predominantly used principles under state law came from
contract law. The reason was that by the mid-twentieth century, most
pre-ERISA courts using state law had concluded that the employees'
relation to the plan was an enforceable contract.231 Therefore, these
1010
230. As used in this Article, the word "LMRA plan" means the multiemployer plans
satisfying the special requirements of LMRA.
231. See, e.g., Shipley, supra note 3, at 467-72.
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courts used contract rules of interpretation.?23 In unambiguous cases,
courts used the classical contract theory's plain meaning principle.233
When ambiguities arose, courts used the contra proferentem principle
of classical contract theory.13' A few courts, using state law, eschewed
232. The courts in the foundational cases, those not citing earlier employee benefit
cases, all claimed to use general contract theory. E.g., Gladden v. Pargas, Inc., 575 F.2d
1091, 1094 (4th Cir. 1978) (North Carolina law); Hudson v. John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 314 F.2d 16, 20-21 (8th Cir. 1963) (Arkansas law); Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Hughes, 228 F. 885, 887-88 (4th Cir. 1915) (South Carolina law); Psutka v. Michigan
Alkali Co., 264 N.W. 385, 388 (Mich. 1936); Elby v. Livernois Eng'g Co., 194 N.W.2d
429,430 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971); Hinkeldey v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 470 S.W.2d 494, 500
(Mo. 1971); Russell v. Princeton Labs., Inc., 231 A.2d 800, 805 (N.J. 1967); Kristt v.
Haire, 155 N.Y.S.2d 362, 366 (Sup. Ct. 1956), rev'don other grounds, Kristt v. Whelan,
164 N.Y.S.2d 239 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957), aft'd, 155 N.E.2d 116 (N.Y. 1958); Taint v.
Kroger Co., 247 N.E.2d 794, 796 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1967); Sigman v. Rudolph Wurlitzer
Co., 11 N.E.2d 878, 879 (Ohio Ct. App. 1937).
233. E.g., Femckes v. CMP Indus., Inc., 195 N.E.2d 884, 887 (N.Y. 1963) (profit-
sharing plan, unspecified contract: reversing judgment for participant); Altv. Long Island
R.R., 365 N.Y.S.2d 480, 484 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (profit-sharing plan, bilateral contract:
reversing judgment for participant); Garner v. Girard Trust Bank, 275 A.2d 359,361 (Pa.
1971) (profit-sharing plan, bilateral contract: rational and probable construction
preferred, citing general contract law; reversing judgment for participant); Schofield v.
Zion's Coop. Mercantile Inst., 39 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1934) (pension plan, bilateral
contract: between two reasonable constructions, select the one establishing a valid
contract, citing contract and property law; affirming judgment for participant); Frank v.
Day's Inc., 535 P.2d 479, 482 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975) (pension plan, unilateral contract:
construe from language alone when unambiguous; reversing judgment for plan).
234. Some courts used the rule to aid the participant by affirming judgments for
participants. See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co., 228 F. at 887-88 (South Carolina life
insurance plan, unspecified contract: by analogy to insurance contracts, construe
ambiguities strongly against insurance company, most favorable to insured, citing
insurance contract law); Elby, 194 N.W.2d at 430 (profit-sharing plan, unspecified
contract theory: construe ambiguities against drafter); Hinkeldey, 470 S.W.2d at 500
(severance pay plan, bilateral contract: resolve ambiguities strongly against employer,
citing employment contract case); Ehrle v. Bank Bldg. & Equip. Corp. of Am., 530
S.W.2d 482, 492 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (disability plan, bilateral contract: construe
strongly against the employer, citing ambiguity case); Brulotte v. Cormier Hosiery Mills,
Inc., 387 A.2d 1162, 1163 (N.H. 1978) (profit-sharing plan, unspecified theory: construe
ambiguities against the company); Sigman, 11 N.E.2d at 879 (pension plan, bilateral
contract: construe against employer as it could have restricted implications); Dangott
v. ASG Indus., Inc., 558 P.2d 379, 383 (Okla. 1976) (severance pay plan, bilateral
contract: construe strongly in favor'of employee, citing ambiguity case); Levitt v. Billy
Penn Corp., 283 A.2d 873, 876 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971) (profit-sharing plan, unilateral
contract: construe ambiguities most favorable to employee, citing contractual LMRA
case); see also Dierks v. Thompson, 295 F. Supp. 1271, 1278 (D.R.I. 1969) (Rhode
Island profit-sharing plan, bilateral contract: for ambiguities draw inferences favorable
to non-drafter, judgment for participant), rev'd on other grounds, 414 F.2d 453 (1st Cir.
1969); Hurd v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 136 F. Supp. 125, 134 (N.D. Il1. 1955) (Illinois
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pension plan, unilateral contract: contra proferentem; same), aff'd, 234 F.2d 942 (7th
Cir. 1956); Kristt, 155 N.Y.S.2d at 366 (profit-sharing plan, bilateral contract: construe
ambiguities in favor of employees, citing contract and trust law; same).
Other courts reversed judgments for the plan administrator. See, e.g., Gladden, 575
F.2d at 1094 (North Carolina disability plan, bilateral contract: construe ambiguity in
favor of insured); Conner v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 249 A.2d 866, 868 (Del. 1969)
(pension plan, bilateral contract: if ambiguous, construe liberally in favor of employee);
Psiuka, 264 N.W. at 388 (pension plan, bilateral contract: resolve ambiguities against
employer).
Some cases mentioned the rule and yet still ruled in favor of the plan administrator
by affirming judgments for the plan administrator. See, e.g., Boase v. Lee Rubber &
Tire Corp., 437 F.2d 527, 533 n.14 (3d Cir. 1970) (New York law, pension plan,
unspecified contract: construe ordinary and technical meaning when unambiguous, but
citing ambiguity cases from state employee benefit law, no ambiguity); Siss v. United
States Steel Corp., 339 N.E.2d 279, 283 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (Pennsylvania law for
pension plan, unspecified theory: resolve ambiguities in interests of employees, without
citation, no ambiguity); Leonard v. Washington Employers, Inc., 461 P.2d 538, 546
(Wash. 1969) (dissenting opinion) (retirement plan, unspecified contract: construe in
favor of employees, citing ambiguity case); see also Brinzo v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 304
A.2d 66, 67 (Del. Ch. 1973) (pension plan, unspecified theory but cites bilateral cases:
if ambiguous, construe liberally in favor of employee; judgment for employer, no
ambiguity); Evo v. Jomac, Inc., 289 A.2d 551, 557 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972)
(profit-sharing plan, unilateral contract: resolve ambiguities against company, citing
general contract law cases; same).
Some cases mentioned the rule and then reversed a judgment for the participant. See,
e.g., Jacoby v. Grays Harbor Chair & Mfg. Co., 468 P.2d 666, 671 (Wash. 1970)
(pension plan, unilateral contract: construe ambiguities against party preparing it, citing
an LMRA case, no ambiguity).
A number of courts cited the favorable construction rule without mentioning the
ambiguity requirement. Some courts used the rule to aid the participant by affirming
judgments for participants. See, e.g., Rochester Corp. v. Rochester, 450 F.2d 118, 121
n.4 (4th Cir. 1971) (Virginia pension plan, bilateral contract: because normally drafted
by the employer, construe liberally in favor of employees); Paddock Pool Constr. Co.
v. Monseur, 533 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (profit-sharing plan, theory
unspecified but cites bilateral contract case: construe in favor of employee, against
employer); Parenti v. Wytmar & Co., 364 N.E.2d 909, 915 (Il1. App. Ct. 1977) (profit-
sharing plan, unspecified contract: construe in favor of employee); Anger v. Bender, 335
N.E.2d 122, 125 (111. App. Ct. 1975) (pension plan, theory unspecified but cites trust
cases: construe liberally in favor of employee); Weesner v. Electric Power Bd. of
Chattanooga, 344 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961) (retirement plan, bilateral
contract: construe most strongly against the employer); Ruditys v. Wing, 260 N.W.2d
794, 798 (Wis. 1978) (profit-sharing plan, unilateral contract: construe liberally in favor
of employee); Rosploch v. Alumatic Corp. of Am., 251 N.W.2d 838, 841 (Wis. 1977)
(profit-sharing plan, unspecified contract: construe liberally in favor of employee);
Holsen v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 190 N.W.2d 189, 192 (Wis. 1971) (profit-sharing
plan, unspecified contract: construe liberally in favor of employee).
Other courts used the rule to aid the participant by reversing judgments for the plan
administrator. See, e.g., In re Home-Stake Prod. Co. Deferred Compensation Trust, 598
P.2d 1193, 1196 (Okla. 1979) (pension plan, unspecified contract theory: construe in
favor of beneficiary, citing contractual plan case); Voigt v. South Side Laundry & Dry
Cleaners, Inc., 128 N.W.2d 411, 413 (Wis. 1964) (group annuity plan, bilateral contract:
construe liberally in favor of the employees).
Courts also cited the rule without mentioning the ambiguity requirement and yet still
rule in favor of the plan by affirming judgments for the plan administrator. See, e.g.,
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the contra proferentem principle, relabelling the doctrine as a method of
construction to avoid forfeitures.235 Some courts received extrinsic
evidence before applying the contraproferentem principle, but others did
not.236 In sum, pre-ERISA courts using state contract law applied both
interpretive rules of classical contract theory.
With respect to the default principle, some pre-ERISA contracts
establishing the plan contained language to the effect that the "sole,
absolute, and final" interpretive authority lay with the plan administra-
tor.237 Under one version of discretionary trust interpretation, this
language would give rise to the abuse of discretion rule. However, the
most analogous contract was the adhesion contract. Courts using
contract law found the interpretive authority provision of no effect
because of employer control, just as some courts did under the second
version of discretionary trust theory.
238
Frietzsche v. First W. Bank & Trust Co., 168 Cal. App. 2d 705, 707, 336 P.2d 589, 590
(1959) (pension plan, theory unspecified but cites bilateral contract case: construe
liberally in favor of employee); Thornbery v. MGS Co., 176 N.W.2d 355, 360 (Wis.
1970) (retirement plan, bilateral contract: construe liberally in favor of employees); see
also Taint v. Kroger Co., 247 N.E.2d 794, 796 (Ohio C.P. 1967) (pension plan,
unspecified theory: strictly construe against employer in favor of employee, citing lease
law; judgment for employer).
235. E.g., Evo, 289 A.2d at 557 (profit-sharing plan, unilateral contract: construe
to avoid forfeiture; judgment for plan); Stopford v. Boonton Molding Co., 265 A.2d 657,
665 (N.J. 1970) (pension plan, bilateral contract: construe to avoid forfeiture; affirming
judgment for participant); Russell v. Princeton Labs., Inc., 231 A.2d 800, 805 (N.J.
1967) (profit-sharing plan, bilateral contract: construe to avoid forfeiture; reversing
judgment for plan); see Zimmermann v. Brennan, 254 N.W.2d 719, 721 (Wis. 1977)
(profit-sharing plan, unspecified contract: construe to avoid forfeiture, on basis of
restraint of trade in anti-competition clause; affirming judgment for participant); see also
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CoNTAC'rs § 236(a) (1932) ("An interpretation which
gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all manifestation of intention is
preferred to an interpretation which leaves part of such manifestation unreasonable,
unlawful, or of no effect.").
236. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Hamilton Steel Prods., Inc., 448 F.2d 501, 505
(7th Cir. 1971) (last resort); Hurd, 136 F. Supp. at 134 (same); Jones v. Mountain States
Tel. & Tel. Co., 670 P.2d 1305, 1311-12 (extrinsic evidence first). Contra Conner, 249
A.2d at 869 (without extrinsic evidence); see also Moore v. Adkins, 576 P.2d 245, 251
(Kan. Ct. App. 1978) (pre-ERISA plan: plan administrator upheld on intrinsic evidence,
default principle unspecified).
237. See, e.g., Russell, 231 A.2d at 805.
238. E.g., Hurd, 136 F. Supp. at 154-55 (Illinois law: rejecting contract version of
arbitrary and capricious standard to review plan interpretation); Siss, 339 N.E.2d at 283;
Wilson v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 194 N.E. 441, 443 (Ohio Ct. App. 1934) (deeming a
forfeiture interpretation as arbitrary and capricious); Russell, 231 A.2d at 805 (same).
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A few pre-ERISA courts using state law viewed the employee-plan
relationship as a trust and used trust law interpretive rules. When
language was unambiguous, these courts used the plain meaning
principle.239 When an ambiguity existed, these courts also used the
contra proferentem principle.24 A few pre-ERISA courts using state
contract law noted a trust law origin of the contra proferentem
principle.24 Finally, courts using the contractual gratuity theory also
developed a default principle of not construing against the employer.
242
Therefore, pre-ERISA courts using state trust law applied all three
interpretive rules of traditional trust theory and both interpretive rules of
discretionary trust theory.
These cases belie an implication of Justice O'Connor concerning the pre-ERISA plan
interpretive rule:
The trust law de novo standard of review is consistent with the judicial
interpretation of employee benefit plans prior to the enactment of ERISA.
Actions challenging an employer's denial of benefits before the enactment of
ERISA were governed by principles of contract law. If the plan did not give
the employer or administrator discretionary or final authority to construe
uncertain terms, the court reviewed the employee's claim as it would have any
other contract claim-by looking to the terms of the plan and other manifesta-
tions of the parties' intent.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112-13 (1989) (considering a
severance pay plan lacking the grant of discretion). But the same review rule also
applied even if the plan gave the employer or administrator discretion provided the court
viewed the plan as a bilateral or unilateral contract. Those cases using a different review
rule applied the gratuity theory. See infra note 242 and accompanying text.
239. E.g., First Nat'l Bank of Birmingham v. Adams, 203 So. 2d 124, 129 (Ala.
1967) (profit-sharing plan: construe to give effect of settlor, reversing judgment for
participant); id. at 131 (give legal terms legal meaning, citing trust law).
240. E.g., Connell v. United States Steel Corp., 371 F. Supp. 991, 1001 (N.D. Ala.
1974) (retirement plan for union employees under Alabama law: construe in favor of
employees, applying LMRA principles to private employer plan; plan administrator
violated arbitrary and capricious standard).
241. E.g., Kristt v. Haire, 155 N.Y.S.2d 362, 366 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (contract and trust
law), rev'd on other grounds, Kristt v. Whelan, 164 N.Y.S.2d 239 (N.Y. App. Div.
1957), aff'd, 155 N.E.2d 116 (N.Y. 1958).
242. E.g., Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 791 (8th Cir. 1944) (Missouri law
not to be interpreted strictly against the employer since it was voluntary and gratuitous
contract; affirming judgment for plan); Burgess v. First Nat'l Bank, 220 N.Y.S. 134, 139
(App. Div. 1927) (plan administrator is court of last resort upon all questions of
interpretation; it is absolute right of employer to put its own construction on plan);
McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 53 N.Y.S. 98, 103 (App. Div.), aff'd, 60 N.E. 115
(N.Y. 1901) (dissenting opinion) (criticizing majority for not construing contract to avoid
forfeiture); McLemore v. Western Union Tel. Co., 171 P. 390, 392 (Or. 1918) (rejecting
the contra proferentem principle under gratuity theory as plan not like a commercial
contract with an insurance company).
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2. LMRA Law
The other major body of pre-ERISA law developed under the LMRA.
Employee benefit plans under LMRA are of two sorts: (1) plans
resulting from the collective bargaining process, administered unilaterally
by employers because the plans are subject to the LMRA proscription
against payments to union officials and (2) plans administered jointly by
both union and management pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement, exempted from LMRA provisions proscribing payment to
union officials. 43
Under both plans, there are generally at least two documents: the
collective bargaining agreement and the plan. Different interpretive rules
apply to each document because federal labor laws focus primarily on
union-management disputes. As a result, federal labor law's interpretive
rule only applies to the collective bargaining agreement and not the
plan.244
243. See Schneider, supra note 96, at 275-78. Both types settled disputes through
arbitration prior to ERISA. Id. at 276.
Unilaterally administered plans are of two types. One type is the subject of a
collective bargaining agreement. But an employer can also establish an employee
benefit plan outside of the collective bargaining agreement for union employees when
it is not the subject of the collective bargaining agreement with the union. See
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 1014(a), 26 U.S.C. § 413(a) (1988)
(special rules for collectively-bargained plans); 26 C.F.R. § 1.413-1(a)(2) (1991). Since
employee benefit plans are mandatory subjects of negotiation, these plans result when
the employer and union fail to agree on a collectively-bargained plan. See, e.g., Allied
Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 180-81 (1971).
In the employee benefit area, LMRA attempted to eliminate the extortion, bribery and
mismanagement plaguing union pension and welfare programs by controlling their
establishment and operation. Eliot A. Landau et al., Protecting a Potential Pensioner's
Pension-An Overview ofPresent and Proposed Law on Trustees'Fiduciary Obligations
and Vesting, 40 BROOK. L. REV. 521, 535-41 (1974). Congress also became concerned
that union officials might convert program resources to their own use and, through
LMRA, made it illegal to set up a program administered solely by a union. Id. at 535.
244. Compare Communications Workers v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 40 F.3d 426,
433 (D.C. 1994) (applying arbitrary and capricious standard to union-negotiated single-
employer plan, but not to the collective bargaining agreement) with Kefer v. H.K. Porter
Co., 872 F.2d 60, 62 (4th Cir. 1988) (applying federal labor law interpretive rule to
collective bargaining agreement, but not the plan). See Schneider Moving & Storage Co.
v. Robbins, 466 U.S. 364, 371 (1984) (federal labor law presumption in favor of
arbitration applies to union-employer agreement, not the plan-employer agreement);
Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., Inc., 752 F.2d 1293, 1296 n.3 (8th Cir.) (party
making the distinction), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1102 (1985).
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Before ERISA's passage, state law interpretive rules applied to the
plan. Employers and unions created plans under state law with
provisions specifying governance by a particular jurisdiction's law. The
courts respected these provisions.245
a. Union-Negotiated Single-Employer Plans
Pre-ERISA courts treated union-negotiated, collectively-bargained
plans created under state law the same as other state plans. They used
contract rules of interpretation. Therefore, courts applied the plain
meaning principle of classical contract theory, followed by the extrinsic
evidence principle and the contra proferentem principle.
24 6
245. For single-employer plans, see, e.g., Craig v. Bemis Co., Inc., 517 F.2d 677,
680 (5th Cir. 1975) (governed by Alabama conflict of law rule that acknowledges plan
provision for Minnesota law); Connell v. United States Steel Corp., 516 F.2d 401, 405
(5th Cir. 1975) (governed by state law on basis of legislative history).
For multi-employer plans, see, e.g., Bricklayers, Masons & Plasterers Int'l Union,
Local Union No. 15 v. Stuart Plastering Co., 512 F.2d 1017, 1025 (5th Cir. 1975)
(governed by state law); Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308, 311 n.3 (6th Cir. 1974)
(governed by Kentucky conflict of law rule that acknowledges plan provision for D.C.
law); Snider v. All State Adm'rs, Inc., 481 F.2d 387, 390 (5th Cir. 1973) (governed by
state law), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 957 (1974).
246. For cases using the rule to aid the participant by affirming judgments for
participants, see, e.g., Jones v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 670 P.2d 1305, 1315
(Idaho Ct. App. 1983) (pre-ERISA pension plan, unilateral contract: construe in favor
of employee, citing ambiguity employee benefit case; rejecting non-insurance plan
analogy since the two types of plans are sufficiently similar to be subject to the same
rules); Luli v. Sun Prods. Corp., 398 N.E.2d 553, 556 (Ohio 1979) (pension plan,
unspecified contract: construe against employer, citing ambiguity case); see also Smith
v. Union Carbide Corp., 231 F. Supp. 980, 985 (E.D. Tenn. 1964) (collectively bargained
pension plan under Tennessee law, unspecified contract: construe liberally in favor of
employees, citing statutory construction rule for public pension, judgment for
participant), rev'd on other grounds, 350 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1965).
For cases mentioning the rule and yet still ruling in favor of the plan administrator (1)
by affirming judgments for the plan administrator, see, e.g., Hudson v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 314 F.2d 16, 21 (8th Cir. 1963) (Arkansas group annuity plan,
bilateral contract: construe ambiguities against scrivener); or (2) by reversing judgments
for the participant, see, e.g., Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Craton, 405 F.2d 41, 49
(5th Cir. 1968) (Florida disability plan, bilateral contract under collective bargaining
agreement: construe against insurance company); see also Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v.
Hamilton Steel Prods., Inc., 448 F.2d 501, 505 (7th Cir. 1971) (Illinois pension plan,
unspecified theory: literal and clear meaning, mentions ambiguities).
For cases using the forfeiture avoidance rules, see, e.g., Hoefel v. Atlas Tack Corp.,
581 F.2d 1, 6 (Ist Cir. 1978) (pre-ERISA Massachusetts pension plan, bilateral contract:
public policy long required construction to avoid forfeiture; affirming judgment for
participant).
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b. LMRA Plans
LMRA plans may be derived from collective bargaining agreements,
but LMRA plans also are trusts under the statute.247 As a result, courts
have applied interpretive rules from both contract and trust law to
LMRA plans.
Because the collective bargaining agreement is a contract, many
LIRA courts used state contract interpretive rules for the LMiRA plans.
Courts used the plain meaning principle.248 When faced with ambigu-
ities, judges used the extrinsic evidence principle,249 followed by the
contractual contra proferentem principle favoring the employee.5
Other courts rejected the contraproferentem principle when faced with
ambiguities in a negotiated contract unresolved by extrinsic evidence.
Courts followed this general method because the terms of the plan had
been freely negotiated and there was thus no reason to believe that the
LMRA plan was a plan of adhesion.251 However, these courts did not
247. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 § 186(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 302(c)(5)
(1988).
248. E.g., Johnson v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 513 F.2d
1173, 1175 (10th Cir. 1975) (not using the contra proferentem principle as plan
unambiguous).
249. E.g., Hurd v. Hutnik, 419 F. Supp. 630, 655 (D.N.J. 1976) (construing
ambiguity as participant's desire, not trustee's, on basis of extrinsic evidence).
250. E.g., Apponi v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 652 F.2d 643, 648-49 (6th Cir. 1981)
(Ohio law, pension plan, unspecified contract: strictly construe against the employer);
Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1369 (9th Cir. 1976) (federal labor law assumes equal
bargaining power of union and employers, so the contra proferentem principle only
appropriate as a tie-breaker; did not use since had no evidence on who drafted the
language); Hart v. United Bhd. of Carpenters Local No. 626, 352 A.2d 423, 426 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1976) (construe in favor of employee, citing state pension contract cases);
Forrish v. Kennedy, 105 A.2d 67, 70 (Pa. 1954) (UMW health plan: if ambiguous,
construe in favor of pensioner, citing Pennsylvania public pension law); Dorward v.
International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union-Pacific Maritime Assoc.
Pension Plan, 452 P.2d 258, 264 (Wash. 1969) (construe most strongly against the
trustees, without citation); see also Neuffer v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers Int'l
Union, 307 F.2d 671, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (citing Illinois law: contract law abhors
forfeitures, without citation).
251. See Beam v. International Org. of Masters, Mates, & Pilots, 511 F.2d 975, 980
(2d Cir. 1975) (rejecting insurance contract interpretive rule since LMRA plan not a
boilerplate contract with a consumer); Lowenstern v. International Ass'n of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers, 479 F.2d 1211, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (rejected insurance
interpretive rule as must follow precedent of D.C. Circuit's rule accepting trustee's
interpretation); Mirigliano v. Local 259, United Auto. Workers, 396 N.Y.S.2d 685, 687
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adopt the trust law version of the contra proferentem principle for
LMRA plans. Instead, federal circuit courts deferred to the trustee's
interpretation. This rule effectively adopted an unsettled principle from
traditional and discretionary trust theory for the special situation of
interpretive discretion, which is not always the case for LMRA
plans.252 The foundational cases, arising from the District of Columbia
Circuit, concluded the courts must accept the trustee's plan interpretation
unless clearly arbitrary and capricious.253 The reason was that they
had already selected the arbitrary and capricious standard to review
trustee actions.
The District of Columbia Circuit erred in developing this interpretive
rule. The Supreme Court, prior to ERISA's passage, held that the word
"contract" in LMRA section 301 encompasses more than just collective
bargaining agreements." Further, in dicta, the Court indicated that
the term "contract" includes employee benefit plans mentioned in the
collective bargaining agreement.255 Consequently, courts before and
after ERISA have held that both employee benefit plans and trusts are
"contracts" under LMRA section 301 for purposes of the benefits-due
(App. Div. 1977) (reject insurance interpretive rule since trust law governs).
It is these cases that the early ERISA courts chose to follow. See Schwartz v.
Newsweek, Inc., 827 F.2d 879, 883 (2d Cir. 1987) (ERISA case: rejected in other
circuits); Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 1985) (ERISA case: the
contra proferentem principle previously rejected); Gordon v. International
Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union-Pacific Maritime Assoc. Benefit Funds, 616
F.2d 433, 439 (9th Cir. 1980) (ERISA and LMRA case: the contra proferentem
principle previously rejected); Bayles v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund,
602 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1979) (rejecting the contra proferentem principle on the basis
of other circuits' opinions).
One commentator has chosen to distort history by ignoring the acceptance of this
LMRA plan interpretive rule by early ERISA courts in order to claim the contra
proferentem principle as the accepted pre-ERISA rule as well as the accepted post-
ERISA rule. STEPHEN R. BRUCE, PENSION CLAIMS, RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 341-43
(2d ed. 1988).
252. For an example of an LMRA plan that specifically denies plan interpretive
discretion, see infra note 296.
253. Miniard v. Lewis, 387 F.2d 864, 865 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 873
(1968); accord Roark v. Lewis, 401 F.2d 425, 427, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (trustees, not
judges, select which of two reasonable alternatives).
However, some subsequent courts confronted with the arbitrary and capricious review
rule applicable to ERISA plan administrators, concluded oppositely, that the contra
proferentem principle still applied. See Moore v. Reynolds Metal Co. Retirement
Program For Salaried Employees, 563 F. Supp. 1372, 1374 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (ERISA
retirement plan: construe ambiguities in favor of employees).
254. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17, 26-28 (1962).
255. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers Local No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404
U.S. 157, 181 n.20 (1971) (retirees, not necessarily represented by union, have breach
of contract lawsuit under LMRA § 301 if pension benefits are unilaterally changed).
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lawsuit.25 6 Thus, the District of Columbia Circuit should have used
contract law, not trust law, to develop an interpretive rule.
Nevertheless, before ERISA's passage, the District of Columbia
Circuit 57 applied trust law in LMRA cases. The First,258 Sec-
ond,259 Fifth,260 Eighth,261 and Ninth2 2 Circuits adopted this rule
from the District of Columbia Circuit in pre-ERISA LMRA cases. Most
of the circuits adopted the rule without bothering to determine whether
the plan administrator had actual plan interpretive discretion specified in
the plan, as if using one of the traditional trust theory interpretive rules
rather than one from discretionary trust theory.
C. Pre-Bruch ERISA Law
Federal circuit courts first confronted interpretation ambiguities in
employee benefit plans under the LMIRA since many of these cases
already were before the federal courts upon ERISA's passage. However,
256. Apponi v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 809 F.2d 1210, 1215 (6th Cir.) ("contracts"
in LMRA § 301 include collectively-bargained pension plans), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820
(1987); Whelan v. Colgan, 602 F.2d 1060, 1061 (2d Cir. 1979) (LMRA plan enforceable
contract under LMRA § 301); Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1367 (9th Cir. 1977)
(same); Alvares v. Erickson, 514 F.2d 156, 161 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
874 (1975); see International Union, United Auto., Aircraft & Agric. Implement Workers
v. Textron, Inc., 312 F.2d 688, 691 (6th Cir. 1963) (rights of employee to pension
benefit grow out of collective bargaining agreement); Vallejo v. American R.R., 188
F.2d 513, 515-16 (1st Cir. 1951) (treats employee benefit plan under contract theory);
American Fed'n of Labor v. Western Union Tel. Co., 179 F.2d 535, 538 (6th Cir. 1950)
(contract includes trust since collective bargaining agreement refers to trust).
257. Lowenstem v. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 479
F.2d 12"11, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (no mention of discretion); Lavella v. Boyle, 444 F.2d
910, 912 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (no mention of discretion).
258. Rueda v. Seafarers Int'l Union, 576 F.2d 939, 942 (1st Cir. 1978) (pre-ERISA
case citing the D.C. Circuit with no mention of discretion).
259. Beam v. International Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots, 511 F.2d 975, 979-80
(2d Cir. 1975) (pre-ERISA LMRA case: adopting rule for plan administrator fact
decisions, suggesting also applies to plan interpretation, citing the D.C. Circuit, plan
granted interpretive discretion).
260. Connell v. United States Steel Corp., 516 F.2d 401, 406-07 (5th Cir. 1975)
(citing the D.C. Circuit with no mention of discretion).
261. Bruce v. Morse, 475 F.2d 858, 860 n.2 (8th Cir. 1973) (citing the D.C. Circuit
with no mention of discretion).
262. Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1372 (9th Cir. 1976) (pre-ERISA case, citing
the D.C. Circuit; plan granted interpretive discretion); accord Aitken v. International
Printing & Graphic Communications Union-Employer Retirement Fund, 604 F.2d 1261,
1264-66 (9th Cir. 1979) (pre-ERISA case, plan granted plan interpretive discretion).
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federal circuit courts, rather than examining first principles or legislative
history, erroneously applied the District of Columbia Circuit's interpre-
tive rule, under which a trustee's interpretation would be upheld unless
it was arbitrary and capricious. State courts followed this lead.
1. The LMRA Plans
The circuit courts should not have adopted the trustee's acceptance
principle under the LMRA because it was intimately tied to federal labor
policy, which favors removal of disputes from the federal courts through
the arbitration process.263  Similarly, the trustee's acceptance principle
serves as another method to get the matter out of the federal court-
house.26  This is contrary to the function of ERISA, which was to
provide access to the federal courts for ERISA participants.265
Nevertheless the District of Columbia,
266 First,267  Second, 268
Fifth,269 Eighth270 and Ninth271 Circuits continued to follow the
263. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 §§ 201(c), 203(d), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 171(c), 173(d) (1988); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965)
(Congress approved contract grievance procedures as the preferred method of settling
disputes over the application or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements);
Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. American Bakery & C.W.I., 370 U.S. 254, 263 (1962) (same);
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566 (1960).
264. United Mine Workers, Dist. No. 2 v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 561 F.2d 1093,
1095 (3d Cir. 1977).
265. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
266. Stewart v. National Shopmen Pension Fund, 795 F.2d 1079, 1083 (D.C. Cir.
1986).
267. Govoni v. Bricklayers, Masons & Plasterers Int'l Union, Local No. 5 Pension
Fund, 732 F.2d 250, 252 (Ist Cir. 1984).
268. Riley v. Maritime Eng'r Beneficial Ass'n Pension Trust, 570 F.2d 406,410 (2d
Cir. 1977) (whether interpretation was rational, not that it was right); accord Dellacava
v. Painters Pension Fund, 851 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 1988) (dicta); Miles v. New York
State Teamsters Conference Pension & Retirement Fund, 698 F.2d 593, 601 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829 (1983).
269. Bayles v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 602 F.2d 97, 99
(5th Cir. 1979); accord James v. Louisiana Laborers Health & Welfare Fund, 29 F.3d
1029, 1033 (5th Cir. 1994); Kennedy v. Electricians Pension Plan, Int'l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers #995, 954 F.2d 1116, 1121-23 (5th Cir. 1992); Batchelor v. International Bhd.
of Elec. Workers Local 861 Pension & Retirement Fund, 877 F.2d 441,444-46 (5th Cir.
1989).
270. Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321-23 (8th Cir. 1981).
271. Gordon v. International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union-Pacific
Maritime Ass'n Benefit Funds, 616 F.2d 433, 440 (9th Cir. 1980) (trustees, not judges,
select which of two reasonable alternatives); accord Board of Trustees of the
Watsonville Frozen Food Welfare Trust Fund v. California Co-op Creamery, 877 F.2d
1415, 1420 (9th Cir. 1989) (arbitrary and capricious); Johnson v. District 2 Marine
Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n-Associated Maritime Officers, Medical Plan, 857 F.2d 514, 516
(9th Cir. 1988) (same); Atkinson v. Sheet Metal Workers' Trust Fund, 833 F.2d 864, 865
(9th Cir. 1987) (any reasonable resolution of ambiguity by the trustees must be upheld);
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LMRA plan interpretive rule in LMRA cases under ERISA. The
Third,272 Fourth,273 Sixth, 74 and Seventh7 5 Circuits joined their
sister circuits by adopting, from the District of Columbia Circuit, the
LMRA interpretive rule for LMRA plans under ERISA.
2. The Non-LMRA Plans
When federal district courts initially confronted plan interpretation of
ambiguities under ERISA for non-LMRA plans, many used the pre-
ERISA state law principle of contra proferentem.2 76
Bance v. Alaska Carpenters Retirement Plan, 829 F.2d 820, 822 (9th Cir. 1987) (same);
McDaniel v. National Shopmen Pension Fund, 817 F.2d 1370, 1373 (9th Cir. 1987)
(same), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1092 (1990); Harm v. Bay Area Pipe Trades Pension Plan
Trust Fund, 701 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1983) (same); Smith v. California Metal
Trades Ass'n-Int'l Ass'n of Machinists Pension Trust, 654 F.2d 650, 655 (9th Cir. 1981)
(rejecting the contra proferentem principle for trustee's interpretation).
272. Wolf v. National Shopmen Pension Fund, 728 F.2d 182, 191 (3d Cir. 1984)
(citing its earlier adoption of the rule for fact resolution traceable to the District of
Columbia Circuit); accord Tanzillo v. Local Union 617, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, 769 F.2d 140, 146 (3d Cir. 1985); Gaines v.
Amalgamated Ins. Fund, 753 F.2d 288, 289 (3d Cir. 1985); Strubble v. New Jersey
Brewing Employee's Welfare Trust Plan, 732 F.2d 325, 338 (3d Cir. 1984) (if in good
faith); see United Steelworkers v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 706 F.2d 1289, 1299 (3d
Cir. 1983) (cannot use Internal Revenue Service regulations to interpret terms of plan
under plain meaning principle).
273. District 17, District 29, Local Union 7113 & Local Union 6023, United Mine
Workers v. Allied Corp., 765 F.2d 412, 416-17 (4th Cir.) (citing its earlier adoption of
the rule for fact resolution from the District of Columbia Circuit), cert. denied, 473 U.S.
905 (1985); accord Skelton v. Lowen, 850 F.2d 200, 201 (4th Cir. 1988); Witmeyer v.
Kilroy, 788 F.2d 1021, 1025 (4th Cir. 1986).
274. Van Gunten v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 672 F.2d 586,
587-88 (6th Cir. 1982); accord Rhoton v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension
Fund, 717 F.2d 988, 989-90 (6th Cir. 1983).
275. Reiheizer v. Shannon, 581 F.2d 1266, 1272 (7th Cir. 1978); accord Van Fossan
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Union Local No. 710 Pension Fund, 649 F.2d 1243,
1246 (7th Cir. 1981).
276. Moore v. Reynolds Metal Co. Retirement Program, 563 F. Supp. 1372, 1374
(S.D. Ohio 1983) (retirement plan: construe ambiguities in favor of employees);
Michota v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 526 F. Supp. 299, 316 (D.N.J. 1980) (pension plan:
resolve ambiguities in favor of employees); Terones v. Pacific States Steel Corp., 526
F. Supp. 1350, 1354 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (pension plan: construe in favor of employees,
citing California employee benefit law); Bonar v. Barnett Bank, 488 F. Supp. 365, 369
(M.D. Fla. 1980) (pension plan: resolve ambiguities in favor of employees, citing pre-
ERISA cases from the First and Fourth Circuits); Baeten v. Van Ess, 474 F. Supp. 1324,
1329 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (profit-sharing plan: construe liberally in favor of employee,
citing Wisconsin employee benefit law); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., v. Ouimet Corp.,
470 F. Supp. 945, 957 n.27 (D. Mass. 1979) (public policy demands construction to
1021
ERISA[VOL. 32: 955, 1995]
However, when first confronted with ambiguities in plan interpretation
in the ERISA context for the non-LMRA plans, the federal circuits did
not bother with first principles or legislative history; they relied on
precedent. The circuit courts followed the LMRA plan-interpretive
principle, accepting the trustee's interpretation unless arbitrary and
capricious.
This LMRA principle should not have been applied to non-LMRA
plans, even if it were applicable to the LMRA plans, for two reasons.
First, LMRA plans are the end product of negotiation between presump-
tively equal bargaining powers. Labor law provides a framework to
work out differences in interpretation through a grievance arbitration
process. 77 However, the negotiation and grievance process is absent
for many non-LMRA plans. Second, in the labor situation, both parties'
ability to negotiate resulted in the rejection of the contra proferentem
principle for LMRA plans. Therefore, it is inappropriate for the circuit
courts to have adopted the LMRA interpretive rule for non-LMRA plans.
Nevertheless, the District of Columbia, 278  First,279  Second,..
avoid forfeiture, citing Massachusetts employee benefit law); Shaw v. Kruidenier, 470
F. Supp. 1375, 1382 (S.D. Iowa 1979) (profit-sharing plan: trust is unilateral adhesion
contract so construe ambiguities in favor of employees, citing Ohio employee benefit
law); Keller v. Graphic Systems, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1005, 1011 (N.D. Ohio 1976)
(profit-sharing plan: since employer could have restricted implications construe against
the employer, citing Ohio employee benefit law).
Occasionally a circuit court would use insurance interpretive rules or general contract
rules after having adopted the LMRA interpretive rule for ERISA plans. See Connick
v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 784 F.2d 1018, 1020 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1986) (using
California plain meaning principle for insurance contracts, the same rule as New York
requires, to interpret annuity plan that provided for governance by New York law); Noell
v. American Design, Inc., Profit Sharing Plan, 764 F.2d 827, 832-33 (11th Cir. 1985)
(using Alabama contract extrinsic evidence principle to interpret profit-sharing plan that
provided for governance by Alabama law). Plans routinely provide that the law of some
state shall govern interpretation. E.g., Loffland Bros. Co. v. Overstreet, 758 P.2d 813,
817 n.10 (Okla. 1988) (plan provides for Texas law); 5A RABKIN & JOHNSON, supra
note 204, at 13-1021 (defined benefit plan form for New York); id. at 13-1542 (money
purchase pension plan form for Ohio); id. at 13-2039 (profit-sharing plan form for Ohio).
Although ERISA provides that plans shall be governed by the terms of the plan, those
terms must be consistent with ERISA and ERISA specifically has eliminated state law,
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 §§ 404(a)(1)(D), 514(a), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1 104(a)(1)(D), 1144(a) (1988), which should include governance under state law
provisions.
277. Fisk, supra note 26, at 201.
278. Block v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 952 F.2d 1450, 1453-54 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
279. Jestings v. New England Tel. and Tel. Co., 757 F.2d 8, 9 (1st Cir. 1985);
accord Sampson v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 863 F.2d 108, 109 (1st Cir. 1988);
Bouchard v. Crystal Coin Shop, Inc., 843 F.2d 10, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1988); Bachelder v.
Communications Satellite Corp., 837 F.2d 519, 521 (Ist Cir. 1988).
None of these cases made reference to the plan granting interpretive discretion to the
plan administrator.
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Third, 28 ' Fourth,2 8 2  Fifth,
28 3  Sixth,28 4  Seventh,285  Eighth,
286
280. Birmingham v. SoGen-Swiss Int'l Corp. Retirement Plan, 718 F.2d 515, 522
(2d Cir. 1983); accord Accardi v. Control Data Corp., 836 F.2d 126, 129 (2d Cir. 1987);
Schwartz v. Newsweek, Inc., 827 F.2d 879, 883 (2d Cir. 1987).
Only the Birmingham and Schwartz plans granted interpretive discretion to the plan
administrator.
281. Edwards v. Wilkes-Barre Publishing Co. Pension Trust, 757 F.2d 52,56-57 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 843 (1985); accord Ashenbaugh v. Crucible Inc. 1975
Retirement Plan, 854 F.2d 1516, 1522 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1105
(1989); Anthius v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 789 F.2d 207, 213 n.5 (3d Cir. 1986).
None of these cases made reference to the plan granting interpretive discretion to the
plan administrator.
The Third Circuit created a short-lived exception to the arbitrary and capricious rule
for plan administrator conflicts of interest. See Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
828 F.2d 134, 145 (3d Cir. 1987) (de novo standard of review applies regardless of plan
administrator's conflicts of interest), rev'd, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989); accord Haeffele
v. Hercules, Inc., 839 F.2d 952, 957 (3d Cir. 1988).
282. Holland v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1140, 1149 (4th Cir.) (citing the
Fourth Circuit's prior adoption of the arbitrary and capricious review standard for factual
determinations of the plan administrators), cert. denied sub nom. Slack v. Burlington
Indus., Inc., 477 U.S. 903, affirmed sub nom. Brooks v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 477 U.S.
901 (1986); accord Stanton v. Gulf Oil Corp., 792 F.2d 432, 434 (4th Cir. 1986).
None of these cases made reference to the plan granting interpretive discretion to the
plan administrator.
283. Paris v. Profit Sharing Plan for Employees of Howard B. Wolf, Inc., 637 F.2d
357, 362 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 836 (1981); accord Lowry v. Bankers Life
& Casualty Retirement Plan, 865 F.2d 692, 694 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 852
(1989); HECI Exploration Co., Inc. v. Halloway, 862 F.2d 513, 524 n.20 (5th Cir. 1988);
Tully v. Ethyl Corp., 861 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir. 1988); Denton v. First Nat'l Bank, 765
F.2d 1295, 1304 (5th Cir. 1985); Ganze v. Dart Indus., Inc., 741 F.2d 790, 793 (5th Cir.
1984); Dennard v. Richards Group, Inc., 681 F.2d 306, 314-18 (5th Cir. 1982).
None of these cases made reference to the plan granting interpretive discretion to the
plan administrator. However, the original LMRA case adopting the LMRA interpretive
rule did. Bayles v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 602 F.2d 97, 99
(5th Cir. 1979).
284. Moore v. Reynolds Metals Co. Retirement Program for Salaried Employees,
740 F.2d 454, 457 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1109 (1985); accord Ross v.
Pension Plan for Hourly Employees of SKF Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 329, 334 (6th Cir.
1988); Adcock v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 822 F.2d 623, 625-26 (6th Cir. 1987)
(using uniformity in application and internally consistent factors of Fifth Circuit to
determine reasonableness); Varhola v. Doe, 820 F.2d 809, 813 (6th Cir. 1987); Cook v.
Pension Plan for Salaried Employees of Cyclops Corp., 801 F.2d 865, 869-70 (6th Cir.
1986); Blakeman v. Mead Containers, 779 F.2d 1146, 1151 (6th Cir. 1985); McBarron
v. S & T Indus., Inc., 771 F.2d 94, 100 (6th Cir. 1985) (remanding for a determination
of drafter's intent).
Only Blakeman made reference to the plan granting interpretive discretion to the plan
administrator.
285. Martinez v. Swift & Co., 656 F.2d 262, 263 (7th Cir. 1981); accord Shull v.
State Machinery Co. Employees Profit Sharing Plan, 836 F.2d 306, 308 (7th Cir. 1987);
1023
* and Ninth287 Circuits extended the LMRA interpretive rule to post-
ERISA cases. The Tenth Circuit joined its sister circuits by adopting,
indirectly from the District of Columbia Circuit, the LMRA interpretive
Brown v. Retirement Comm. of the Briggs & Stratton Retirement Plan, 797 F.2d 521,
529 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1094 (1987); Sly v. P.R. Mallory & Co., 712
F.2d 1209, 1211 (7th Cir. 1983) (rejecting the contra proferentem principle); but see Van
Boxel v. Journal Company Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1053 (de novo
review if plan administrator has conflict of interest).
Only Brown made reference to the plan granting interpretive discretion to the plan
administrator.
286. Quinn v. Burlington N. Inc. Pension Plan, 664 F.2d 675, 678 (8th Cir.)
(rejecting the contract rules previously used), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1982); accord
Simmons v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 844 F.2d 517, 521 (8th Cir. 1988) (same);
Redmond v. Burlington N.R.R. Co. Pension Plan, 821 F.2d 461, 465 (8th Cir. 1987);
Pabst Brewing Co. v. Anger, 784 F.2d 338, 338 (8th Cir. 1986); see also Landro v.
Glendenning Motorways, Inc., 625 F.2d 1344, 1352 (8th Cir. 1980) (claiming to use the
contractual rule, but not going beyond use of the extrinsic evidence principle; thus,
reaching a choice between the acceptance of the trustee's interpretation and the contra
proferentem principle); Winer v. Edison Bros. Stores Pension Plan, 593 F.2d 307, 312
(8th Cir. 1979) (cannot use arbitrary and capricious rule when trustee's interpretation
violates ERISA, but means when trustee's interpretation violates arbitrary and capricious
review rule, court will interpret).
Only Landro made reference to the plan granting interpretive discretion to the plan
administrator. In dicta, the Landro court noted that resolving the ambiguity through
extrinsic evidence provided the same result as would have the contra proferentem
principle. Landro, 625 F.2d at 1354 (plan under exclusive control of employer is
unilateral contract in nature of adhesion contract so it can be construed against the
draftsman, citing Minnesota insurance law). The Eighth Circuit subsequently repudiated
this dicta because it did not comport with the arbitrary and capricious review standard.
See Simmons, 844 F.2d at 521; Quinn, 664 F.2d at 678.
287. Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 1985); accord Pilon v.
Retirement Plan for Salaried Employees of Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 861 F.2d 217, 218
(9th Cir. 1988) (deferring unless arbitrary and capricious); Hansen v. Western Greyhound
Retirement Plan, 859 F.2d 779, 781 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988) (same); MacDonald v. Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc., 859 F.2d 742, 744-45 (9th Cir. 1988) (same); Fielding v.
International Harvester Co., 815 F.2d 1254, 1257 (9th Cir. 1987) (trustees, not judges,
select which of two reasonable alternatives); Dockray v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 801 F.2d
1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 1986); Hancock v. Montgomery Ward Longterm Disability Trust,
787 F.2d 1302, 1308 (9th Cir. 1986) (same).
Only MacDonald made a reference to the plan granting plan interpretive discretion to
the plan administrator, although several of the LMRA cases indicated plan interpretive
discretion. See Board of Trustees of the Watsonville Frozen Food Welfare Trust Fund
v. California Coop. Creamery, 877 F.2d 1415, 1420 (9th Cir. 1988); Smith v. California
Metal Trades Ass'n & Int'l Ass'n of Machinists Pension Trust, 654 F.2d 650, 655 (9th
Cir. 1981); Gordon v. International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union Pac,
Maritime Ass'n Welfare Plan, 616 F.2d 433, 436 (9th Cir. 1980); Aitken v. International
Printing & Graphic Communications Union-Employer Retirement Fund, 604 F.2d 1261,
1264-70 (9th Cir. 1979).
The Ninth Circuit created an exception to the arbitrary and capricious rule for plan
administrator conflicts of interest, requiring heightened scrutiny. See Pilon, 861 F.2d at
219; Fielding, 815 F.2d at 1256; Dockray, 801 F.2d at 1152; Jung, 755 F.2d at 711-12.
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rule for employee benefit plans under ERISA. 288 The Eleventh Circuit,
formed in 1981 from the Fifth Circuit, followed the Fifth Circuit. 9
3. Union-Negotiated Single-Employer Plans
Under ERISA, the courts continued the distinction between union-
negotiated, single-employer plans and the collective bargaining
agreement. But the courts extended the LMRA arbitrary and capricious
rule to the union-negotiated single-employer plans.2 In some cases,
participants could avoid the LMRA arbitrary and capricious rule by
asking a court to apply the rule of interpretation under federal labor law
because a collective bargaining agreement covered the matter.29" '
288. Torix v. Ball Corp., 862 F.2d 1428, 1429-30 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing the Ninth
and Eleventh Circuits, as well as prior Tenth Circuit LMRA cases not involving
interpretation) (no mention of discretion).
289. Griffis v. Delta-Family & Disability & Survivorship Plan & Delta Family Care
Medical Plan, 723 F.2d 822, 825 (1 lth Cir.) (citing the Fifth Circuit), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1242 (1984); accord Hoover v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 855 F.2d 1538, 1541
(l1th Cir. 1988); Harris v. Pullman Standard, Inc., 809 F.2d 1495, 1497-98 (11th Cir.
1987); Anderson v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 759 F.2d 1518, 1522 (1 Ith Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 995 (1985); Helms v. Monsanto Co., 728 F.2d 1416, 1420 (11th Cir. 1984).
Only Griffis made reference to the plan granting interpretive discretion to the plan
administrator.
The Eleventh Circuit holds that Fifth Circuit opinions prior to October 1, 1981 bind
the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (1 lth Cir. 1981);
accord Helms, 728 F.2d at 1420 n.5 (for ERISA opinions).
290. See Printing Specialties & Paper Prod. Union Local 680 v. Nabisco Brands,
Inc., 833 F.2d 102, 104-05 (7th Cir. 1987) (employees denied early retirement under plan
with interpretive discretion seek arbitration under collective bargaining agreement to
avoid arbitrary and capricious standard; participants unsuccessful).
291. Keffer v. H.K. Porter Co., 872 F.2d 60, 62 (4th Cir. 1989) (collective
bargaining agreement to provide health and life insurance benefits: use collective
bargaining history and practice, usage, and custom for all such agreements; participants
successful); Delgrosso v. Sprang & Co., 769 F.2d 928, 933 (3d Cir. 1985) (collective
bargaining agreement to prohibit reversion to employer on termination: using collective
bargaining history; participants unsuccessful), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986);
Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., Inc., 752 F.2d 1293, 1298-99 (8th Cir.) (collective
bargaining agreement to provide life and health benefits: retirees need not exhaust
administrative remedies based on intrinsic evidence and summary plan description), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1102 (1985); International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric.
Implement Workers v. Yard Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1479-80 & n.1 (6th Cir.)
(collective bargaining agreement to provide life-time health benefits: use intrinsic
evidence to resolve ambiguities since no extrinsic evidence presented; participants
successful), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984).
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4. State Court Opinions
Under ERISA, state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the
benefits-due lawsuit.2" Therefore, state courts also participate in
developing the federal common law of ERISA. However, state courts
carry out this task under two handicaps. First, the Supremacy Clause
requires many state courts to defer to the opinions of the federal circuit
courts.293  Consequently, state courts considering non-LMRA plans
under ERISA also adopted the arbitrary and capricious rule of the
LMRA. 9  Second, in fashioning new federal common law, state
292. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 512(e)(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(c) (1988).
Due to the ability to remove the lawsuit to federal court, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 67 (1987), state court opinions are not as numerous as the
federal circuit opinions.
293. E.g., Gurganus v. Continental Am. Life Ins. Co., 603 So. 2d 903, 906 (Ala.
1992) (ERISA jury trial denial: bound by appropriate federal circuit court but not
federal district courts); Golden Bear Family Restaurants, Inc. v. Murray, 494 N.E.2d 581,
583-84 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (ERISA preemption: bound by all federal courts, including
district court); Schultz v. Nepco Employees Mut. Ben. Ass'n, Inc., 528 N.W.2d 441,443
n.5 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (ERISA plan review rule: bound by U.S. Supreme Court but
not federal circuit courts whose opinions merely serve as a guide); see U.S. CoNsT., art.
VI, cl. 2 ('[T]he laws of the United States which shall be made.., shall be the supreme
law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby.").
294. Gesina v. General Elec. Co., 780 P.2d 1380, 1383-84 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989);
Arnold v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 525 N.E.2d 59, 65 (Ill. 1988) (determining plan
administrator's decision was valid based on consistent prior interpretations); Solivan v.
Commonwealth Edison Mut. Benefit Ass'n, 497 N.E.2d 119, 122 (Il1. App. Ct. 1986)
(reversing plan administator because plain meaning principle violated); Rizzo v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 549 N.E.2d 810, 814 (II. App. Ct. 1984) (determining plan
administrator's interpreation was valid under plain meaning principle and rejecting
contra proferentem); Associates Inv. Co. v. Claeys, 533 N.E.2d 1248, 1256 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1989) (plan administrator's interpretation was arbitrary and capricious because it
rendered part of plan superfluous); Hebert v. Red Simpson, Inc., 544 So. 2d 751, 752
(La. Ct. App. 1989) (plan administrator upheld under plain meaning principle); Barry v.
Dymo Graphic Sys., Inc., 478 N.E.2d 707, 714 (Mass. 1985) (remand for facts under
arbitrary and capricious standard); Desmarais v. Joy Mfg. Co., 538 A.2d 1218, 1220
(N.H. 1988) (plan administrator upheld under plain meaning principle); Coyne v. General
Motors Corp., 546 N.E.2d 414, 417 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (plan administrator upheld on
consistent priors); Davis v. Simpson Employees Retirement Trust, 659 P.2d 990, 993 n.5
(Or. Ct. App. 1983) (plan administrator upheld on consistent priors); Hepler v. CBS,
Inc., 696 P.2d 596, 600 (Wash. Ct. App.) (determining plan administrator's interpretation
was invalid due to lack of disclosure; rejecting contra proferentern and reasonable
expectation principles as incompatible with arbitrary and capricious standard), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985); Evans v. Wisconsin Educ. Ass'n Ins. Trust, 361 N.W.2d
630, 636 (Wis. 1985) (plan administrator reversed as violated plain meaning principle);
see also Erich v. GAF Corp., 540 A.2d 518, 521 (N.J. 1988) (recognizing arbitrary and
capricious standard, but case remanded for proceedings under heightened scrutiny of
Third Circuit), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1034 (1989).
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courts rely upon their jurisdiction's law rather than develop a federal
common law.
295
D. Post-Bruch ERISA Law
Since the interpretive rule used by the circuit courts was based on the
arbitrary and capricious rule, when that rule was slightly modified by the
Supreme Court in 1989 the modification resulted in some rethinking of
the plan interpretive rule.
In Firestone Tire and Rubber Co v. Bruch, the Supreme Court dealt
with the plan administrator review rule for plan interpretation under a
plan not providing the plan administrator with discretion to interpret the
plan.296 Justice O'Connor chose to be guided by trust law princi-
ples.297 Trust law principles, however, might not govern the situation
in light of the fact that several of the trust cases claim the abuse of
discretion review rule has a contractual origin.29 Contract law, as well
as trust law, also provides for an abuse of discretion standard when one
party is granted discretion.9
Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor claimed that if the trustee has
interpretive discretion, trust law accepts the trustee's interpretation
For LMRA cases to the same effect, see Winston v. Trustees of the Hotel &
Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union Welfare Fund, 441 N.E.2d 1217, 1219
(Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (plan administrator's interpretation found invalid because it violated
plain meaning principle).
295. E.g., McGarrah v. Southwestern Glass Co., 852 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Ark. Ct.
App. 1993) (using Arkansas law to avoid ambiguity principle to apply immediately
contra proferentem principle to ERISA plan interpretation without extrinsic evidence);
Head v. Central Reserve Life of N. Am. Ins. Co., 845 P.2d 735, 742 (Mont. 1993) (using
Montana law to avoid ambiguity principle to apply immediately contra proferentem
principle to ERISA plan interpretation without extrinsic evidence); Forbau v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 876 S.W.2d 132, 133 (Tex. 1994) (using Texas law to uphold plan administra-
tor under the plain meaning principle, denying ERISA applies to the benefits-due);
Schultz v. Nepco Employees Mut. Benefit Ass'n, Inc., 528 N.W.2d 441, 445-46 (Wis.
1994) (using Wisconsin make-whole rule to interpret plan subrogation provision under
ERISA).
296. 489 U.S. 101, 112 (1989).
297. Id. at I11.
298. See American Board of Comm'rs of Foreign Missions v. Ferry, 15 F. 696, 699
(Cir. Ct., W.D. Mich. 1883) (building contracts); Moore v. Harper, 27 W. Va. 362, 373-
74 (1886) (general contract law); see also Penn v. Howe-Baker Eng'rs, 898 F.2d 1096,
1100 (5th Cir. 1990) (determining that the plan interpretive rule under the abuse of
discretion standard is a contractual interpretive rule).
299. See Flint, supra note 1, at 372-76.
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provided it is reasonable-in other words, the Court adopted the abuse
of discretion standard: "A trustee may be given power to construe
disputed or doubtful terms, and in such circumstances the trustee's
interpretation will not be disturbed if reasonable.""3 ' This is definitely
not a well-settled rule of trust law.3"' Justice O'Connor's support for
this proposition is a case supporting the exact opposite rule, namely that
courts will interpose their own correct interpretation, the de novo review
rule.
30 2
Then, Justice O'Connor noted that if the trustee lacks interpretive
discretion, trust law reviews the trustee's interpretation under the de
novo review standard: "[O]ther settled principles of trust law point to
de novo review of [beneficiary] eligibility determinations based on plan
interpretations[.] As they do with contractual provisions, courts construe
terms in trust agreements without deferring to either party's interpreta-
tion."
303
300. Bruch, 489 U.S. at Ill.
301. See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
302. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 212, § 559, at 169-71 (citing only Taylor
v. McClave, 15 A.2d 213, 216 (N.J. 1940)).
This is another example of a Supreme Court Justice not checking research from
submitted briefs before incorporating it in an opinion. See Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 14-15 n.1 1, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) (No. 87-1054); see also Flint, supra note 18, at 647
(Justice Stevens guilty of the same practice with respect to ERISA's extracontractual
damages rule).
Courts do use the abuse of discretion standard (reasonableness) for review of
discretionary decisions not involving trust interpretation. See RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS
§ 187 (1935); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959); 3 ScoTT & FRATCHER,
supra note 212, § 187, at 14-51; BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 212, § 560, at 185-208.
303. Bruch, 489 U.S. at 112; see 3 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 212, § 201, at
221 (1988) (citing no cases but dealing with the determining extent of powers, that is,
the extent of discretion granted); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 212, § 559, at 169-71
& n.43 (same).
Some courts have taken this language about not accepting either party's interpretation
to mean that the contra proferentem principle must be rejected. See, e.g., Brewer v.
Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 150, 154 (8th Cir. 1990); Franklin v. Pitney Bowes,
Inc., 919 F.2d 45, 48 (6th Cir. 1990). This position reflects the practicalities of how
judges construe in favor of a party. They do not, however, merely accept that party's
interpretation.
Other courts reject the Brewer conclusion since it involves the failure to distinguish
between accepting one party's interpretation and using a rebuttable presumption in favor
of one party to arrive at the correct interpretation. See Heasley v. Belden & Blake
Corp., 2 F.3d 1249, 1258 (3d Cir. 1993); McNeilly v. Bankers United Life Assurance
Co., 999 F.2d 1199, 1201 (7th Cir. 1993); Phillips v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 978
F.2d 302, 312 (7th Cir. 1992); Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 540-
41 (9th Cir. 1990). This position inverts interpretive steps two and three, using the
default principle first as a rebuttable presumption and extrinsic evidence under the
ambiguity principle last to rebut it
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Next, Justice O'Connor observed that this trust law rule was compati-
ble with the contractual pre-ERISA rule: "The trust law de novo
standard of review is consistent with the judicial interpretation of
employee benefit plans prior to the enactment of ERISA."' 4 This is
a true statement, but it is also true of the cases where the plan granted
the plan administrator interpretive discretion.0 5 Nevertheless, Justice
O'Connor held that the arbitrary and capricious standard did not apply
to the review of a plan administrator's interpretation when the plan
administrator lacked discretion; instead, courts were to use de novo
review.
306
Consequently, circuit courts must first determine whether a plan
administrator has interpretive discretion. If the administrator has
interpretive discretion, courts must develop a federal common law plan
interpretive rule for handling the abuse of discretion standard. If the
administrator does not have discretion, courts must develop a federal
common law plan interpretive rule for handling de novo review of the
decision.
1. Discretion Granted
When a plan administrator has interpretive discretion, all of the federal
circuits have equated the abuse of discretion standard with the arbitrary
and capricious standard and continue to use the LMRA interpretive
rule.0 7 When plan interpretive discretion is absent, requiring de novo
304. Bruch, 489 U.S. at 112.
305. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
306. Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115.
307. For the District of Columbia Circuit, see Block v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 952 F.2d
1450, 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring) (equating the abuse of
discretion standard as equivalent to the arbitrary and capricious standard).
For the First Circuit, see Curtis v. Noel, 877 F.2d 159, 161 (1st Cir. 1989) (describing
the Bruch abuse of discretion standard as the arbitrary and capricious standard).
For the Second Circuit, see Shelden v. Barre Belt Granite Employer Union Pension
Fund, 25 F.3d 74, 80 (2d Cir. 1994) (describing the Bruch abuse of discretion standard
as the arbitrary and capricious standard).
For the Third Circuit, see Nazay v. Miller, 949 F.2d 1323, 1336 (3d Cir. 1991)
(equating the arbitrary and capricious standard with the Bruch abuse of discretion
standard).
For the Fourth Circuit, see De Nobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 1180, 1185-88 (4th Cir.
1989) (develops its abuse of discretion standard from old arbitrary and capricious
standard cases).
1029
review,0 8 it is incorrect to suggest use of trust law in this situation
without justifying the rule with one of ERISA's defined purposes.
Nevertheless, the First,0 9  Second,10  Third, l' Fourth,3 2
For the Fifth Circuit, see Batchelor v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 861
Pension & Retirement Fund Trust, 877 F.2d 441, 444-46 (5th Cir. 1989) (calling the
standard abuse of discretion, but citing old arbitrary and capricious standard cases).
For the Sixth Circuit, see Brown v. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp., 876 F.2d 546, 550 (6th
Cir. 1989) (dictum) (calling the new standard to review discretionary interpretations the
arbitrary and capricious standard).
For the Seventh Circuit, see Cuddington v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 33 F.3d 813,
816 (7th Cir. 1994) (equating the two); see also Cutting v Jerome Foods, Inc., 993 F.2d
1293, 1295-96 (7th Cir. 1993) (abuse of discretion standard may be the same as the
arbitrary and capricious standard); Halpin v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 962 F.2d 685, 688
(7th cir. 1992) (citing Bruch as support for the arbitrary and capricious standard); Lister
v. Stark, 942 F.2d 1183, 1188 (7th Cir. 1991) (equating the two).
For the Eighth Circuit, see Shell v. Amalgamated Cotton Garment, 43 F.3d 364, 366
(8th Cir. 1994) (equating abuse of discretion standard with arbitrary and capricious
standard); Lakey v. Remington Arms Co., 874 F.2d 541, 544 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing
Bruch as authority for arbitrary and capricious standard).
For the Ninth Circuit, see Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317, 1321 n.l (9th
Cir. 1995); contra Eley v. Boeing Co., 945 F.2d 276, 278 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1991).
For the Tenth Circuit, see Pratt v. Petroleum Prod. Management, Inc. Employee Say.
Plan & Trust, 920 F.2d 651, 657 (10th Cir. 1990) (describing the post-Bruch rule as the
arbitrary and capricious standard).
For the Eleventh Circuit, see Jett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 890 F.2d 1137, 1139
(I th Cir. 1989) (describing the post-Bruch rule as the arbitrary and capricious standard).
308. E.g., Wickman v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077, 1084 (1st
Cir.) (using common sense canons of contract interpretation in absence of plan
interpretive discretion), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1013 (1990); Burnham v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co., 873 F.2d 486,489 (lst Cir. 1989) (same); see infra note 360 and accompanying
text for similar pronouncements by the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits. But
see Fuller v. CBT Corp., 905 F.2d 1055, 1058 (7th Cir. 1990) (abuse of discretion
standard is a contractual rule); Penn v. Howe-Baker Eng'rs, Inc., 898 F.2d 1096, 1100
(5th Cir. 1990) (same).
309. Curtis v. Noel, 877 F.2d 159, 161 (Ist Cir. 1989) (plan administrator's decision
upheld as consistent with ERISA).
For a post-Bruch LMRA case to the same effect, see Diaz v. Seafarers Int'l Union, 13
F.3d 454, 456-57 (1st Cir. 1994) (plan administrator upheld under plain meaning
principle).
310. O'Shea v. First Manhattan Co. Thrift Plan & Trust, 55 F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir.
1995) (plan administrator upheld as interpretation comports with ERISA); O'Neil v.
Retirement Plan for Salaried Employees of RKO Gen., Inc., 37 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir.
1994) (plan administrator upheld on extrinsic evidence of prior interpretation and intent);
see Pagan v. NYNEX Pension Plan, 52 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 1995) (plan administrator
upheld under plain meaning principle); Jordan v. Retirement Comm. of Rensselaer
Polytechnic Inst, 46 F.3d 1264, 1271-72 (2d Cir. 1995) (plan administrator upheld on
extrinsic evidence of legislative intent).
For a post-Bruch LMRA case to the same effect, see Shelden v. Barre Belt Granite
Employer Union Pension Fund, 25 F.3d 74, 80-81 (2d Cir. 1994) (remand based on
intrinsic evidence).
311. Kotrosits v. GATX Corp. Non-Contributory Pension Plan for Salaried
Employees, 970 F.2d 1165, 1172 (3d Cir.) (plan administrator upheld under plain
meaning principle), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 657 (1992); Nazay v. Miller, 949 F.2d 1323,
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Fifth,3 13  Sixth,3 14  Seventh,
315  Eighth,316  Ninth,317  Tenth,
3 18
1335-36 (3d Cir. 1991) (plan administrator upheld as its interpretation favors beneficia-
ry); Stoetzner v. United States Steel Corp., 897 F.2d 115, 119 (3d Cir. 1990) (plan
administrator upheld as had logical reason).
For a post-Bruch LMRA case to the same effect, see Moats v. United Mine Workers
Health & Retirement Funds, 981 F.2d 685, 688 (3d Cir. 1992) (plan administrator upheld
under plain meaning principle).
312. Hickey v. Digital Equip. Corp., 43 F.3d 941, 945 (4th Cir. 1995) (plan
administrator satisfied five factor test); Shepherd & Enoch Pratt Hosp., Inc. v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 32 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1994) (same); Aliff v. BP Am., Inc., 26 F.3d 486,
489 (4th Cir. 1994) (plan administrator upheld as had logical reason); Crosby v. Crosby,
986 F.2d 79, 83 (4th Cir. 1993) (same); Davis v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 966 F.2d 890,
894 (4th Cir. 1992) (plan administrator overruled as contrary to plain meaning principle);
Dewitt v. State Farm Ins. Cos. Retirement Plan for United States Employees, 905 F.2d
798, 801 (plan administrator upheld as faithful to plain meaning principle) (4th Cir.
1990); PPG Indus. Pension Plan A CIO v. Crews, 902 F.2d 1148, 1151 (4th Cir. 1990)
(plan administrator upheld as had logical reason); De Nobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d
1180, 1184 (4th Cir. 1989) (plan administrator satisfied five factor test).
For post-Bruch LMRA cases to the same effect, see Hale v. Trustees of United Mine
Workers Health & Retirement Funds, 23 F.3d 899, 901-02 (4th Cir. 1994) (plan
administrator upheld as had logical reason); Lockhart v. United Mine Workers 1974
Pension Trust, 5 F.3d 74, 77-78 (4th Cir. 1993) (plan administrator satisfied five factor
test); Gauer v. Connors, 953 F.2d 97, 99 (4th Cir. 1991) (same); O'Connor v. Central
Va. U.F.C.W. & Subscribing Employers Welfare Fund, 945 F.2d 799, 801 (4th Cir.
1991) (plan administrator upheld as had logical reason).
See infra notes 329-30 and accompanying text for the Fourth Circuit's five-factor test.
313. Chevron Chem. Co. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Local Union 4-447, 47
F.3d 139, 145-46 (5th Cir. 1995) (non-LMRA ERISA plan: plan administrator was
legally correct under step one); Izzarelli v. Rexene Prods. Co., 24 F.3d 1506, 1519 n.25
(5th Cir. 1994) (same); Duhon v. Texaco, Inc., 15 F.3d 1302, 1307 n.3 (5th Cir. 1994)
(court refuses to apply two step analysis after it finds plan administrator had documenta-
tion and logical reason for decision); Haubold v. Intermedics, Inc., 11 F.3d 1333, 1337
(5th Cir. 1994) (plan administrator was legally correct under step one); Jones v. SONAT,
Inc. Master Employee Benefits Plan Admin. Comm., 997 F.2d 113, 115 (5th Cir. 1993)
(plan administrator reversed as violated plain meaning principle); Wildbur v. ARCO
Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 637-38 (5th Cir. 1992) (remanded for extrinsic evidence not
before plan administrator); Vasseur v. Halliburton Co., 950 F.2d 1002, 1005 (5th Cir.
1992) (plan administrator correct under plain meaning principle); Jordan v. Cameron Iron
Works, Inc., 900 F.2d 53, 55 (5th Cir.) (plan administrator legally correct under first step
of a two-step process in analyzing interpretations), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 939 (1990).
For post-Bruch LMRA cases to the same effect, see James v. Louisiana Laborers
Health & Welfare Fund, 29 F.3d 1029, 1033 (5th Cir. 1994) (plan administrator legally
correct under step one of two-step process); Kennedy v. Electricians Pension Plan, Int'l
Bhd. of Elec. Workers No. 995, 954 F.2d 1116, 1121 (5th Cir. 1992) (plan administrator
legally incorrect, but no abuse of discretion found); Batchelor v. International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers Local 861 Pension & Retirement Fund, 877 F.2d 441, 444-46 (5th Cir.
1989) (plan administrator legally incorrect and abused discretion due to direct conflict
with express plan language).
See infra notes 321-27 and accompanying text for the Fifth Circuit's two-step process.
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314. Bartling v. Fruehauf Corp., 29 F.3d 1062, 1071 n.l 1 (6th Cir. 1994) (plan
administrator upheld as had logical reason); Richards v. General Motors Corp., 991 F.2d
1227, 1231-32 (6th Cir. 1993) (plan administrator reversed as against plain meaning
principle); Johnson v. Eaton Corp., 970 F.2d 1569, 1574 (6th Cir. 1992) (plan
administrator upheld as had logical reason); Wells v. United States Steel & Carnegie
Pension Fund, Inc., 950 F.2d 1244, 1248-49 (6th Cir. 1992) (plan administrator reversed
as violated plain meaning principle); Callahan v. Rouge Steel Co., 941 F.2d 456, 458-60
(6th Cir. 1991) (same); Davis v. Kentucky Fin. Cos. Retirement Plan, 887 F.2d 689, 694-
95 (6th Cir. 1989) (plan administrator upheld as consistent with prior interpretations and
in good faith), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 905 (1990).
315. Butler v. Encyclopedia Britanica, Inc., 41 F.3d 285, 291 (7th Cir. 1994) (plan
administrator upheld as had logical reason); Krawczyk v. Harnischfeger Corp., 41 F.3d
276, 279 (7th Cir. 1994) (plan administrator satisfied three factor test); Cuddington v.
Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 33 F.3d 813, 816-17 (7th Cir. 1994) (plan administrator
upheld as had logical reason); Loyola Univ. of Chicago v. Humana Ins. Co., 996 F.2d
895, 899-900 (7th Cir. 1993) (plan administrator upheld as had logical reason); Cutting
v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 993 F.2d 1293, 1298-99 (7th Cir.) (plan administrator upheld
under plain meaning principle), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 308 (1993); Fought v. Evans
Prods. Co. Racine Pension Plan Agreement, 966 F.2d 304, 306-07 (7th Cir. 1992) (plan
administrator upheld as had logical reason); Halpin v. W.W. Grainger, Inc, 962 F.2d 685,
695-96 (7th Cir. 1992) (plan administrator overruled as made no interpretation); Lister
v. Stark, 942 F.2d 1183, 1188 (7th Cir. 1991) (plan administrator overruled as did not
consider extrinsic evidence); Fuller v. CBT Corp., 905 F.2d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 1990)
(plan administrator upheld as filled gap in contract with summary plan description in
employee handbook); Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis v. SwedishAmerican
Group Health Benefit Trust, 901 F.2d 1369, 1372 (7th Cir. 1990) (plan administrator
upheld under plain meaning principle); Egert v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 900 F.2d
1032, 1038 (7th Cir. 1990) (plan administrator reversed as violated plain meaning
principle).
For post-Bruch LMRA cases to the same effect, see Russo v. Health, Welfare &
Pension Fund, Local 705, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 984 F.2d 762, 766 (7th Cir. 1993)
(plan administrator upheld under plain meaning principle); Saracco v. Local Union 786
Bldg. Material Pension Fund, 942 F.2d 1213, 1216 (7th Cir. 1991) (same); Exbom v.
Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Health & Welfare Fund, 900 F.2d 1138, 1143 (7th
Cir. 1990) (plan administrator upheld as had logical reason).
316. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 48 F.3d 365,
371 (8th Cir.) (plan administrator reversed under plain meaning principle), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 300 (1995); Brandis v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 47 F.3d 947, 950
(8th Cir. 1995) (plan administrator upheld as correct); Shell v. Amalgamated Cotton
Garment, 43 F.3d 364, 366 n.4, 337 (8th Cir. 1994) (same); Bennett v. Soo Line R.R.,
35 F.3d 334, 336 n.4, (8th Cir. 1994) (plan administrator upheld as had logical reason);
Kennedy v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 31 F.3d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1994) (plan administrator
reversed as violated plain meaning principle); Brumn v. Bert Bell NFL Retirement Plan,
995 F.2d 1433, 1437-40 (8th Cir. 1993) (plan administrator reversed as violated four of
the five factors, including plain meaning principle); Sturges v. Hy-Vee Employee Benefit
Plan & Trust, 991 F.2d 479, 480-81 (8th Cir. 1993) (plan administrator reversed as
violated plain meaning principle); Cox v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., 965 F.2d 569,
572-73 (8th Cir. 1992) (remand as trial court used de novo review); Finley v. Special
Agents Mut. Benefit Ass'n, Inc., 957 F.2d 617, 621-22 (8th Cir. 1992) (plan administra-
tor upheld as complied with all five factors); Lakey v. Remington Arms Co., 874 F.2d
541, 545 (8th Cir. 1989) (plan administrator upheld as consistent with prior interpre-
tations).
For post-Bruch LMRA cases to the same effect, see Lutheran Medical Ctr. v.
Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters & Eng'rs Health & Welfare Plan, 25 F.3d 616, 621-22
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and Eleventh319 Circuits use the LMRA interpretive rule for those
(8th Cir. 1994) (plan administrator reversed as violated all five factors).
317. Parker v. BankAmerica Corp., 50 F.3d 757, 768 (9th Cir. 1995) (plan
administrator upheld under plain meaning principle); Winters v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,
49 F.3d 550, 554 (9th Cir.) (trial court incorrectly used contra proferentem principle),
cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3249 (1995); Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317,
1323 (9th Cir. 1995) (plan administrator upheld under plain meaning principle); Barnett
v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 32 F.3d 413, 417 (9th Cir. 1994) (plan administrator
upheld on extrinsic evidence); Watkins v. Westinghouse Hanford Co., 12 F.3d 1517,
1525 (9th Cir. 1993) (plan administrator upheld under plain meaning principle); Taft v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 9 F.3d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir. 1993) (plan administrator
upheld on extrinsic evidence limited to that before the administrator); Bogue v. Ampex
Corp., 976 F.2d 1319, 1325 (9th Cir. 1992) (plan administrator upheld under plain
meaning principle), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1847 (1993); Eley v. Boeing Co., 945 F.2d
276, 279 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); Williams v. Caterpillar, Inc., 944 F.2d 658, 666 (9th
Cir. 1991) (same); Madden v. ITT Long Term Disability Plan for Salaried Employees,
914 F.2d 1279, 1285-86 (9th Cir. 1990) (same), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1087 (1991).
For post-Bruch LMRA cases to the same effect, see Carpenters Pension Trust Fund
v. Underground Constr. Co., 31 F.3d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 1994) (plan administrator upheld
under plain meaning principle); Clark v. Washington Teamsters Welfare Trust, 8 F.3d
1429, 1431 (9th Cir. 1993) (plan administrator upheld on intrinsic evidence); Jones v.
Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund, 906 F.2d 480, 482 (9th Cir. 1990) (plan
administrator upheld on extrinsic evidence before plan administrator); Johnson v.
Trustees of W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 879 F.2d 651, 654 (9th
Cir. 1989) (plan administrator upheld under plain meaning principle).
318. Averhart v. US West Management Pension Plan, 46 F.3d 1480, 1485-86 (10th
Cir. 1994) (plan administrator upheld under plain meaning principle); Headrick v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 24 F.3d 1272, 1276 (10th Cir. 1994) (same); Pitman v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield, 24 F.3d 118, 123-24 (10th Cir. 1994) (remand to give proper deference
for conflict of interest); Rademacher v. Colorado Ass'n of Soil Conservation Dists.
Medical Benefit Plan, 11 F.3d 1567, 1570 (10th Cir. 1993) (plan administrator upheld
as had logical reason); Counts v. Kissack Water & Oil Serv., Inc., 986 F.2d 1322, 1324-
25 (10th Cir. 1993) (plan administrator reversed as interpretation contrary to ERISA);
Winchester v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 975 F.2d 1479, 1488 (10th Cir. 1992) (plan
administrator upheld on extrinsic evidence); Millensifer v. Retirement Plan for Salaried
Employees of Cotter Corp., 968 F.2d 1005, 1009-10 (10th Cir. 1992) (plan administrator
upheld as had logical reason); Arfsten v. Frontier Airlines, Inc. Retirement Plan for
Pilots, 967 F.2d 438, 440 (10th Cir. 1992) (plan administrator upheld on extrinsic
evidence); McGee v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., 953 F.2d 1192, 1200-01 (10th Cir.
1992) (plan administrator upheld on plain meaning principle); Pratt v. Petroleum Prod.
Management Inc. Employee Say. Plan & Trust, 920 F.2d 651, 661 (10th Cir. 1990) (plan
administrator upheld as had logical reason).
319. Florence Nightingale Nursing Serv. Inc. v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 41 F.3d
1476, 1483 (11th Cir. 1995) (plan administrator's interpretation reversed as based on
documents not part of the plan), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2002 (1995); Lee v. Blue
Cross/Blue Shield, 10 F.3d 1547, 1551 (1lth Cir. 1994) (plan administrator's
interpretation reversed under contra proferentem principle); Blank v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 926 F.2d 1090, 1093 (1 lth Cir.) (plan administrator upheld on plain meaning
principle), cert denied, 502 U.S. 938 (1991); Anderson v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 907
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ERISA plans granting the plan administrator interpretive discretion.
State courts similarly use the LMIRA interpretive rule for the plan
interpretive discretion situation.320
Several circuits have developed subrules-corollaries to the trustee's
acceptance principle-to assist in the determination of whether a plan
administrator's interpretation was arbitrary and capricious. These
subrules, developed after ERISA's passage, generally insure that
violation of the plain meaning principle is an arbitrary and capricious
act.
The Fifth Circuit was the first federal circuit to develop the subrules.
The Fifth Circuit uses a two-step process for applying the arbitrary and
capricious standard. The court must: (1) determine whether the plan
administrator's interpretation is correct and, if not, (2) determine whether
the plan administrator's decision is arbitrary and capricious.3 2'
Under the first step, the court uses a three factor test: (1) whether the
plan administrator gives the plan a uniform meaning over time, (2)
whether the plan administrator's interpretation is consistent with a fair
reading of the plan, and (3) whether a different interpretation would
result in unanticipated costs.3"
Under the second step, the court uses a four-factor test: whether the
plan administrator's interpretation (1) is internally consistent, (2)
comports with federal regulations, (3) is supported by facts, and (4)
suggests no inference of bad faith." Under this test, an interpretation
F.2d 1072, 1076 (11 th Cir. 1990) (remand as trial court used de novo review); Newell
v. Prudential Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 644, 651-2 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (plan administrator upheld
on plain meaning principle); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 898 F.2d 1556, 1569
(11 th Cir. 1990) (remanded for conflict of interest evidence), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040
(1991); Jett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 890 F.2d 1137, 1538 (11th Cir. 1990)
(remanded as trial court used de novo review).
For post-Bruch LMRA cases to the same effect, see Guy v. Southeastern Iron
Workers' Welfare Fund, 877 F.2d 37, 39 (1 lth Cir. 1989) (plan administrator upheld as
had logical reason); Dixon v. Seafarers' Welfare Plan, 878 F.2d 1411, 1412 (1 1th Cir.
1989) (plan administrator reversed as violated plain meaning principle).
320. Bertrand v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 635 So. 2d 579, 582 (La. Ct. App.
1994) (plan administrator upheld under plain meaning principle); Talley v. Enserch
Corp., 589 So. 2d 615, 618-19 (La. Ct. App.) (plan administrator reversed as did not use
plan definitions), writ denied, 592 So. 2d 1342 (La. 1992); Lessard v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 568 A.2d 491, 496-98 (Me. 1989); (plan administrator upheld as legally
correct); St. Louis Children's Hosp. v. Commerce Bancshares, Inc., 799 S.W.2d 87, 95
(Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (plan administrator upheld on intrinsic evidence); Hamilton,
Johnston & Co. v. Johnston, 607 A.2d 1044, 1048-49 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992)
(plan administrator reversed as provided no logical reason).
321. Batchelder v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 861 Pension &
Retirement Fund, 877 F.2d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 1989); Bayles v. Central States, S.E. &
S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 602 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1979).
322. Batchelder, 877 F.2d at 444; Bayles, 602 F.2d at 100.
323. Batchelder, 877 F.2d at 445; Bayles, 602 F.2d at 99.
1034
[VOL. 32: 955, 1995] ERISA
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
contrary to the plain meaning principle is arbitrary and capricious.3 24
After Bruch, the Fifth Circuit mandated the use of the plain meaning and
extrinsic evidence principles to determine a fair meaning.3"
More recently, the Fifth Circuit questioned the usefulness of the first
step. It would seem easier to determine one of many logical reasons
under the arbitrary and capricious standard, rather than which one of the
many is the correct one.326 The Eleventh Circuit also follows the two-
step process of the Fifth Circuit.
327
The Ninth Circuit applies the arbitrary and capricious standard under
a different two-step process. A court must (1) determine compliance
with the plain meaning principle and then (2) determine compliance with
four other factors--good faith, consistency of application, provision of
a rationale, and accordance with the drafter's intent.328
The Fourth Circuit, since the Bruch decision, uses a five factor test
under which the court must consider: (1) whether the plan
administrator's interpretation is consistent with the goals of the plan, (2)
whether it might render some other language in the plan meaningless or
inconsistent, (3) whether the interpretation is consistent with the
procedural and substantive requirements of ERISA, (4) whether the
interpretation is applied consistently, and (5) whether the interpretation
is contrary to the clear language of the plan.329  An interpretation
324. Batchelder, 877 F.2d at 445; see Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 § 404(I)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (1988) (operate plan in accordance with
plan documents).
325. Chevron Chem. Co. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Local Union 4-447, 47
F.3d 139, 145 (5th Cir. 1995) (can use court's own interpretation and explanations given
workers under the ambiguity principle); Izzarelli v. Rexene Prods. Co., 24 F.3d 1506,
1520 (5th Cir. 1994) (plain meaning principle and extrinsic evidence principle); Haubold
v. Intermedics, Inc., 11 F.3d 1333, 1338-39 (5th Cir. 1994) (plain meaning principle).
326. See Duhon v. Texaco, Inc., 15 F.3d 1302, 1307 n.3 (5th Cir. 1994) (non-
LMRA ERISA plan: refusing to use step one).
327. Guy v. Southeastern Iron Workers' Welfare Fund, 877 F.2d 37, 39 (1 1th Cir.
1989) (LMRA case); Harris v. Pullman Standard, Inc., 809 F.2d 1495, 1498 (1lth Cir.
1987); Anderson v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 759 F.2d 1518, 1522 (1 th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 995 (1985).
But see Miles v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension & Retirement Fund
Employee Pension Benefit Plan, 698 F.2d 593, 599 (2d Cir. 1983) (rejecting the Fifth
Circuit's two-step process).
328. Pilon v. Retirement Plan for Salaried Employers of Great N. Nekoosa Corp.,
861 F.2d 217, 219-20 (9th Cir. 1988).
329. Hickey v. Digital Equip. Corp., 43 F.3d 941, 947 (4th Cir. 1995); Sheppard &
Enoch Pratt Hosp., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 32 F.3d 120, 126 (4th Cir. 1994); Lockhart
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contrary to the plain meaning principle is an abuse of discretion.33
The Eighth Circuit adopted this five factor test from the Fourth
Circuit.3 ,
The Seventh Circuit recently set forth a three-factor test under the
abuse of discretion standard. This test requires the court to consider
extrinsic evidence on: (1) whether the plan administrator's interpretation
is consistent with the intent of the plan sponsor, (2) whether the plan
administrator applies the interpretation consistently, and (3) whether the
interpretation results in additional costs to the plan.
332
The circuits have also developed other variations on the abuse of
discretion standard. The Bruch decision directs courts to subject
potential conflicts of interest by the plan administrators to de novo
review.333 As a result, some circuits apply a slightly different standard
to conflicts under the abuse of discretion standard. In the Fourth Circuit,
a plan administrator with a conflict must have offered an interpretation
consistent with one the court would expect from a fiduciary without a
conflict.334 This means de novo review.335 The Sixth Circuit ignores
the directive, applying the arbitrary and capricious standard even in the
presence of a conflict of interest.336 The Ninth Circuit gives less
deference in the event of a pecuniary conflict of interest,337 the stan-
dard the Ninth Circuit used before Bruch.338 If a plan administrator
v. United Mine Workers 1974 Pension Trust, 5 F.3d 74, 77 (4th Cir. 1993); De Nobel
v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 1180, 1188 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing various circuits for each
part).
330. Davis v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 966 F.2d 890, 895 (4th Cir. 1992).
331. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 48 F.3d 365,
371 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 300 (1995); Shell v. Amalgamated Cotton
Garment, 43 F.3d 364, 366 (8th Cir. 1994); Kennedy v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 31 F.3d
606, 609 (8th Cir. 1994); Brum v. Bert Bell NFL Retirement Plan, 995 F.2d 1433, 1437
(8th Cir. 1993); Finley v. Special Agents Mut. Benefit Ass'n, Inc., 957 F.2d 617, 621
(8th Cir. 1992).
For post-Bruch LMRA cases to the same effect, see Lutheran Medical Ctr. v.
Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters & Eng'rs Health & Welfare Plan, 25 F.3d 616, 620-22
(8th Cir. 1994).
332. Karwczyk v. Hamischfeger Corp., 41 F.3d 276, 279 (7th Cir. 1994).
333. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989); id. at 108
(limiting opinion to interpretive cases involving an absence of interpretive discretion).
334. Doe v. Group Hospitalization & Medical Services, 3 F.3d 80, 87 (4th Cir.
1993); accord Hickey v. Digital Equip. Corp., 43 F.3d 941, 946 (4th Cir. 1995).
335. Doe, 3 F.3d at 89.
336. Callahan v. Rouge Steel Co., 941 F.2d 456, 459 (6th Cir. 1991).
337. Parker v. BankAmerica Corp., 50 F.3d 757, 767 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 64
U.S.L.W. 3249 (1995); Winters v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 49 F.3d 550, 553 (9th Cir.
1995); Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317, 1321 (9th Cir. 1994); Watkins v.
Westinghouse Hanford Co., 12 F.3d 1517, 1525 (9th Cir. 1994).
338. Pilon v. Retirement Plan for Salaried Employers of Great N. Nekoosa Corp.,
861 F.2d 217, 219 (9th Cir. 1988); Fielding v. International Harvester Co., 815 F.2d
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has a conflict, the Eleventh Circuit shifts the burden of proof to the plan
administrator, who must show the interpretation was not tainted by self-
interest. 3
The circuits have different approaches for how they limit a trial court's
use of extrinsic evidence. Some courts limit the extrinsic evidence that
can be considered to the evidence before the plan administrator when it
made its determination. This was the rule before Bruch under the
arbitrary and capricious standard.34°  The Fourth34' and Ninth342
Circuits continue this limitation. On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit has
abrogated this variation and allows courts to investigate evidence not
before the plan administrator.343
Another variation among the circuits deals with the origin of the abuse
of discretion standard. The Sixth Circuit claims this interpretive rule is
a trust law rule3" while the Seventh Circuit claims a contractual origin
for the rule.345
The Sixth Circuit has also determined that courts make the determina-
tion whether the plan grants plan interpretive discretion to the plan
administrator under the de novo standard.346
1254, 1256 (9th Cir. 1987); Dockray v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 801 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th
Cir. 1986); Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 711-12 (9th Cir. 1985).
339. Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 898 F.2d 1556, 1566 (1lth Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991); accord Florence Nightingale Nursing Serv. Inc. v.
Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 41 F.3d 1476, 1481 (11th Cir. 1995); Lee v. Blue Cross/Blue
Shield, 10 F.3d 1547, 1550 (11th Cir. 1994); Anderson v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 907
F.2d 1072, 1076 (1 1th Cir. 1990); Newell v. Prudential Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 644, 651 (1 1th
Cir. 1990).
340. See Flint, supra note 28, at 140-41.
341. Sheppard & Enoch Pratt Hosp., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 32 F.3d 120, 125
(4th Cir. 1994).
342. Winters v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 49 F.3d 550, 553 (9th Cir.), cert denied,
64 U.S.L.W. 3249 (1995); Taft v. Equitable Life Ins. Soc'y, 9 F.3d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir.
1994).
343. Wildbur v. ARCO Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 638-39 (5th Cir. 1992).
344. Wells v. United States Steel & Carnegie Pension Fund, Inc., 950 F.2d 1244,
1248 (6th Cir. 1991).
345. Fuller v. CBT Corp., 905 F.2d 1055, 1058 (7th Cir. 1990); see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 228 cmt. a (1981) (satisfaction of a party called for in a
contract must be reasonable); see also Flint, supra note 1, at 372-76 (explaining the
parallel development of the arbitrary and capricious standard under both state contract
law and state trust law).
346. Tiemeyer v. Community Mut. Ins. Co., 8 F.3d 1094, 1099 (6th Cir. 1993).
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2. Discretion Absent
When plan interpretive discretion is absent, the circuits divide into two
sets. One set applies the same rule under de novo review to all types of
plans, although the rule chosen may vary from circuit to circuit. The
other set divides the plans into two groups. For those plans using
insurance contracts, de novo review in these circuits means an insurance
contract rule. Therefore, the court applies either the classical contract
rule, including the contraproferentem principle for ambiguous language,
or the neoclassical contract theory of reasonable expectation. When a
plan does not involve an insurance contract, the circuits in this set use
a default principle that does not defer to either party's interpretation.
The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
comprise the first set. This set further divides over the understanding
principle and the default principle. The Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh
Circuits use an elite standard, while the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and
Tenth Circuits use a lay standard. The Sixth and Eighth Circuits also
use a default rule that does not favor either party.
When plan interpretive discretion is absent, the Fourth, Fifth, and
Eleventh Circuits resort to de novo review. In the absence of ambigu-
ities, these courts apply the plain meaning principle.1 7 In the presence
347. For the Fourth Circuit, see Hendricks v. Central Reserve Life Ins. Co., 39 F.3d
507, 512 (4th Cir. 1994) (plan administrator correct under plain meaning principle);
Hardester v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 330, 334 (4th Cir. 1994) (plan
administrator a person of average intelligence); Gill v. Moco Thermal Indus., Inc., 981
F.2d 858, 860 (6th Cir. 1992) (same); Coleman v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 969 F.2d
54, 57-58 (4th Cir. 1992) (same).
For the Fifth Circuit, see Todd v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 1448, 1452 n.1 (5th Cir.
1995) (as understood by a person of average intelligence); Southern Farm Bureau Life
Ins. Co. v. Moore, 993 F.2d 98, 101 (5th Cir. 1993) (plan administrator correct under
plain meaning principle); Nesom v. Brown & Root, U.S.A., Inc., 987 F.2d 1188, 1191
& n.4 (5th Cir. 1993) (same); Wise v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 986 F.2d 929, 939 (5th
Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 196 (1993); Harms v. Cavenham Forest Indus., 984
F.2d 686, 688 (5th Cir. 1993) (non-insurance plan, plan administrator correct under plain
meaning principle), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 382 (1993).
For the Eleventh Circuit, see Bedinghaus v. Modem Graphic Arts, 15 F.3d 1027, 1029
(1 Ith Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 426 (1994) (plan administrator reversed under plain
meaning principle); Arnold v. Life Ins. Co., 894 F.2d 1566, 1567 (11 th Cir. 1990) (plan
administrator upheld under plain meaning principle); Moon v. American Home
Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86, 89 (1Ith Cir. 1989) (plan administrator reversed under plain
meaning principle); see also Kirwin v. Marriott Corp., 10 F.3d 784, 789 (1 1th Cir. 1994)
(remand for de novo review when trial court used arbitrary and capricious standard);
Baker v. Big Star Division of the Grand Union Co., 893 F.2d 288, 291 (1Ith Cir. 1989)
(same).
Only Harms, Bedinghaus, and Kirwin dealt with a plan without insurance contracts.
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of ambiguities, they apply the extrinsic evidence principle34 followed
by the contra proferentem principle of insurance contract law.
349
When plan interpretive discretion is absent, the Tenth and Seventh
Circuits use the de novo review. In the absence of ambiguities, these
courts apply the lay meaning principle.35 In the presence of ambigu-
The use of a person of average intelligence by Hardester, at 334, and Todd, at 1452
n.1, suggests the Fourth and Fifth Circuits also soon may go to a lay standard.
348. For the Fourth Circuit, see Adkins v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 917 F.2d
794, 796-97 (4th Cir. 1990) (defer to neither party, but plan administrator lost on
extrinsic evidence of court cases interpreting similar insurance provisions).
For the Fifth Circuit, see Hansen v. Continental Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971, 982 (5th Cir.
1991) (ambiguity unresolved after using extrinsic evidence).
For the Eleventh Circuit, see Blake v. Union Mut. Stock Life Co. of Am., 906 F.2d
1525, 1527 (1 lth Cir. 1990) (plan administrator upheld on extrinsic evidence).
All of these cases dealt with plans with insurance contracts.
349. For the Fourth Circuit, see Glocker v. W.R. Grace & Co., 974 F.2d 540, 544
(4th Cir. 1992) (remanded for de novo review); see also Doe v. Group Hospitalization
& Medical Service, 3 F.3d 80, 89 (4th Cir. 1993) (discretion but with conflict of interest:
use de novo and construe ambiguities against the draftsman; plan administrator overruled
on construction).
For the Fifth Circuit, see Hansen, 940 F.2d at 982 (construing in favor of employee
on the basis of an insurance contract case); accord Todd, 47 F.3d at 1451-52 (accepting
employee interpretation); Ramsey v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am., 12 F.3d 472, 479
(5th Cir. 1994) (same).
For the Eleventh Circuit, compare Mareeek v. Bellsouth Servs., Inc., 49 F.3d 702, 705
(11th Cir. 1995) (plan administrator upheld as correct under de novo; correctness
determined under de novo review and arbitrary and capricious standard by same method)
with Lee v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 10 F.3d 1547, 1551 (1 lth Cir. 1994) (plan adminis-
trator incorrect under arbitrary and capricious standard, the contra proferentem principle
is appropriate to resolve ambiguities).
Only Marecek dealt with a plan without insurance contracts.
Participant lawyers in the Eleventh Circuit have attempted to introduce extrinsic
evidence of oral representations of ambiguous language under interpretive doctrines. See
Glass v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 1341, 1347 (1Ith Cir. 1994) (cannot
if the plan is unambiguous); Lordmann Enters., Inc. v. Equicor, Inc., 32 F.3d 1529,
1534-35 (1 lth Cir. 1994) (same); Novak v. Irwin Yacht & Marine Corp., 986 F.2d 468,
472 (11th Cir. 1993) (same); Meadows v. Cagle's Inc., 954 F.2d 686, 698 (11th Cir.
1992) (same); Simmons v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 940 F.2d 614, 617 (11th Cir.
1991) (same); Alday v. Container Corp., 906 F.2d 660, 666 (1lth Cir. 1990) (same);
Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1986) (same). But see National
Cos. Health Benefit Plan v. St. Joseph's Hosp., Inc., 929 F.2d 1558, 1565 (1 Ith Cir.
1991) (can if plan is ambiguous); Kane v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 893 F.2d 1283, 1285-86
(11th Cir. 1990) (same).
350. For the Tenth Circuit, see Blair v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 1219,
1221 (10th Cir. 1992) (reasonable participant); McGee v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp.,
953 F.2d 1192, 1202 (10th Cir. 1992) (same); accord Bartlett v. Martin Marietta
Operations Support, Inc. Life Ins. Plan, 38 F.3d 514, 517 (10th Cir. 1994) (plan
administrator upheld under ordinary meaning principle); Awbrey v. Pennzoil Co., 961
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ities, these courts apply the partial-extrinsic evidence principle"'
followed by the contra proferentem principle of insurance contract
law.352  The rationale the Tenth Circuit gives for the contra
proferentem principle is that it is consistent with the ERISA policy of
protecting the interests of the participants."'
The Sixth and Eighth Circuits also use the de novo standard. Mindful
that Bruch cautioned against favoring either party's interpretation, these
circuits have changed both the understanding principle and the default
principle used by other circuits. ERISA requires plan administrators to
provide participants with a plan description "written in a manner
calculated to be understood by the average plan participant." '  To
this end, these circuits use, as the understanding principle in the absence
F.2d 928, 930-31 (10th Cir. 1992) (same).
For the Seventh Circuit, see Brewer v. Protexall, Inc., 50 F.3d 453, 457 (7th Cir.
1995) (person of average intelligence); Casey v. Uddeholm Corp., 32 F.3d 1094, 1096
(7th Cir. 1994) (as understood by an average participant); McNeilly v. Bankers United
Life Assurance Co., 999 F.2d 1199, 1201 (7th Cir. 1993) (as understood by a lay
person); Senkier v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 948 F.2d 1050, 1052-53 (7th Cir.
1991) (same); accord Edwards v. Great W. Life Assurance Co., 20 F.3d 748, 749 (7th
Cir.) (plan administrator upheld under ordinary meaning principle), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 424 (1994); Bechtold v. Physicians Health Plan, Inc., 19 F.3d 322, 325-26 (7th Cir.
1994) (same); Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1405, 1408 (7th Cir. 1994)
(same); Bullwinkel v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 429,431 (7th Cir. 1994)
(same); Meredith v. Allsteel, Inc., 11 F.3d 1354, 1357-58 (7th Cir. 1994) (plan
administrator reversed as contrary to the ordinary meaning principle); Shanks v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield United, 979 F.2d 1232, 1233 (7th Cir. 1992) (plan administrator
upheld under ordinary meaning principle); Hammond v. Fidelity & Guar. Life Ins. Co.,
965 F.2d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1992) (same); Petrilli v. Drechsel, 910 F.2d 1441, 1446 (7th
Cir. 1990) (remanded for de novo review); see also Preze v. Board of Trustees,
Pipefitters Welfare Fund Local 597, 5 F.3d 272, 274 (7th Cir. 1993) (LMRA plan: plan
administrator upheld under ordinary meaning principle); Chapter v. Monfort, Inc., 20
F.3d 286, 288 (7th Cir. 1990) (court will abandon plain meaning principle when it
produces absurdities).
Only Awbrey and Meredith dealt with a plan without insurance contracts.
351. For the Seventh Circuit, see Hickey v. A.E. Staley Mfg., 995 F.2d 1385, 1389
(7th Cir. 1993) (ambiguity unresolved after using extrinsic evidence).
For the Tenth Circuit, see Blair, 974 F.2d at 1221 (plan administrator reversed on
reasonable expectations evidence).
Only Hickey dealt with a plan without insurance contracts.
352. For the Seventh Circuit, see Brewer, 50 F.3d at 457 (reversing plan
administrator to construe in favor of insured); Casey, 32 F.3d at 1096 (same); McNeilly,
999 F.2d at 1201 (same); Phillips v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 302, 307 (7th
Cir. 1992) (same).
For the Tenth Circuit, see Blair, 974 F.2d at 1222 (dicta).
All of these cases dealt with plans with insurance contracts.
353. Blair, 974 F.2d at 1222.
354. Employment Income Security Act of 1974 § 102(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1)
(1988); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-2(a) (1994) (Department of Labor regulation on
summary plan description); 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-10(c)(3) (1994) (same on summary
annual report).
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of ambiguities, the reasonable expectation principle.355 In the presence
of ambiguities, these circuits use the partial-extrinsic evidence princi-
ple35 6 followed by the default principle. However, based on Bruch,
the default principle does not defer to either party's interpretation.
357
Therefore, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits have rejected the contra
355. For the Sixth Circuit, see Wulfv. Quantum Chem. Corp., 26 F.3d 1368, 1376-
77 (6th Cir. 1994) (plan administrator reversed on the basis of letters made to employee);
see Boyer v. Douglas Components Corp., 986 F.2d 999, 1005 (employer right to
terminate case: use contractual methods for resolving ambiguities in plan).
For the Eighth Circuit, see Maxa v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 980, 985 (8th
Cir. 1992) (reasonable participant); Jacobs v. Pickands Mather & Co., 933 F.2d 652, 658
(8th Cir. 1991) (lead to believe); Brewer v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 150,
153-54 (8th Cir. 1990) (lay persons, not experts). Some commentators depict Brewer,
due to its result, as standing for the plain meaning rule of classical contract theory rather
than the radical acceptance of the neoclassical contract theory. Mary P. Benz, Interpre-
tation of Insurance Policies Governed by ERISA, 59 DEF. COUNS. J. 74, 76 (1992)
(depicting Brewer as the counter to the contra proferentem principle). Frequently, the
Eighth Circuit describes the understanding principle in terms of the plain meaning princi-
ple. Farley v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 653, 660 (8th Cir. 1992) (plan
administrator upheld under the plain meaning principle); Harper v. R.H. Macy & Co.,
Inc., 920 F.2d 544, 545 (8th Cir. 1990) (same); Johnson v. Enron Corp., 906 F.2d 1234,
1237 (8th Cir. 1990) (same); Howe v. Varity Corp., 896 F.2d 1107, 1109 n.4 (8th Cir.
1990) (same).
Only Wulf, Harper, Johnson, and Jacobs dealt with a plan without insurance contracts.
356. For the Sixth Circuit, see Wulf, 26 F.3d at 1376-77; Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g,
a Div. of Lukens Gen. Indus., Inc., 900 F.2d 963, 967 (6th Cir. 1990).
For the Eighth Circuit, see Dvorak v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 965 F.2d 606, 607
(8th Cir. 1992) (remand to use extrinsic evidence); Kirk v. Provident Life & Accident
Ins. Co., 942 F.2d 504, 505 (8th Cir. 1991) (plan administrator upheld); Jacobs, 933 F.2d
at 652 (plan administrator reversed); Brewer, 921 F.2d at 153-54 (remand to obtain.
extrinsic evidence).
Only Wu/fand Jacobs dealt with a plan without insurance contracts.
357. For the Sixth Circuit, see Wulf, 26 F.3d at 1373 (plan administrator reversed
on the basis of letters made to employee); Anderson v. Great W. Life Assurance Co.,
942 F.2d 392, 394 (6th Cir. 1991) (reversed to determine whether had grant of plan
interpretive discretion); Franklin v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 919 F.2d 45, 47 (6th Cir. 1990)
(plan administrator upheld as no evidence of a contrary interpretation); Adams v.
Avondale Indus., Inc., 905 F.2d 943, 950 (6th Cir. 1990) (plan administrator upheld
under plain meaning principle); Perry, 900 F.2d at 965 (plan administrator upheld as no
evidence of a contrary interpretation: no presumption); MacMahan v. New England
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 888 F.2d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 1989) (plan administrator upheld under
plain meaning principle); Aubrey v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 886 F.2d 119, 122 (6th Cir.
1989) (plan administrator reversed as employee interpretation more reasonable); Brown
v. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp., 876 F.2d 546, 550 (6th Cir. 1989) (remanded as trial court
used arbitrary and capricious standard).
Only Wuif, Franklin, Adams, and Brown dealt with a plan without insurance contracts.
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proferentem principle35 for the most reasonable interpretation of the
plan in the opinion of the court.35 9
These circuits have also developed other aspects of the de novo review
standard. The Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits recognize a
contractual origin for the review standard. 60 The Sixth Circuit limits
the extrinsic evidence reviewed by the court to that before the plan
administrator when it rendered its interpretation.36
In exceptional circumstances, the Fourth Circuit allows an exception
to this subrule,3 62 and the Eleventh Circuit has abrogated it altogeth-
358. For the Sixth Circuit, see Franklin, 919 F.2d at 48 (oral severance pay plan).
For the Eighth Circuit, see Maxa, 972 F.2d 985 (cannot use the contra proferentem
principle, so use reasonable expectation principle).
359. For the Sixth Circuit, see Aubrey, 886 F.2d at 123.
For the Eighth Circuit, see Maxa, 972 F.2d at 985 (cannot use contra proferentem
principle so use reasonable expectation principle). Contra Jensen v. Sipco, Inc., 38 F.3d
945, 951 (8th Cir. 1994) (decided for employees as plan administrator provided no
extrinsic evidence); Delk v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 959 F.2d 104, 106 (8th Cir. 1992)
(contra proferentem principle is last tool to resolve ambiguity).
The Eighth Circuit generally is credited with being against the contra proferentem
principle since the circuit once stated that ERISA preempts state law, including the
contra proferentem principle. Brewer, 921 F.2d at 153-54 (remand to obtain extrinsic
evidence); see, e.g., Benz, supra note 355, at 78 (insurance defense counsel arguing
against the contra proferentem principle as not leading to uniform interpretation of the
same insurance language). But the Brewer court had little need for the contra
proferentem principle since it adopted the reasonable expectation principle. Brewer, 921
F.2d at 153-54.
360. For the Fourth Circuit, see Hardester v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d
330, 334 (4th Cir. 1994); Glocker v. W.R. Grace & Co., 974 F.2d 540, 544 (4th Cir.
1992).
For the Sixth Circuit, see Wu/f, 26 F.3d at 1376.
For the Seventh Circuit, see Bullwinkel v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 18 F.3d
429, 431 (7th Cir. 1994); Meredith v. Allsteel, Inc., 11 F.3d 1354, 1357-58 (7th Cir.
1993); Preze v. Board of Trustees, Pipefitters Welfare Fund Local 597, 5 F.3d 272, 274
(7th Cir. 1993); McNeilly v. Bankers United Life Assurance Co., 999 F.2d 1199, 1201
(7th Cir. 1993); Hickey v. A.E. Staley Mfg., 995 F.2d 1385, 1389 (7th Cir. 1993);
Shanks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 979 F.2d 1232, 1233 (7th Cir. 1992);
Phillips v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 302, 307 (7th Cir. 1992); Hammond v.
Fidelity & Guar. Life Ins. Co., 965 F.2d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1992).
For the Eighth Circuit, see Dvorak v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 965 F.2d 606, 608
(8th Cir. 1992); Jacobs v. Pickands Mather & Co., 933 F.2d 652, 656 (8th Cir. 1991);
Howe v. Varity Corp., 896 F.2d 1107, 1109 n.4 (8th Cir. 1990); Wallace v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 882 F.2d 1327, 1330 (8th Cir. 1989) (remand to use de novo
review). For post-Bruch LMRA cases to the same effect, see Baxter v. Lynn, 886 F.2d
182, 188 (8th Cir. 1989) (discretion absent so remand to use de novo review).
361. Wul,] 26 F.3d at 1376-77 (limiting the extrinsic evidence to that before the plan
administrator); Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g, a Div. of Lukens Gen. Indus., Inc., 900 F.2d
963; 967 (6th Cir. 1990) (same).
362. Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 987 F.2d 1017, 1025 (4th Cir. 1993).
This case dealt with a plan with insurance contracts.
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er.363  De novo review, however, should mean that the court is not
limited on the extrinsic evidence it can examine, because the court is to
derive its own interpretation.
The First, Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits comprise the second set.
For plans involving insurance contracts, these circuits divide into two
groups based on the understanding principle used. The First and Ninth
Circuits use a lay standard; the Second and Third Circuits use an elite
standard.
The First and Ninth Circuits, when considering de novo review for
cases with plan interpretive discretion absent and involving insurance
policies, adopted the rule of neoclassical contract theory.31 Therefore,
de novo review in the absence of ambiguities involves the reasonable
expectation principle, 365 and in the presence of ambiguities the partial-
extrinsic evidence principle 36 is followed by the contra proferentem
principle. 67 The reason given by the Ninth Circuit for the contra
363. Moon v. American Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86, 89 (1 1th Cir. 1989)
(since that would be inconsistent with de novo review).
364. For the First Circuit, see Hughes v. Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 264,
267-68 (Ist Cir. 1994); Wickman v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077, 1084
(Ist Cir. 1990); Burnham v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 873 F.2d 486, 489 (1st Cir.
1989).
For the Ninth Circuit, see Saltarelli v. Bob Baker Group Medical Trust, 35 F.3d 382,
386-87 (9th Cir. 1994); Evans v. Safeco Life Ins. Co., 916 F.2d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir.
1990) (interpret insurance policies as a lay person would); Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life
Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 536 (9th Cir. 1990) (as a lay person); see also Lea v. Republic
Airlines, Inc., 903 F.2d 624, 629 (9th Cir. 1990) (de novo review, plan administrator
upheld under plain meaning principle).
365. For the First Circuit, see Wickman, 908 F.2d at 1084 (plain meaning of the
average person, citing insurance law treatises; plan administrator upheld under lay
meaning principle); accord Burnham, 873 F.2d at 489 (natural meaning under the canons
of contract interpretation; plan administrator upheld under lay meaning principle).
For the Ninth Circuit, see Saltarelli, 35 F.3d at 386-87 (plan administrator overruled
under reasonable expectation principle).
366. For the First Circuit, see Hughes, 26 F.3d at 268 (extrinsic evidence failed to
resolve ambiguity).
For the Ninth Circuit, see Mongeluzo v. Baxter Travenol Long Term Disability Benefit
Plan, 46 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 1995) (remanded for consideration of extrinsic
evidence); Evans, 916 F.2d at 1441 (plan administrator upheld on extrinsic evidence);
Kunin, 910 F.2d at 537 (reversing plan administrator on basis of extrinsic evidence).
367. For the First Circuit, see Hughes, 26 F.3d at 268 (only in the insurance
contract context).
For the Ninth Circuit, see Mongeluzo, 46 F.3d at 942 (if ambiguous construe against
insurance company); Patterson v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 11 F.3d 948, 950 (9th Cir. 1993)
(plan administrator reversed under contraproferentem principle); Kunin, 910 F.2d at 539
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proferentem principle is the unanimity of the state decisions from which
the uniform federal rule should not vary.
3 68
When plan interpretive discretion is absent, the Second and Third
Circuits take de novo review of cases involving insurance policies.
These circuits adopt the rule of classical contract theory.369  In the
absence of ambiguities, these circuits apply the plain meaning princi-
ple.370 In the presence of ambiguities, they apply the extrinsic evi-
dence principle37' followed by the contra proferentem principle.372
In the Second Circuit, extrinsic evidence is not limited to that submitted
to the plan administrator.73
If an ERISA plan does not involve an insurance policy, these circuits
also divide into two groups based on the default principle. The First,
Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits follow a similar rule, using in the
(if ambiguous, construe against insurance company).
The Ninth Circuit does not apply the rule to LMRA plans since they are collectively-
bargained and unlike the plans drafted by the insurance companies. Kunin, 910 F.2d at
540; see Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 1985) (rejecting the contra
proferentem principle); Smith v. California Metal Trades Ass'n-Int'l Assoc. of
Machinists Pension Trust, 654 F.2d 650, 655 (9th Cir. 1981) (same); Rehmar v. Smith,
555 F.2d 1362, 1369 (9th Cir. 1976).
368. Kunin, 910 F.2d at 540.
369. For the Second Circuit, see Masella v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 936
F.2d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 1991); Kunstenaar v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 902 F.2d
181, 183 (2d Cir. 1990).
For the Third Circuit, see Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d 1249, 1257-58 (3d
Cir. 1993); accord Smith v. Hartford Ins. Group, 6 F.3d 131, 139 (3d Cir. 1993); Flick
v. Borg-Warner Corp., 892 F.2d 285, 291 (3d Cir. 1989) (dissent: "expressed intentions
... (even if pro-employer), but silence or ambiguity is construed in favor of the
employee participants").
370. For the Second Circuit, see Kunstenaar, 902 F.2d at 183 (upholding the plan
administrator under the plain meaning principle).
For the Third Circuit, see Curcio v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226,
231 (3d Cir. 1994) (plan administrator upheld on plain meaning principle).
371. For the Second Circuit, see Masella, 936 F.2d at 104-05 (allowing participant
to introduce expert testimony not presented at administrative level since plan
administrator has superior access to such information; plan administrator reversed on
extrinsic evidence).
For the Third Circuit, see Smith, 6 F.3d at 138-39 (plan administrator reversed on
extrinsic evidence); Heasley, 2 F.3d at 1256-57 (plan administrator upheld on extrinsic
evidence).
372. For the Second Circuit, see Masella, 936 F.2d at 107 (the contrary rule does
not "promot[e] the interest of employees and beneficiaries [nor] protect ... contractually
defined benefits").
For the Third Circuit, see Smith, 6 F.3d at 138-39 (dicta); Heasley, 2 F.3d at 1256-57
(dicta); see Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 1993)
(mandamus to removejudge: can use reasonable understanding of beneficiary to resolve
ambiguity).
373. Masella, 936 F.2d at 104.
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absence of ambiguities the plain meaning principle 374 and in the
presence of ambiguities the extrinsic evidence principle.3 75  But the
First, Second, and Ninth Circuits have yet to specify the default
principle, 6 while the Third Circuit applies a default principle that
favors neither party.
377
For union-negotiated, single-employer plans, when there is plan
interpretive discretion, courts use the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard.378 But if the collective bargaining agreement covers the matter,
courts continue to use the federal labor law interpretive rule.
379
374. For the First Circuit, see Pizzufi v. Polaroid Corp., 985 F.2d 13, 14 (1st Cir.
1993) (plan administrator upheld on plain meaning principle); Bellino v. Schlumberger
Technologies, Inc., 944 F.2d 26, 29-30 (1st Cir. 1991) (same).
For the Second Circuit, see Bradwell v. GAF Corp., 954 F.2d 798, 800 (2d Cir. 1992)
(plan administrator upheld on plain meaning principle). For post-Bruch LMRA cases
to the same effect, see Jordal v. Simmons, 926 F.2d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 1991) (reversing
plan administrator on plain meaning principle).
For the Third Circuit, see Frank v. Colt Indus. Inc., 910 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1990)
(plan administrator reversed under plain meaning principle); Ulmer v. Harsco Corp., 884
F.2d 98, 101 (3d Cir. 1989) (same).
For the Ninth Circuit, see Orozco v. United Air Lines, Inc., 887 F.2d 949, 952 (9th
Cir. 1989) (plan administrator upheld on plain meaning principle).
375. For the First Circuit, see Rodriguez-Abreu v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 986 F.2d
580, 586-87 (1st Cir. 1993) (plan administrator upheld on extrinsic evidence); Allen v.
Adage, Inc., 967 F.2d 695, 697 (Ist Cir. 1992) (same).
For the Second Circuit, see Heidgerd v. Olin Corp., 906 F.2d 903, 909 (2d Cir. 1990)
(using participant's reliance on summary plan description as most reasonable
interpretation).
For the Third Circuit, see Taylor v. Continental Group Change in Control Severance
Pay Plan, 933 F.2d 1227, 1232-33 (3d Cir. 1991) (remand to use extrinsic evidence to
resolve ambiguity); Anderson v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Corp., 893 F.2d 638, 639-41 (3d
Cir. 1990) (same).
For the Ninth Circuit, see Nelson v. EG & G Energy Measurements Group, Inc., 37
F.3d 1384, 1388 (9th Cir. 1994) (plan administrator upheld on extrinsic evidence
principle).
376. For the First Circuit, see Allen, 967 F.2d at 701 (rejecting the contra
proferentem principle under the Bruch directive not to favor either party).
377. Taylor, 933 F.2d at 1233 (refusing to adopt the contra proferentem principle
except possibly as a last effort).
378. See Communications Workers v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 40 F.3d 426, 433
(D.C. 1994) (can not apply arbitrary and capricious standard until participant exhausts
administrative remedies).
379. Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 609 (7th Cir. 1993) (collective
bargaining agreement to provide lifetime benefits: use extrinsic evidence and contra
proferentem principle; remanded for extrinsic evidence); Smith v. ABS Indus., Inc., 890
F.2d 841, 845-46 (6th Cir. 1989) (collective bargaining agreement to provide health
benefits: use extrinsic evidence, participants win on basis of employer representations).
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State courts, exercising their concurrent jurisdiction over the benefits-
due lawsuit in the absence of plan interpretive discretion, also recognize
de novo review.80 They generally follow the same variations as the
federal circuit courts, applying the rule to all cases,38" ' using the plain
meaning principle,3" using extrinsic evidence, 3 and refusing to
adopt the contra proferentem principle.3"
IV. FURTHERING THE PURPOSE OF ERISA
The federal circuit courts have recognized that the reasonable
expectation principle and the contra proferentem principle from contract
law have a place in the federal common law of ERISA. The First,
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have adopted the
reasonable expectation principle. The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the contra proferentem
principle in all cases. The First, Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits have
adopted the contra proferentem principle for plans with insurance
contracts. Unfortunately, this minor success for participants may be
short-lived. Although the Sixth Circuit asserts that grants of plan
interpretive discretion are not common,385 employers are beginning to
include the plan interpretive discretionary grant to achieve the more
favorable abuse of discretion review standard.
The determinative issue should not be plan interpretive discretion and
either following some version of neoclassical contract theory in the
absence of that discretion or following some version of discretionary
trust theory in the presence of that discretion. By focusing on the grant
But see Stewart v. KHD Deutz of Am. Corp., 980 F.2d 698, 702 (11th Cir. 1995)
(collective bargaining agreement to provide health benefits to retirees: do not use federal
labor interpretive rule but ordinary contract interpretive rule since relates to retirees, not
employees; remand to consider extrinsic evidence due to ambiguity).
380. Brown v. Hartford Life Cos., 593 So. 2d 1376, 1386-87 (La. Ct. App. 1992)
(dicta); Guiles v. University of Mich. Bd. of Regents, 483 N.W.2d 637, 641 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1992) (dicta); Holchuk v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 558 N.Y.S.2d 673, 674
(App. Div. 1990) (dicta); Gorman v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 811 S.W.2d 542, 548
(Tex. 1991) (dicta); Siska v. Travelers, 467 N.W.2d 174, 177 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991)
(dicta).
381. UNC Teton Exploration Drilling, Inc. v. Peyton, 774 P.2d 584, 589 (Wyo.
1989).
382. Thomas v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 568 N.E.2d 937, 939 (Ill. Ct. App.
1991) (plan administrator upheld under plain meaning principle); Peyton, 774 P.2d at
589 (plan administrator reversed under plain meaning principle).
383. Kennedy v. Deere & Co., 548 N.E.2d 610, 612 (II1. Ct. App. 1990) (remand
for acceptance of more extrinsic evidence).
384. Overcash v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 381 S.E.2d 330, 335 (N.C. Ct. App.
1989).
385. Anderson v. Great W. Life Assurance Co., 942 F.2d 392, 394 (6th Cir. 1991).
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of discretion, federal circuit courts avoid the real issues and continue to
adhere to precedent based on erroneous premises. The issue the federal
circuits should confront is which rule of plan interpretation best furthers
ERISA's policies. As this Article discussed in Part II, one of ERISA's
principal purposes is to protect the reasonable expectations of plan
participants.
At present, courts have considered essentially four rules. The first is
an interpretive rule of state discretionary trust theory. Courts should
interpret the plan language in accordance with the plain meaning
principle as a reasonably intelligent person, use extrinsic evidence to
resolve ambiguities, and, if any ambiguities remain, accept the trustee's
interpretation unless it is arbitrary and capricious.
The second rule is an interpretive rule of state classical contract
theory, traditional trust theory, and property law. Courts should interpret
the plan language in accordance with the plain meaning principle as a
reasonably intelligent person, use extrinsic evidence to resolve ambigu-
ities, and, if any ambiguities remain, construe the ambiguities in favor
of the participants.
The third rule is the interpretive rule of federal labor law of collective
bargaining agreements. Courts should interpret the plan language in
accordance with the plain meaning principle plus some extrinsic
evidence, use the remaining extrinsic evidence to resolve ambiguities
and, if any ambiguities remain, construe the ambiguities in favor of the
participants.
The fourth rule is an interpretive rule of state neoclassical contract
theory. Courts should interpret the plan language in accordance with the
understanding of a reasonable participant plus some extrinsic evidence,
use the remaining extrinsic evidence to resolve ambiguities, and, if any
ambiguities remain, construe the ambiguities in favor of the participants.
These four rules essentially differ in two ways. The first rule differs
from the second, third, and fourth rules in the choice of default principle.
The first rule construes ambiguities in favor of plan fiduciaries; the
second, third, and fourth rules construe ambiguities in favor of the
participants. The fourth rule differs from the first, second, and third
rules in using a less stringent understanding principle. The fourth rule
uses the understanding of the participants, while the first and second
rules use the understanding of the plan fiduciaries' lawyers and the third
rule modifies that by the parties' experience and industry customs.
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The problem a court should confront when developing the federal
common law of plan interpretation is which of the two initial under-
standing principles, which of the three ambiguity principles, and which
of the two default rules furthers the purposes of ERISA. Examination
of the policy Congress intends ERISA to foster, express provisions in
ERISA, and ERISA's legislative history leave little doubt as to the
correct resolution of that problem.
A. The Policy of Protecting Participant Expectations
The policy that ERISA seeks to further is to protect the reasonable
expectations of the participants. This policy mandates a particular
selection for the component parts of the plan interpretive rule.
Only one of the understanding principles even seeks to find reasonable
expectations: the reasonable expectation rule from neoclassical contract
theory. Under this principle, the understanding of a significant portion
of the participants would govern the interpretation.
The other option for an understanding principle--the plain meaning
rule-would fail to achieve ERISA's fundamental policy goals. The
plain meaning rule was developed for the express purpose of frustrating
the reasonable expectations of individuals like plan participants. Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, a leading proponent of the objective plain
meaning principle, acknowledged that the principle led to court
interpretation:
If it turns out that one meant one thing and the other another[,] the only choice
possible... is either to hold both parties to the judge's interpretation.., or to
allow the contract to be avoided .... The latter course not only would greatly
enhance the difficulty of enforcing contracts ... but would run against a plain
principle of justice. For each party to a contract has notice that the other will
understand his words according to the usage of the normal speaker of English
386
And that court imposed interpretation was not that of the participants:
If I am right it will be a slow business for our people to reach rational views,
assuming that we are allowed to work peaceably to that end . ... [And]
competition from new races will cut deeper than working men's disputes and
will test whether we can hang together and can fight... 3i7
386. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417,
419 (1899).
387. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law and the Court, Speech at the Harvard Law
School Association of New York Dinner (Feb. 15, 1913), in THE HOLMEs READER 66
(Julius J. Marke ed., 2d ed. 1964).
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Samuel Williston, another leading proponent of the objective plain
meaning principle, recognized that the principle reflects the interests of
those groups in power and not the majority of the people:
[I]t has only been a section of the people, and, until recently, not a very large
section that has had a hand in the work [of law]. If [a legal] result was in
accordance with the mores of the rest of the people it could often only be
because it was the habit of the masses to submit to what they could not
help.38
8
Later critics of the plain meaning principle noted its tendency to sacrifice
the lay person to those in power.389 Choice of the reasonable expecta-
tion principle, as mandated by the policies of ERISA, would merely
comport the court-imposed interpretation with democratic principles.
With respect to the second interpretive step, only one of the possible
ambiguity principles adequately supports the reasonable expectation
principle: the partial-extrinsic evidence principle. This interpretive step
is superior to the others for the following reasons. First, the reasonable
expectation of the participants is likely to be embedded in and typified
by extrinsic evidence, such as oral representations and written materials.
Second, lay testimony on word usage would also be necessary to satisfy
the demands of the reasonable expectation principle. Third, the use of
extrinsic evidence should not be limited to situations in which there is
an ambiguity, otherwise courts cannot determine the reasonable
expectations of the participants. Exclusion of extrinsic evidence in the
unambiguous situation, or exclusion of all extrinsic evidence, does not
facilitate finding the expectations of the participants. Fourth, the partial-
extrinsic evidence principle permits the court to bar technical evidence
introduced by plan administrators in the same way that courts currently
bar employers from introducing technical evidence in the interpretation
of collective bargaining agreements. Thus, ERISA's use of the partial-
extrinsic evidence principle is geared not to using industry custom or
388. SAMUEL WILLISTON, SOME MODERN TENDENCIES IN THE LAW 11 (1929).
389. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 242-43 (1968) (Objective standards "may exempt those who...
are obviously grossly incapable, but apart from this, if men are too veak in understand-
ing or in will-power, they must be sacrificed to the common good."); Austin T. Wright,
Opposition of the Law to Business Usages, 26 COLUm. L. REv. 917, 929 (1926) ("[A]s
to the standardized contracts ... the group whose understandings determines the
meaning.., is a smaller one.").
1049
bargaining history, but to admitting evidence bearing on the participant's
reasonable expectations.
With respect to the default principle, obviously only a construction in
favor of the participants---the contra proferentem principle-comports
with the policy of protecting the reasonable expectations of the
participants. The acceptance of the plan administrator's interpretation
clearly frustrates ERISA's policy mandate because it rarely is made with
participant expectations in mind. However, construction of the plan
documents need not be the one demanded by a particular litigating
participant. ERISA only mandates the protection of the reasonable
expectations of the participants.
B. The Policy of Fostering Plan Growth
The three component parts of the ERISA plan interpretive rule
suggested by this Article do not conflict with the other major ERISA
policy-fostering plan growth. Under the congressional scheme, plan
growth is fostered by tax subsidies to management employees. The
interpretive rule chosen by this Article does not adversely affect tax,
subsidies. The interpretive rule, like most interpretive rules, leaves tax
subsidies in place and plan costs within the control of management
employees.
The plan interpretive rule suggested by this Article will not increase
plan costs in the same fashion as congressionally-mandated participation
and fiduciary rules, or the vesting and funding rules. Employers cannot
directly control congressional mandates. However, employers can
control the impact of the interpretive rule. The interpretive rule
suggested by this Article does not increase a particular plan's costs over
those already promised by the sponsoring employers, because it is
limited to merely enforcing promises as understood by a certain number
of participants. Thus, the impact of this interpretive rule is under the
control of sponsoring employers. Costs of litigation and settlement can
be reduced through careful wording and representations. Insurance
companies exist under similar interpretive rules and continue to thrive.
The interpretive rule suggested by this Article does not discourage
new sponsoring employers from adopting new plans. Rather, the rule
only adversely affects those sponsoring employers that engage in
reprehensible practices. Employers adopting new plans to benefit
employees seldom intend to engage in those reprehensible practices.
Ethically, employers that slyly mislead their employees through the use
of non-understandable language or deceptive representations, either
intentionally or through negligence, should bear the loss. By passing
ERISA, Congress intended to allocate the risk of loss to employers.
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C. Specific ERISA Provisions
Not only does the ERISA plan interpretive rule selected by this Article
serve the fundamental purposes of ERISA, but the rule also comports
with the statute itself. ERISA's penchant for lay language mandates the
reasonable expectation principle. In addition, ERISA's prudent person
standard mandates the contra proferentem principle.
1. Layman ' Language
ERISA expressly takes into account that the understanding of rank and
file participants may not be up to the level of the fiduciary's attorney.
The statute requires that summary plan descriptions and summary annual
reports delivered to participants contain language understandable by the
average participant. Section 102(a)(1) states: "The summary plan
description... shall be written in a manner calculated to be understood
by the average plan participant, and shall be sufficiently accurate and
comprehensive to reasonably apprise such participants and beneficiaries
of their rights and obligations under the plan." '  Section 104(b)(3)
states: "[T]he administrator shall furnish to each participant, and to each
beneficiary receiving benefits under the plan[,] such other material as is
necessary to fairly summarize the latest annual report."39
Employer compliance with the provision of understandable summary
annual reports was so weak as to prompt Department of Labor regula-
tions specifying the language of those reports.392 One of Congress'
major pre-ERISA concerns was that participants could not understand the
technical language used in plans nor the misleading and incomprehensi-
ble plan booklets.393  The only plan interpretive component that
390. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 102(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1022(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis added); 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-2(a) (1994).
391. Id. § 104 (b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(3) (1988) (emphasis added).
392. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-10(d) (1994). Compare 41 Fed. Reg. 32,522, 35,528
(Aug. 3, 1976) (temporary regulation allowed sponsor to add information to summary
annual report) with 44 Fed. Reg. 19,400, 19,402 (April 3, 1979) (rejecting sponsor
additions to summary annual report since uniform format more understandable than
sponsor's variable format). See also 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-5 (1994) (specifying the
form of the ERISA notice of participant rights).
393. See infra note 401 and accompanying text (technical language) and supra note
125 and accompanying text (incomprehensible language).
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recognizes participant understanding and strives to protect it is the
reasonable expectation principle.
It would be a mistake to select the plain meaning principle, which
would impose the fiduciary lawyer's understanding. Choosing the plain
meaning principle as a component of the plan interpretive rule would
clearly defeat Congress' goal that participants understand their plans.
There is a a difference between the elite and lay understanding of plan
language. Congress opted for the lay understanding. Some circuit
courts have correctly followed congressional intent, adopting the lay
understanding of plan language. When there is a conflict between the
summary plan description (which is actually given to a participant) and
the plan document (usually made available for a participant's inspection),
these courts recognize the plan's terms as those specified in the summary
plan description.3 94 If sponsoring employers desire to impose their will
through ERISA plans, their lawyers need to use language understandable
by lay persons.
2. Prudent Person Standard
The real question behind the plan interpretive rule is the standard
under which the court will review the interpretation of the plan
documents by the plan administrator. ERISA provides such a standard.
The plan administrator is to behave as a prudent person acting in a
similar function for a similar entity:
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interests of the participants and beneficiaries and ... with the care, skill,
prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent
man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the
conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims ... and in
accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as
such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of this
subchapter ... 39S
The most similar entity providing benefits for numerous beneficiaries
is an insurance company. In fact, many of the same insurance compa-
394. See, e.g., Heidegerd v. Olin Corp., 906 F.2d 903, 907-08 (2d Cir. 1990)
(ERISA "contemplates that the summary will be an employee's primary source of
information regarding employee benefits, and employees are entitled to rely on the
descriptions contained in the summary. To allow the Plan to contain different terms that
supersede the terms of the [summary plan description] would defeat the purpose of
providing the employees with summaries."); accord Aiken v. Policy Management Sys.
Corp., 13 F.3d 138, 140 (4th Cir. 1993); Hansen v. Continental Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971,
981-82 (5th Cir. 1991); Fuller v. CBT Corp., 905 F.2d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 1990).
Contra Gridley v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., 924 F.2d 1310, 1318 (3d Cir. 1991).
395. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 406(1)(B), (D), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(1)(B), (D) (1988) (emphasis added).
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nies administer contracts under ERISA plans and non-ERISA plans.396
One would have thought that this prudent behavior provision means that
the behavior in both instances would be the same. Yet these plan
administrators contend, despite the prudent person provision, that they
can ignore the contra proferentem principle that would constrain their
interpretive powers under insurance law merely by providing an
interpretive discretion grant in the plan documents. This can only
continue so long as the circuit courts continue sleeping.397
Congress imposed minimum standards of behavior on plan administra-
tors with ERISA. 9s  The prudent person standard under section
396. See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 4(b), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1003(b) (1988) (ERISA does not apply to governmental plans, church plans that have
not made the ERISA coverage election, worker's compensation plans, alien plans, and
excess benefit plans for the highly compensated); Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co., 50 F.3d
793, 799-800 (10th Cir. 1985) (applying Oklahoma insurance law, the contra
proferentem principle, to a church plan not covered by ERISA).
397. For courts not sleeping, see Witmeyerv. Kilroy, 788 F.2d 1021, 1025 (4th Cir.
1986) (trustees acted in a reasonable and prudent manner); Struble v. New Jersey
Brewery Employees' Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325, 334 (3d Cir. 1984) (using
prudent person principle if the decision affects a class and not just one individual);
Pierce v. National Elec. Contractors Ass'n-Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Welfare Trust
Fund, 620 F.2d 589, 591 (6th Cir. 1978) (agreeing with district court opinion using the
prudent man standard to review a trustee amendment reducing extended welfare plan
coverage), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1015 (1980).
Contra Morse v. Stanley, 732 F.2d 1139, 1145 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting the prudent
person standard but when reviewing benefit claim denial uses the arbitrary and
capricious standard); Allen v. United Mine Workers 1979 Benefit Plan & Trust, 726 F.2d
352, 353-54 (7th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the prudent person standard for the arbitrary and
capricious standard when reviewing a benefit denial); Palino v. Casey, 664 F.2d 854,
857-58 (1st Cir. 1981) (same).
One reason for the failure to follow the statutory standard for review of plan
administrator action may be the trust law use of the standard also for investment
purposes. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1959) (prudent person
standard for investments); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 212, § 612, at 8 (same); 3
SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 212, § 227, at 431 (same). Courts apparently neglect
that the standard also applies to other fiduciary actions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959) (prudent person standard for administering the trust); BOGERT
& BOGERT, supra note 212, § 541, at 158 (same); 2 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note
212, § 227, at 466 (same).
398. 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 204 (Javits's introduction of bill:
"[T]he legislative approach of establishing minimum standards and safeguards for private
pensions is not only consistent with retention of the freedom of decision-making vital
to pension plans, but in furtherance of the growth and development of the private
pension system."), 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1633 (Bentsen's floor
debate: "The purpose of this legislation is not to establish an ideal pension plan, but
rather set up certain minimum standards to assure that all workers receive the pension
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406(1)(@) demands, at a minimum, the use of the same contra
proferentem principle used by all the states under their insurance
laws.399 This minimum standard certainly rejects the default principle
of accepting the trustee's interpretation. No state court rule applies a
similar standard for any similar functionary working for any similar
entity. The trustee's acceptance rule is only used in some states for




The ERISA plan interpretive rule suggested by this Article also
comports with the legislative history of ERISA. As discussed in Part II
of this Article, Congress stated that trust law had failed pre-ERISA
participants and incorrectly led to far too technical interpretations.
Further, Congress specifically stated that the application of trust law
required modification before its use on ERISA plans. Therefore,
Congress rejected the old trust law interpretive rules then prevalent for
pre-ERISA plans. Recall that the LMRA plan interpretive rule's
components are the plain meaning principle, the extrinsic evidence
principle, and the trustee's acceptance principle. This Article's plan
interpretive rule consists of the reasonable expectation principle, the
partial-extrinsic evidence principle, and the contra proferentem principle.
As the following discussion shows, each of the component elements of
the rule suggested by this Article is more in keeping with ERISA's
legislative history.
1. Against Technical Wording
ERISA's legislative history specifically mentioned, as one of the
shortcomings of the pre-ERISA plan interpretive rule, that the rule relied
too much on technical document wording: "Courts strictly interpret the
plan indenture and are reluctant to apply concepts of equitable relief or
to disregard technical document wording. Thus, under present law,
accumulated pension credits can be lost .... ,,40 Concerns about
benefits that they have earned.").
399. 2 COUCH, supra note 206, § 15:83, at 399 n.4 (citing cases from D.C. and 47
states with no cases cited for contrary position); 13 APPELMAN & APPELMAN, supra note
39, § 7401, at 197 n.1 (citing cases from D.C. and 48 states including 3 not included in
list of 47 by Couch); WDT, supra note 207, § 6.02, at 286 (applied in all jurisdictions).
400. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
401. S. REP. No. 127, supra note 18, at 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838,
4842; H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 18, at 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4643 (same).
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technical wording arise in two plan interpretive components: the plain
meaning principle and the use of extrinsic evidence to ascertain technical
meanings. These two components were used by almost all pre-ERISA
courts, whether under state law or under LMRA.
There could not be a more clear condemnation of the plain meaning
principle and use of extrinsic evidence on technical matters. Both were
applied by courts dealing with employee benefit plans. Congress clearly
intended that this would be one rule eliminated by ERISA preemption.
The only component selections consistent with this desire to eliminate
technical interpretations is the reasonable expectation principle and the
partial-extrinsic evidence principle.
2. Trust Law Failure
Congress also noted that the conventional trust law had failed during
the pre-ERISA period. ERISA's legislative history stated that conven-
tional trust law is insufficient to protect the reasonable expectations of
the participants.4 2
The only trust law interpretive rule prevalent during the pre-ERISA
era was the LMRA interpretive rule. This rule, as previously stated,
consisted of the plain meaning principle, the extrinsic evidence principle
barring extrinsic evidence in the absence of an ambiguity, and the
trustee's acceptance principle. Continuation of the pre-ERISA plan
interpretive rule in federal court opinions today only continues this
failure and clearly was not what Congress expected.
It is as if the federal judiciary were asleep when ERISA was passed.
When the offending elements of conventional trust law are eliminated,
the plan interpretive rule that remains consists of the reasonable
expectation principle, the partial-extrinsic evidence principle or anti-
extrinsic evidence principle, and the contra proferentem principle.
3. Modification of Trust Law
Congress also intended to eliminate the trustee's acceptance rule as the
default rule. ERISA's legislative history indicated that trust law rules,
one of which is the trustee's acceptance rule, were to be used under
ERISA only after modification to reflect the differences between typical
402. See supra notes 113, 129, and accompanying text.
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trusts designed for the settlor's donative purposes and employee benefit
plans, which embody property of participants.0 3
Some of the differences between trusts and employee benefit plans
include: (1) pension trusts are tax-exempt and individuals need not
invest by reference to tax consequences; (2) pension trusts need no
special provisions to balance needs of income and principal beneficiaries;
(3) pension trusts receive a continual infusion of cash from the settlor;
(4) participants are numerous; (5) participants are presumed to have
comparatively small interests in the whole and so are unlikely to invoke
legal protection for their interests, therefore participants require legal
protection; and (6) participants are presumed to be unsophisticated and
likely to be cheated unless the law provides them special help.4 °4
The purpose of the trustee's acceptance rule is to prevent consumption
of the trust estate by litigation fees. This is not a problem for an ERISA
plan. A plan is not limited in assets like a conventional trust. A
conventional trust increases through income and gains attributable to its
original capital. In contrast, a plan receives continuing infusions of new
money from subsequent employer contributions.
In addition, ERISA plans generally do not pay legal fees. If the plan
wins the lawsuit, the employer generally pays the legal fees to obtain the
income tax deduction that plans can not obtain.405 Any expense
incurred by an employer in connection with an employee benefit plan is
deductible under Internal Revenue Code section 162 for trade or business
expenses or section 212 for production of income expenses to the extent
they are ordinary and necessary.4 6 If the fiduciary has paid the legal
fees, the plan may reimburse fiduciary legal fees407 and be reimbursed
by the employer desirous of the deduction. Or the fiduciary can seek
legal fees under ERISA from the participant.403
403. See supra notes 113, 129, and accompanying text.
404. See Daniel C. Knickerbocker, Jr., Trust Law with a Difference: An Overview
of ERISA Fiduciary Responsibility, 23 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 633, 634-35 (1989).
405. See 5A RABKiN & JOHNSON, supra note 204, at 13-1073 (defined benefit plan:
company intends to pay any expenses of administering the trust); id. at 13-1511 (money
purchase plan: expenses of administering the plan may be paid by the employer); id. at
13-2072 (profit-sharing plan: company intends to pay any expenses of administering the
trust).
The plan cannot use the deduction since it ordinarily does not pay income taxes.
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 § 501(A), 26 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1988).
406. 26 C.F.R. § 1.404(a)-3(d) (1994).
407. See Firstier Bank v. Zeller, 16 F.3d 907, 913 (8th Cir. 1994) (where provided
in plan); Leigh v. Engle, 858 F.2d 361, 369 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078
(1989); see 3 ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra note 212, § 188.4, at 66-67 (trust law).
408. In a benefits-due lawsuit the court may award, in its discretion, attorney fees
to either party. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 502(g)(1), 29
U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (1988). To determine whether to award attorney fees, the circuit
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If the plan loses the lawsuit, either the plan fiduciary or employer will
be liable for costs of the unnecessary litigation. Wrongful denial of
benefits always involves a fiduciary breach.4 9 Congressional intent
was to incorporate certain trust law fiduciary standards into employee
benefit plans through ERISA section 404(a).410 Among those fiduciary
standards of trust law are duties running to the beneficiaries in the
payment of trust benefits.4" Congress clearly indicated that this trust
duty applied to employee benefit plans under ERISA.412
courts have developed a five-factor test, the greater presence of which leads to the
award: (1) the degree of the opposing parties' culpability or bad faith; (2) the ability of
the opposing parties to satisfy the fee award; (3) whether the award against a particular
party will deter other persons acting under similar circumstances; (4) whether the party
requesting the fees sought to benefit all participants and beneficiaries of the plan or to
resolve significant questions regarding ERISA; and (5) the relative merits of the parties'
positions. Gray v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 257 (1st Cir. 1986);
Lawrence v. Westerhaus, 749 F.2d 494, 496 (8th Cir. 1984); Gordon v. United States
Steel Corp., 724 F.2d 106, 109 (10th Cir. 1983); Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d
670, 673 (3d Cir. 1983); Fine v. Semet, 699 F.2d 1091, 1095 (1 1th Cir. 1983); Miles v.
New York State Teamsters Conference Pension Plan and Retirement Fund Employee
Pension Benefit Plan, 698 F.2d 593, 602 n.9 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829 (1983);
Marquardt v. North Am. Car Corp., 652 F.2d 715, 717 (7th Cir. 1981); Hummell v. S.
E. Rykoff & Co., 634 F.2d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 1980); Iron Workers Local #272 v.
Bowen, 624 F.2d 1255, 1266 (5th Cir. 1980); Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 465 (10th
Cir. 1978). Some circuits also apply the test to prevailing defendants, Carpenters S. Cal.
Admin. Corp. v. Russell, 726 F.2d 1410, 1415 (9th Cir. 1984), but others, due to the
limited resources of participants look only to factors two and five. Chicago Painters &
Decorators Pension v. Karr Bros. Inc., 755 F.2d 1285, 1292 (7th Cir. 1985); Bittner v.
Sadoff & Rudoy Indus., 728 F.2d 820, 830 (7th Cir. 1984).
409. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 152 (1985)
(concurring opinion).
410. E.g., H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 18, at 11, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 4649 ("The fiduciary responsibility section, in essence, codifies and makes applicable
to... fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts."); see
also Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1988 &
Supp. 1993).
411. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959) ("A trust ... is a
fiduciary relationship with respect to property, subjecting the person by whom the title
to the property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of
another person . . . ."); id. § 182 ("Where a trust is created to pay the income to a
beneficiary for a designated period, the trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to pay
to him .... "); RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS §§ 2, 182 (1935); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra
note 212, § 814, at 314; 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 212, § 182, at 550.
412. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 69, at 301 & n.1, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5081 & n.1 (procedures for delegating fiduciary duties include
"allocation or delegation of duties with respect to payment of benefits").
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If the plan paid the expenses, the fiduciary whose breach of fiduciary
duty caused the loss is liable to reimburse the plan for any losses to the
plan.413 If the fiduciary paid the expenses, the plan cannot reimburse
the fiduciary. Under ERISA, the fiduciary is entitled to reimbursement
only for reasonable expenses properly and actually incurred, not those
from breaches of fiduciary duties.414
However, the employer may indemnify the fiduciary. Department of
Labor regulations, however, permit indemnity agreements only to the
extent that insurance is available.4 5 ERISA permits plans to purchase
insurance for a fiduciary, if the insurer has recourse against the fiduciary
for breach of fiduciary duty.416 The employer is permitted to purchase
insurance for the fiduciary without the recourse limitation.417
Either the fiduciary or the employer, not the plan, will bear the cost
of attorney fees. This is the congressional mechanism under ERISA to
replace the function of the trustee's acceptance rule under trust law. The
trustee's acceptance rule is at best redundant for employee benefit plans.
E. Distinctions
Courts considering interpretive rules for employee benefit plans have
made three distinctions. Before ERISA's passage, courts divided
employee benefit plans into two groups: LMRA plans to which a
discretionary trust theory interpretive rule applied and the non-LMRA
plans to which a classical contract theory interpretive rule applied. More
recently, the circuit courts have divided employee benefit plans between
(1) plans providing interpretive discretion to which the discretionary trust
interpretive rule still applies, and (2) those not providing plan interpre-
tive discretion to which a contractual interpretive rule applies. Some
circuit courts further subdivide the last group between those plans with
insurance contracts to which the contraproferentem principle applies and
those plans without insurance contracts.
413. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109
(1988).
414. Id. §§ 408(c)(2), 409(a), 410(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1108(c)(2) (fiduciary
reimbursement for reasonable expenses); id. § 1109(a) (fiduciary personally liable for
breaches of fiduciary duty); id. § 1110(a) (agreement to relieve a fiduciary of fiduciary
liability is void).
415. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-4 (1990).
416. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 410(b), 29 U.S.C.
§ lll0(b) (1988).
417. Id. See generally John R. Cornell & James J. Litter, Indemnification of
Fiduciary and Employee Litigation Costs Under ERISA, 25 B.C. L. REV. 1 (1983).
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But the component parts of the ERISA plan interpretive rule suggested
by this Article make no such distinctions. The same ERISA interpretive
rule should apply to all ERISA plans.
1. LMRA Distinction
There is no reason to single out LMRA plans for a special interpretive
rule that favors the plan administrator. The LMIRA plans were what
caused Congress to adopt ERISA to prevent future union and manage-
ment malfeasance.418 Therefore, LMRA plans should be subject to an
ERISA plan interpretive rule different from the prior one.
ERISA eliminated the jurisdictional rationale behind the LMRA plan
interpretive rule.4 19 Courts no longer need it.
LMRA plans, from the participant's viewpoint, are adhesion contracts
lacking in sufficient negotiation on behalf of the participant, as much as
any other ERISA plan.420 LMRA plans should be subject to the same
reasonable expectation principle and contra proferentem principle as are
other ERISA plans.
Moreover, ERISA's preservation of prior federal law does not apply
to the LMRA plan interpretive rule because it developed as a branch of
state law.42" ' ERISA eradicated such state law.
418. See supra note 100 and accompanying text for management failures to prevent
LMRA plan fiascoes; see also supra note 99 and accompanying text for union
incompetence to avoid collectively-bargained single-employer plan fiascoes.
419. Guiles v. University of Mich. Bd. of Regents, 483 N.W.2d 637, 641 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1992) (the Supreme Court rejected the LMRA plan interpretive rule); see Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (ERISA eliminated the
jurisdictional purpose of the arbitrary and capricious standard by providing jurisdiction,
so LMRA principles do not apply to the benefits-due lawsuit).
420. See Jones v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 670 P.2d 1305, 1315 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1983) (recognizing that a plan under a collective bargaining agreement is
sufficiently similar to an insurance contract to subject it to the contra proferentem
principle).
421. Bricklayers, Masons & Plasterers Int'l Union, Local Union No. 15 v. Stuart
Plastering Co., Inc., 512 F.2d 1017, 1025 (5th Cir. 1975) (federal law impinges on
LMRA plans only to prohibit payment of moneys to union officials, otherwise state law
controls); accord Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989)
(LMRA principles have no application to the benefits-due lawsuit); see Hobbs v. Lewis,
159 F. Supp. 282, 286 (D.D.C. 1958) (first LMRA case to use arbitrary and capricious
standard, citing only federal cases decided under state law for the proposition); see also
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 §§ 514(a), (d), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(a),




There is no reason to provide a special interpretive rule that favors the
plan administrator when plan documents grant the adminstrator
discretion. Pre-ERISA courts routinely ruled plan interpretive discretion
provisions to be of no effect and proceeded to reject the trustee's
acceptance rule.4"
Even state courts using discretionary trust theory do not uniformly use
the trustee's acceptance rule, with many state courts adopting the contra
proferentem principle for the interpretive discretion situation.423 Thus,
the trustee's acceptance rule is not a well-settled rule of common law.
Nothing in the legislative history of ERISA suggests a discretion
distinction. Further, courts considering ERISA plans prior to 1989
ignored plan interpretive discretion provisions which called for the
application of the trustee's acceptance rule even in cases denying the
plan interpretive discretion.424  This action reflects an absence of a
rationale for the distinction.
The Supreme Court has yet to specify an ERISA plan interpretive rule
for the interpretive discretion situation. The Bruch decision, requiring
de novo review for the absence of interpretive discretion, dealt with a
plan not granting interpretive discretion .4' Thus, Bruch does not
necessarily require the trustee's acceptance rule.
Moreover, the discretionary grant situation typifies the situation under
which participants need ERISA's protection. ERISA recognizes
employee benefit plans as non-negotiated contracts that require
legislative intervention to insure fair provisions for participants. 42
6
Discretionary grant provisions are likely to arise in that situation where
employees lack the negotiating power to prevent them. It is the duty of
the courts to assure protection of participants' reasonable expectations
for benefits through the ERISA plan interpretive rule consisting of the
reasonable expectation principle and the contra proferentem principle.
422. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
423. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
424. See supra notes 257-62, 279-89.
425. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989). But see id. at 111
(dicta) (court guided by trust principles provide a deferential review for discretionary
grants); id. at 115 (specification of de novo review only for the absence of discretionary
grants suggests some other rule for presence of discretionary grant).
426. See supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
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3. Insurance Distinction
There is no reason to single out plans without insurance contracts for
a special interpretive rule that favors the plan administrator. The
adhesion contract nature of employee benefit plans does not depend on
the investment of the plan assets in insurance contracts, but on the
absence of an employee's negotiating power when accepting employment
at reduced salary to cover contributions to the employee benefit plan.
Plans without insurance contracts are likely to need more supervision.
Insurance companies administer numerous employee benefit plans with
large legal departments and will have more expertise in interpreting
employee benefit plans than plan administrators of a single employer's
plan.
Furthermore, insurance companies are regulated by state agencies.
ERISA leaves this regulation intact,427 so insurance companies will
have some state supervision. Employee benefit plans without those
insurance contracts will receive no such supervision.
V. CONCLUSION
When developing the federal common law of ERISA, courts cannot
choose rules willy-nilly. Judges must not draw upon rules articulated by
pre-ERISA case law or draw upon some analogy to well-accepted state
law. Instead, courts must develop common law rules that consider the
history, foundations, and policies of ERISA. In almost every case,
federal courts have yet to conduct this process. The result of this failure
has been a body of ERISA law extremely hostile to participants and the
policies Congress intended ERISA to foster.
There is some reason for hope for finally achieving justice through the
federal judiciary. This becomes evident from an examination of the
progress of the plan interpretive rule. Prior to ERISA's passage,
employee benefit law engaged in two struggles. The first dealt with the
ownership of plan property. State courts resolved this battle to recoguize
plan property as belonging to participants and began the second struggle
to develop common law rules to insure the participants eventually
427. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 514(b)(2), 29 U.S.C.
§ 514(b)(2) (1988).
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received their fair share of the plan property. Consequently, state courts,
upon ERISA's passage, were developing a plan interpretive rule using
the contra proferentem principle. These state courts' efforts did not
progress quickly enough, however, to adequately protect participants'
property. Congress passed ERISA to impose certain plan provisions to
provide that protection.
Upon ERISA's passage, the federal courts lagged behind the state
courts in the two struggles. The federal courts had not yet resolved the
first struggle; some courts still recognized ownership of plan property in
the employer. Consequently, some federal courts had developed a plan
interpretive rule accepting the plan interpretation of the trustee as agent
of the employer. After ERISA's passage, the federal courts continued
to lag behind, using ERISA's preemption to eliminate the state courts'
contra proferentem principle and imposing their trustee's acceptance
interpretive rule on all ERISA plans.
The Supreme Court redirected the federal judiciary in 1989 with
respect to the plan interpretive rule. Incrementally, the federal judiciary
began to resolve the struggles. Although seldom following the proper
principles for the development of the federal common law of ERISA, the
federal judiciary has-for a narrow sub-set of ERISA plans-developed
a plan interpretive rule fostering the policies of ERISA. The interpretive
rule uses a lay understanding principle, allows extrinsic evidence to
determine that understanding as well as resolve ambiguities, and employs
a default principle of construing the plan in favor of participants.
Unfortunately, this interpretive rule is used only by some circuits, and
only if the plan denies the plan administrator plan interpretive discretion.
Once the judiciary and participants' bar understand the foundations for
this minor success, however, they can apply the proper plan interpretive
rule to all ERISA plans and, hopefully, develop all the proper ERISA
rules for the benefits-due lawsuit.
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